AUGUST 1964

Commentary

VOLUME THIRTY-EIGHT, NUMBER TWO

THE POLITICS OF RACE

SAMUEL LUBELL on Negro Voting

DAVID DANZIG on The White Backlash

ALEXANDER M. BICKEL on The Civil Rights Act

Antitrust in America by Richard Hofstadter

EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES: Raymond Aron

THE YOKE OF THE TORAH—A MEMOIR: Mordechai Amer

BREAKTHROUGH?: David Daiches

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

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

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

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Commentary

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

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LETTERS FROM READERS

The White Liberal

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

James Baldwin, arguing in your symposium on "Liberalism and the Negro" [March], seemed to be fighting the wrong battle. His arguments against the white liberal have nothing to do with the realities of the fight for public accommodations or voter registration in the South, or with the struggle for jobs, for good education, or for decent housing which plagues the Negroes of the North.

On the Southern battlefields—in Selma, Alabama, for example—Mr. Baldwin remains a liberal: an angry, black Northern liberal who cannot be distinguished from an angry, white Northern liberal in intellectual references, speech patterns, accent, or usage. While others are fighting the real war in the South, Mr. Baldwin is like a chaplain standing behind the troops, issuing sermons to them when they are on leave from marching or from jail.

I was in Selma, Alabama two days before Mr. Baldwin was. I traveled with Dorothy I. Height, President of the National Council of Negro Women and two other ladies. Two of us were white, two were Negro. The Northern black liberal, James Baldwin, would have sneered at the efforts of the mixed team of liberal ladies who were trying to bring a little hope and a little help to that beleaguered town, and to build a bridge between the Negro and the white communities. Would a divisive tactic as suggested by Baldwin have been more useful?

Some of us were later subpoenaed to appear before the Dallas County Grand Jury. Perhaps Mr. Baldwin was too. That's the way they treat all liberals in Selma—black and white alike. They subpoena them, they jail them, they try to intimidate them whether they are named Gregory, Baldwin, or Smith.

I heard Dick Gregory say at a Freedom Rally in Selma that he wished that by the grace of God there were some way the entire Negro race could disappear overnight. "They [the whites] would go crazy hunting us . . . because they need us."

Mr. Baldwin must know that if all the white liberals disappeared overnight, the Negroes would come hunting us. We all need each other, not to hate, not to love, but to survive. . . .

(MRS.) LOUIS G. COWAN
New York City

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Having read your panel discussion, . . . I should like to say that James Baldwin speaks for me, and, I believe, for all . . . his colored brothers.

We have no desire to integrate into a burning house, "especially when the foundation is rotten." We are more interested in our acceptance within a reconstructed society. . . .

ANTHONY MOODY
New York City

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

We, of *Liberator* Magazine, were amused and interested by your symposium. We were also frightened. It seems that the "liberals" are not in contact with reality. We wonder whether you are showing the strains of racism and having to apologize for its existence. . . . We grieve for the liberals because they find themselves attached and attracted to and in love with tokenism and the select few Negroes who meet their standards. We grieve for you most particularly because we think you might be sincere but also misguided as to what the problems are.

As you continue to turn out material like that symposium, we can only hope that you are spending your evenings reading and thinking about what the real problems of our culture are. It seems that the participants in the discussion . . . were just not aware of those problems. In this connection, may we call to your attention a discussion on liberalism and the Negro, which appears in our June issue.

C. E. WILSON
Associate Editor
Liberator Magazine
New York City

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

. . . Contrary to Mr. Myrdal's assertion, economic progress is not the answer to acceptance of the

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

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

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





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Negro, although it would help. . . . Even Negroes in the highest economic circumstances have not been accepted. . . .

Nor is Mr. Hook correct in his assumption, shared by many who probably call themselves liberals, that the problem of race relations can be solved by intelligence. This is not the answer. Pure, extraordinary love of a fellow being is the answer . . . . Cold intellectuality has gotten us nowhere . . . and never will. As Mr. Baldwin and so many other Negroes so vividly realize, we are talking too much and feeling too little. . . .

JANET KEIM
Indiana, Pennsylvania

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

. . .The inability of the other panelists and the audience to understand what James Baldwin and Dr. Kenneth Clark were trying to say reflects . . . what could be called the "empathetic fallacy." That is, the white liberal thinks that the American black man is as white as he is, and hopes that the black man in his turn will think that the white American is as black as he is. Unfortunately, as Mr. Baldwin's writings consistently and passionately point out, this reciprocity does not exist. There may be some black Americans who are white, but there cannot at present, because of our mutual history, be white Americans who are black. . . . Because of the existence of this fallacy, we white liberals find it difficult to understand the hate that Baldwin talks about. It is a special kind of hate, having more to do with Buber's I-thou relationship than with anger or despising. . . .

Again and again in the discussion, Mr. Glazer, Mr. Hook, and even Gunnar Myrdal trapped themselves into being unable to admit—as all of us liberals are unable to admit—that the black American is black and the white American liberal is white. All three from their various positions fell back on the "some of my best friends. . ." defense. And the most appalling performance was by Mr. Hook, who saw signs of salvation in the fact that university communities have no black-white problems. One wonders if there would still be no problems if those same communities were suddenly to acquire a proper proportion of Negroes—enough, indeed, to threaten faculty jobs. . . .

What the white liberal refuses to recognize is that every American Negro—every single one—lives in the dirty hole into which our past has put him, no matter how rich, how intellectual, how famous, how anything. Not one of us whites ever meets a Negro without feeling that, knowing it, or being ashamed to face and admit it. And we cannot help ourselves or matters in general simply by believing that Negroes are or can be, white like us. We have not let them live with us or as we do, and we must now pay the consequences.

What can we do? Aside from hating the history we share with the American Negro, we can do nothing except what we are now doing in our various ways. Like young lovers, we can only be stumbling, awkward, and inept—and Mr. Baldwin and Dr. Clark and all black American liberals will have to suffer us and perhaps even welcome us in order to achieve, by the only means available to us, the end we and they seek—a mutual exchange of enough whiteness and blackness so that deprivation and fulfillment can flow back and forth between us without the hindrance of thought or the obstacle of ethics. . . .

SEY CHASSLER
Executive Editor
Redbook Magazine
New York City

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

In the course of the symposium, Mr. Glazer repeatedly expressed amazement that there are so few Negro principals in New York City. . . .

Surely Mr. Glazer is aware that in the not too distant past there were also very few Jewish or Italian principals. Nevertheless, children of these immigrant groups, though growing up in slums, took advantage of educational opportunities and were able to meet the standards of a Board of Examiners whose procedures were reputed to be far more inflexible than those of the present Board. As Negroes, a more recent in-migrant group, take advantage of educational opportunities in New York City, they, too, will qualify and become principals. (It should be mentioned here that the Board of Education has recently set up special courses in Negro and Puerto Rican districts to coach Negro candidates for supervisory positions in the schools.)

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Elsewhere, Mr. Glazer states that the Board of Examiners ". . . [has] tests which for a lot of reasons, Negroes find hard to pass. . . ." If these, however, are fair tests of scholarship and understanding of educational problems, surely Mr. Glazer would not condemn, nor seek to change them, in order to secure more Negro principals. I believe the merit system of selecting qualified candidates, regardless of race, color, or creed, to be an equitable one, which has generally resulted in the selection of better qualified personnel for our schools. (In all phases of the examination except the final interview, the identity of a candidate is shielded by assigning a number to his paper so that neither prejudice nor favor is possible. . . .)

As more and more qualified Negro teachers enter the New York City school system and gain experience there, more and more Negroes will eventually qualify as principals. Our children deserve the best qualified principals available. This—and this alone—should be the criterion for their selection.

JOSEPH H. AARON
President
Junior Principals Association
New York City

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Why do so-called "white liberals" feel the need to justify their attitudes toward Negroes by theorizing in the areas of sociology and economics? Could it be that their "liberalism" is based on their ignorance of what the Negro really is? Could it be that they . . . are only partially able to perceive him as a human being?

Mr. Baldwin has tried, and I fear in vain, to convey to white Americans what it means to be a Negro in this country. Every Negro in America feels, in varying degrees, the reality inherent in Mr. Baldwin's work. He tells the world what Negroes feel. Unfortunately, few of your panelists seemed to understand what he was saying. Their observations were academic and clinical, their approach reminded me of missionaries. . . .

As a self-incriminating portrait of "white liberals," I feel that the panel was a brilliant success. It revealed that the white liberal is emotionally unprepared to be liberal when confronted with straight talk about the Negro. His perspective is too narrow.

DONALD F. JOYCE
Chicago, Illinois

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To the Editor of Commentary:

The profound gap between Messrs. Baldwin and Clark and the rest of the participants . . . seemed to point up that the problem of race relations in America is not integration, but personal equality. . . . What Negroes are looking for as a group is not a middle-class house in an integrated neighborhood with a white-collar job, but rather the right to self-respect. . . . We should recall that a case was carried all the way to the Supreme Court over the right of a Negro woman to be addressed as "Miss" in an Atlanta courtroom . . .

There are major differences between the Negro experience and the Jewish or immigrant experience. One is that the Negro is not just discriminated against, but rather held in complete contempt. . . . And unlike the Jew of the Middle European ghetto whose experience his own somewhat resembles, the Negro does not have the buffer of pride in the law and the ghetto civilization . . . nor the buffer of isolation, . . . for he meets his white employers daily. . . . Before talking about civil rights, we must at least try to imagine what it would be like to grow up as a Negro. . . .

Julian S. Weitzenfeld
Farmville, Virginia

To the Editor of Commentary:

"Liberalism and the Negro" was a fascinating demonstration of how very nearly impossible it is for a Negro to make known to a white what being a black American means. (I should at this point admit to being white, which perhaps makes such a statement unforgivably presumptuous). It was staggering to witness how James Baldwin's attempt to explain the implications of being black was challenged on all sides—as if his very perceptiveness and eloquence made his experiences as a Negro raised in Harlem of questionable relevance. It was a slight relief when Kenneth Clark intervened to rescue Baldwin from the stigma of being a unique eccentric of no particular color.

The problem . . . is incredibly difficult to solve, even theoretically. If whites could somehow experience in their guts the dreads, horrors, and occasional joys of Negro life it would be hard to imagine their continuing to pretend that Negroes aren't quite human beings (a pretense white liberals can be expected to deny unanimously). But between the whites' deep-seated fear of such empathy and the Negroes' three-centuries-old tradition of dissembling in order to save their skins and their sanity, it is hard to imagine how the necessary intimacy could come about. Perhaps it happens in interracial marriages; conceivably the programs a few colleges have of sending a few white students to spend a year at Negro colleges accomplish a little along these lines. But the programs providing for groups of white and Negro families to spend Sunday afternoons in each others' homes strike me as too superficial and self-congratulatory to be worthwhile. "Education," the favorite liberal panacea, has yet to devise a way to enlighten men's guts. Even were a well-intentioned white to move to Harlem, the fact of his being white would to a large extent invalidate the experiment. And if Baldwin has any approaches to offer to the problem, the white liberals in all probability refuse to take them seriously.

(Mrs.) Louise Bram
Chicago, Illinois

To the Editor of Commentary:

I was present at your symposium . . . and somewhat disconcerted to find myself tremendously indifferent to the occasion, the major reason being that I found the participants so obviously concerned with their own style as opposed to the subject itself.

Each had come armed with his personal suppositions, but because Mr. Baldwin tended to take a subjective and highly emotional approach, and the others, a more objective and theoretical one, it seemed to me that communication among the panelists themselves became the major problem. . . . I found it unfortunate that there tended to be more speeches than listeners. . . .

Rhoda Nathans
New York City

To the Editor of Commentary:

. . . Reflecting . . . upon James Baldwin's attacks on the liberals, it struck me with a certain amount of glee (although I have only sympathy with the liberals, of whom I consider myself one) how very similar Mr. Baldwin's attitude toward whites is to that of many Jews toward Gentiles.

As a non-Jew married to a Jew, many, many evenings of my life have been spent with Jewish

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"There is a feeling that the responsible authorities are in possession of information that has not yet been given to the public. . . ."—Henry Brandon, **Saturday Review.**

"I cannot accept as proven facts the incoherent conglomeration of circumstantial evidence against him. . . . If Oswald had lived, I do not see how he could have been convicted, or the conviction upheld on appeal."
—Leo Sauvage, **The Reporter.**

"The Warren Commission must tell us if the FBI or any other government intelligence agency was in any way connected with the alleged assassin, Lee Harvey Oswald."—Harold Feldman, **The Nation.**

"As citizens the aspects of the case we should find most troubling are the ineptitudes of the Dallas police, the carelessness of the Secret Service and the arrogant above-the-fray attitude of the FBI. In a democracy there is no place for a 'secret police', however holy their reputation."—Harriet Van Horn, **N.Y. World Telegram & Sun.**

If you are one of the millions of Americans assailed by questions and doubts about the assassination of President Kennedy, you will be fascinated by the sifting of the evidence by a veteran journalist and his conclusion that Oswald—despite the official version—was not the lone assassin. You will be shocked by his biting analysis that views the case against Oswald as a tissue of improbabilities, contradictions, and outright falsifications—and Oswald as a convenient fall guy for powerful conspiratorial forces. No wonder the Warren Commission asked the author on March 6, 1964 for a copy of the typescript. You will probably read this book at one sitting and with the strongest of feelings.

"OSWALD: ASSASSIN OR FALL GUY? . . . *DOCUMENTS ITS THEORY SO METICULOUSLY THAT IT IS FRIGHTENING.*"

Kenneth L. Dixon, *N.Y. World-Telegram & Sun*, July 7, 1964.

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

Joachim Joesten, a former assistant editor for Newsweek foreign affairs department, is the author of 26 books in English and German and hundreds of newspaper and magazine articles.

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friends and acquaintances in the course of which I have been told again and again that there are certain things I cannot understand because I am not Jewish. If I do seem to understand, I am told it is because I have a "Jewish heart." This last remark is usually made in Yiddish and then kindly translated. I have also heard frequently about how devoid of color, sensitivity, and intellectuality practically all non-Jewish life is. . . .

(The foregoing is not to be taken as more profound than it seems. . . . It is merely a casual observation although I think there must be some moral to be drawn from it.)

LEES C. WAINTROOB
Highland Park, Illinois

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

I found your round-table discussion . . . quite disturbing. For all his eloquence and verbal facility, James Baldwin was unable to reach more than one white person in the audience and was totally incapable of communicating with any of the other liberal, intellectual panel members, who seemed to respond to him like old-fashioned toy horses with blinders on. This realization was especially depressing to me in that it served to highlight the utter futility of the less verbal Negro's even attempting to communicate with the white "professional liberals" in his community. In other words, if James Baldwin can't get through to them, I might just as well forget it.

(MRS.) IRBY D. HOUSTON
Hopewell, New Jersey

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Your round-table discussion . . . left me depressed on two counts. First, it reinforced my own prejudices on the subject of liberalism, a term which seems to have become a semantic trap, useless for any kind of significant discourse . . . Second, I was appalled at the apparent inability of such perceptive and able people as James Baldwin, Kenneth Clark, and Sidney Hook to communicate with each other effectively. . . .

KENNETH BIRR
Delmar, New York

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

. . . The comments made by Mr. Baldwin, Mr. Hook, and Mr. Clark about white Liberals remind me of what Jean-Paul Sartre had to say about democrats and anti-Semites: . . . To paraphrase, the democrat (liberal) tries to destroy the Jew in order to preserve the human being in him; the anti-Semite destroys the human being in order to see nothing but the Jew. The same thing is true of the attitude of a number of honest liberals toward the Negro.

ULRICH H. JENNY
Gerlafingen, Switzerland

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

The real difficulty with your symposium was that James Baldwin operates on two somewhat incompatible levels—Negro ideologue and artist—neither of them accessible to a liberal, narrowly defined.

Thus in his ideological role as the voice of "the people in the street," Mr. Baldwin perforce resorts to rhetoric . . . whereupon Sidney Hook objects to his "exaggeration," which has no place in the logical, reasonable discourse of an ideal liberal society. Nathan Glazer, on the other hand, concedes with baffled asperity that actual politics does invariably diverge from liberal theory. . . . What neither Glazer nor Hook seems to appreciate is that Baldwin's rhetoric has been the means of welding the Negro civil rights movement together. . . .

On the other hand, when Mr. Baldwin speaks of a sort of liberal "collective unconscious," a reservoir of unthinkable thoughts which makes "innocence" possible, he does so in his role as artist, not as ideologue. . . . The same is true in his answer to Lionel Abel's question about the seeming contradiction in the claim that Negroes, though grievously disadvantaged . . . lead lives that are more vivid, vital, etc., than those of the more fortunate whites. Here Mr. Baldwin's role as artist, "speaking again only for myself . . .," lets him evade the paradox. The great majority of Negroes would be only too happy to be integrated into the bland, over-privileged, other-directed, feckless world of white liberalism, but James Baldwin, because he is a writer, is determined to hold out for something better. However, strictly as a Negro leader, Mr. Baldwin cannot legitimately insist on anything beyond the standard American pie: affluence, anomie, and the rest—for example, his extremely practical "last word" in the final paragraph of the symposium. . . .

HOWARD HUBBARD
Sherborn, Massachusetts

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Jewish Survivalism

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

I wish to thank David Daiches for his perceptive review of my book, *The Meaning of Jewish History* [April], and to answer his two questions. He caught the main core of my treatise and his reaction is rewarding to me as proof of the impact of my work.

His first *caveat* relates to the nature of religion and philosophy. It is my conviction that religion, as a living experience, is a feeling both of *possession* and of *privation*. The greatness of Judaism was precisely its inclusion of the rationalistic-moral approach and of philosophic doubt within the confines of religion. This was its challenge to paganism, which either excluded the moral-rational approach, or else, as in Greece, separated it from religion. Within the Jewish faith, the two phases of religion were kept in *tension*. I do not say, balance or equilibrium, for *unbalance* resulted as often as a healthy synthesis. I maintain that my view is in consonance with the greatest expressions of the faith, but I do not claim that it was either popular, or "normative," or the "mainstream." I dispute the validity of these terms. I expounded this thesis at length in a previous book, *The Evolution of Jewish Thought*.

My challenge to intellectuals is to bring their "open-mindedness" within the social and ideological tensions of the Jewish community. Else, a disequilibrium results, and leadership reverts to the ideological time-servers, who cater to popular prejudice and to the "pooled pride" of their constituents. "Open-mindedness" is but one-half of Judaism; the other half is a firm rootedness within the tradition, in both its social and religious aspects.

As I see it, the spectral fears about "Jewish survival" are sociologically meaningless and morally unjustified. Sociologically, the Jewish community will be preserved indefinitely, as can be seen by simple mathematical calculation, even if intermarriage should reach the rate of 25 per cent, which now prevails between Catholics and Protestants, and even if *all* intermarried couples should desert the community—which, of course, is by no means the case. Morally, it is not "Jewish survival" that should be our main concern, but the creative continuity of the healthy elements in our faith, on the one hand, and the physical-spiritual well-being of Jewish individuals, on the other. "Survivalists" dare not write as if the catastrophe of the six million had never happened. The real problem is the maintenance of the tradition in a state of healthy tension, allowing for both a dynamic continuity with the past and a creative integration into the ideal society of the future. We can leave it to the masses and their servitors to provide the social cement of habits, institutions, sentiments, even of collective bias. It is for the intellectuals to provide the ferment of fresh criticism. For if the intellectuals should fail, the massive fatalities built into Jewish history by centuries of bias, both Jewish and Christian, will surely generate a deluge of hatred that will engulf all—including the deracinated intellectuals.

(RABBI) JACOB B. AGUS
Beth El Congregation
Baltimore, Maryland

MR. DAICHES *writes:*

"A firm rootedness within the tradition"—but *what* tradition, what aspect of the mutually contradictory elements that Rabbi Agus himself finds in Jewish religious history? And if Jewish tradition in the form most worth perpetuating is something available to people of humane intelligence of whatever background (and this seems to be implied by Rabbi Agus's definition of it in his book) why should mere social survival of any particular group matter? And what is a "deracinated intellectual"? Are the Jews a *race*, with an obligation to maintain a viable religion in order to insure racial survival? I agree that Jewish intellectuals should help "to provide the ferment of fresh criticism" and seek a dynamic relationship between past, present, and future; one cannot and should not write off one's past. But might not Rabbi Agus's prescription lead to new kinds of communities? Does it require the perpetual separate existence in the diaspora of the Peculiar People? Two thousand years of suffering, culminating in the catastrophe of the six million, represent an appalling price. Exactly what was it paid for?

By Any Other Name . . . .

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

As one who has long read and enjoyed the *Carolina Israelite*, I was glad to see, from his letter on Philip Roth's brilliantly argued essay ["Letters from Readers,"

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

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April], that Mr. Harry Golden is maintaining his high reputation for partial accuracy.

My grandfather's name was indeed Goldberg. My own, whatever "attempt to blend into the anonymous mass" Mr. Golden may darkly be referring to, has always been the same:

BRIAN GLANVILLE
London, England

Intermarriage

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

I would like to take exception to Marshall Sklare's assertion in his article "Intermarriage and the Jewish Future" [April] that the findings of my study of Jewish intermarriage in Iowa point to the disappearance of the Jewish communities in that state by the end of the century. My research shows that a high level of intermarriage in this state has been observed since 1910 and that it affects mainly isolated Jews in small towns and rural areas. As for the intermarriage rate in greater Washington, my research shows in considerable detail that this community—contrary to Sklare's assertion—is representative of communities of this size. His statement that "Washington's Jews [are] not . . . known for the intensity of their Jewish commitment" has no basis in the facts that were at my disposal.

It is disappointing that Dr. Sklare, who has been a long-time student of the sociology of religion, has not addressed himself to the implications of my findings for the validity of theories concerning the role of religion in contemporary American society. These theories, as formulated by Will Herberg, posit the increasing significance of the tripartite religious division among Americans and "the return of the third generation" to the religion of the grandparents.

ERICH ROSENTHAL
Queens College
Flushing, N.Y.

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

. . . Mr. Sklare is disturbed by the growing rate of intermarriage and the declining birth rate. No religion or belief has ever thrived on mere numbers. There is nothing wrong with intermarriage if the non-Jewish partner converts to Judaism. . . .

(MRS.) TIBY SHARLIN
Ames, Iowa

[*More correspondence on this will follow next month.*]

Correction

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

In your December 1963 issue of COMMENTARY an article appeared by Alan F. Westin, entitled "Anti-Communism and the Corporations," one part of which read as follows:

> . . . . Looking first at in-plant programs, such a Birchite course for employees is held at the Coleman Corporation in Wichita, Kansas ("the nation's largest manufacturers of gasoline lanterns and stoves"), whose president, Sheldon Coleman, is a leading patron of the Birch Society in his state. In the company's auditorium, films of speeches by Birch Society founder Robert Welch are shown, and company executives deliver lectures embodying Birch doctrines about the menace of Communism in America today.

The above statement is in error. The true facts are that I am not a member of the John Birch Society and have never been a member. I have never sponsored even one in-plant Birch propaganda program.

The Coleman Company has maintained for many years, as a public service, two meeting rooms that can be used and have been used by hundreds of Wichita organizations of every kind and description.

It is my understanding that there was one Birch Society meeting scheduled and held in one of these rooms. I did not attend the meeting and certainly in no way sponsored it.

SHELDON COLEMAN
President
The Coleman Company
Wichita, Kansas

N. B.

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

We were very pleased to see George Lichtheim's reference to *The Challenge of Modernization* by I. R. Sinai in his article "The Cold War in Perspective" [June]. May we draw your readers' attention to the fact that we have just published this work in this country.

LORNA SCOTT
W. W. Norton & Company
New York City

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

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—The new edition of the book Franny Glass had a nervous breakdown over, "The Way of a Pilgrim," and why one publisher discontinued publication of the book.

—Buckminster Fuller's definition of man.

—Three new writers with talent.

—The arrival at Simon & Schuster of "a big book . . . very, very important," Charles Chaplin's long-awaited autobiography.

—The farmer, the clerk, and the electrician who believe that they are Jesus Christ. (They live in the back wards of the state mental hospital at Ypsilanti, Mich.)

—Dag Hammarskjold's posthumously published diary, to be issued in America in October.

—What Stravinsky thinks of Disney.

—What Allen Welsh Dulles could reveal about the C.I.A.

—The increasing interplay between crowds and power, perhaps the most important social phenomenon of the 20th Century.

—The sudden popularity of three books by Dr. Immanuel Velikovsky, who holds the overpoweringly unorthodox theory that the Earth has undergone repeated catastrophes that were not miraculous interventions in the order of nature but, quite to the contrary, natural phenomena.

—Availability of an invaluable book for students of printing history.

—The billingsgate (plus high praise) that greeted publication in Ecuador in 1964 of "The Villagers."

—Mrs. JFK, who, writes Murray Kempton, used to convey at a campaign meeting the effect of a Florentine madonna dropped into a Jack Levine painting.

—A. J. Liebling's observation that "the country's present supply of foreign news depends largely on how best a number of drygoods merchants in New York think they can sell underwear."

—Zohra Lampert. "Now I feel that I can make myself go. Because I want to."

—The man President Johnson identified as "Lady Bird's boy friend."

—The first radio commercial. (It ran 10 minutes.)

—The felicitous coincidence that resulted in a vivid picture of Toscanini.

—What the Union Jack, Shackle, and Blue Eagle mean in U.S. history.

—Dostoevsky, first editor of Time.

—Steinbeck in Stockholm.

—Balanchine, the cat's meow.

—An outstanding work of popular history, "The Age of Napoleon."

—How to be famous.

—The book Peter Blake wrote in fury, though not, he trusts, in blind fury.

—Why Lillian Ross' fans are terribly excited.

—Edward Lewis Wallant's fourth and, unfortunately, last book, "The Children at the Gate."

—Presidential power and responsibility.

—The important event in the world of literature that has come from Wales' heron-priested shores.

—The two things that excite us to love a woman and who embodies these ideals.

—Manhattan's historical buildings.

—The changing social season in America.

—How to go about writing a book.

—A letter from Lenin.

—A view of America by an old friend, Gunnar Myrdal.

—Dr. Strangelove, "The Fail-Safe Fallacy," and "City of Night," which reports on people, to quote one critic, who "have gone beyond the fail-safe point."

—"100 Negroes Shot, Burned, Clubbed to Death in E. St. Louis Race War."

—America's first woman president.

—The questions that, consciously or unconsciously, plague the most talented American-Jewish writers and their sympathetic readers. "All That Glistens Is Gold, Malamud, etc."

—What Shakespeare was doing at 10 in the morning.

—Why you can now turn to the pages of Samuel Richardson with a new awareness of the internal struggles of Richardson's characters and the meaning and structure they give to his novels.

—The importance of being a privateer.

—Is stupidity failure? Is the egghead really abused as the stupid are? Do schools create stupidity?

—The big best-seller, "The Martyred," rejected by six publishers before a seventh bought it.

—"God Almighty, what a cool book! This baby is red hot." (Some of the praise for Elliott Baker's "A Fine Madness.")

—What causes people to lose their jobs.

—The performance of Verdi's Requiem in a German concentration camp. (After the performance, the entire cast was dispatched to death chambers.)

—The Queen was dedicated to culture.

—The most distinguished books in 1963.

—Why a Christian can never be a fatalist.

—The 50 different jobs in 24 separate categories that an author had in search of experience.

—How it was growing up in the Cherokee strip.

—A popular I.Q. test that hasn't been revised since 1928. College deans who work on the side as multiple-choice test salesmen.

—The Grand Shrine of Ise in Iseshi that is pulled down every 20 years and an exact copy built in its place.

—What Joseph P. Kennedy, George Santayana, and Ralph Waldo Emerson have in common.

—13 profiles of notable suicides.

—To the vector belong the spoils.

—Why Theresa Morse isn't afraid of a wolfing guest.

—"It was only luck that Oswald didn't order his rifle from an ad in our official publication."

—Why George Braziller, Inc., opened up its Spring list.

—The rude assignment of The Enemy.

—Children and mental health.

—Why anyone should translate Froissart.

—They'll tell you one good commintern deserves another.

—The Nixons once played the romantic leads in an amateur production of The Dark Tower.

—A travel guide to Europe for adult, knowing sophisticates only.

—The unquenchable desire for sweeping social change, from Plato to Mao Tse-tung.

—Do the countervailing force of Big Labor and Big Government effectively offset the power of Big Business.

—Papa and Cozzens.

—Mangrove Town, where the action is.

—Hope for the extreme schizophrenic.

—"I have assumed that the slaves were merely ordinary human beings, that innately Negroes are, after all, only white men with black skins, nothing more, nothing less."

—Go West, investor, go West.

—"There are too many Americans!"

—"After the Fall," which might not have been published and produced if it had not been written by Arthur Miller.

—Woodrow Wilson, who created segregation in the public buildings of Washington, D. C.

—A world with 150,000,000,000 people by 3964.

—A life devoted to racial equality, Mary Bethune.

—The college girl: "She's a jolly good fellow."

—At least 14,789,452 Americans have broken the law.

—Grist about J. S. Mill.

—The chip off the gyppo logger.

—All Russians love to eat.

—The contribution of Southern Illinois University Press to man's knowledge.

—Mud sculpture, a disappearing art.

—Was it Southampton? Was it Pembroke?

—The return of Sneed Martin, Larson E. Whipsnade, Chester Snavely, A. Pismo, Clam, J. Pinkerton Snoopington, Mahatma Kane Jeeves.

—"So brilliant is William Melvin Kelley's first novel that one must consider Mr. Kelley for tentative future placement among the paragons of American letters."

—The sameness to the co-ed of the CCNY males: "They're all so Bronxy middle-class Jewish—even the Negro boys tend to be Bronxy middle-class Jewish."

—Historic racing cars, 1907-1960.

—How the potato chip and the zipper got their names.

—Delphine Seyrig, Gregory Corso, and Allen Ginsberg.

—James Gould Cozzens, Jerome Robbins, and Eugene Boe.

—The loveliest dust jacket of the year.

—The similarity in Dr. Strangelove and Terry Southern's "Candy."

—"The Junkie Priest," "Croiset the Clairvoyant," and "Innovation in Education."

—The Deputy expects violence.

—"I'm rather amazed that someone hasn't brought up the question of Lee Harvey Oswald as a potential Christ."

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THE NEGRO & THE DEMOCRATIC COALITION

SAMUEL LUBELL

OF THE KEY elements in the American electorate, Negroes have consistently been the most loyal of voters. Over the past half century, when major shifts of power have occurred from one party to another, Negroes have generally lagged one election behind the rest of the nation. Thus, they broke from their Republican allegiance and went for Franklin Roosevelt in 1936, not 1932; and they swung for Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1956, not 1952. Moreover, when control of cities like Philadelphia, Chicago, Pittsburgh, and New York has changed, Negroes have usually been the last to forsake the losing party.

This record of party loyalty contrasts quite sharply with the much-publicized political strategy of Negro leaders, of trying to hold the balance of power in Presidential elections by keeping the Negro voter independent of both Democrats and Republicans and ready to shift to whichever bids highest in terms of action on civil rights. In essence, this strategy assumes that the issue of civil rights is the one overriding consideration that governs Negro political thinking. Actually, however, although racial feeling has come to dominate the voting of Negroes in the South, the story of the Negro in Northern politics revolves around his slow acquisition of other than racial interests. It was the development of these other interests—such as the attractions of the big city machine and the economic appeal of the New Deal—that broke the Negro's traditional Republicanism in the first place and moved him into the Democratic party, despite its being the party of his hated political foe, the white Southerner. For the immediate future, the important fact of Negro political life remains the solidarity with which he has dug into the Democratic party. This solidarity, however, is not an unmixed blessing for the Democrats. While it yields them a plurality of a million or more votes in a Presidential contest, it has also helped bring about an upheaval in the voting of whites in the South and may do so in the North as well.

* * *

THAT NEGROES should now be so deeply entrenched in the Democratic party is all the more astonishing when one recalls how intense was their loyalty to the party of Abraham Lincoln and emancipation. After the Civil War, most Negroes were raised to agree with Frederick Douglass, the ex-slave and first recognized Negro leader, who declared: "I would as soon go to hell as vote Democratic." But as Negroes moved North, they soon acquired a second loyalty—to the political machine in the city where they lived. Indeed, in some cities, like New York, Negroes developed the practice of voting for the Democrats in local elections and for the Republicans in Presidential contests. This same split loyalty persisted into the New Deal years when, as in Philadelphia, Negroes continued to vote with the Republican machine in local elections long after they had turned Democratic in Presidential voting.

The Negro's dependence on the political machine has lasted to this day. Possibly because of continued migration, sizable numbers of Negroes need the services traditionally performed by the machines. In the 1920's and early 1930's, there were baskets before Christmas or coalbins to be filled; there was also help in getting out of legal scrapes, in raising bail, or in finding jobs. In more recent years, the big city machine has offered assistance in getting onto the relief or welfare rolls, or into public housing projects.

How strong was the pull of the machine upon the early Negro migrants from the South could be seen in New York City, where Tammany Hall managed to win the Negroes over despite an impressive pro-slavery reputation. Before the Civil War, Tammany henchmen often broke up abolitionist meetings. In 1860, Mayor Fernando Wood used gangs of Tammany repeaters to sweep New York City for Stephen Douglas, with 62,611 votes to Lincoln's 33,311. When it seemed certain the South would secede, Mayor Wood actually proposed that New York also secede from the United States and establish itself as

---

SAMUEL LUBELL—whose syndicated column, "The People Speak," appears in over one hundred newspapers—is the author of *The Future of American Politics, Revolution in World Trade,* and *Revolt of the Moderates.* The present essay has been adapted from his new book *White and Black: Test of a Nation,* which is being published this month by Harper & Row.

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an independent city-state so that it could continue to trade with the South. Even as late as 1915, fewer than 1,000 Negroes were enrolled as Democrats in the whole city. Yet by 1920, the exodus from the South had swelled New York's Negro population to over 150,000, and the bulk of the newcomers tended to vote Democratic in local elections. By 1930, when New York's Negro population stood at 327,000, only three of the twenty-two political clubs in the city were still Republican.

This alliance of the Negro with the corrupt political bosses dismayed white reformers, but not Negro leaders. In 1925, in an article for the *Crisis,* W. E. B. Du Bois defended Ferdinand Q. Morton, the Democratic boss of Harlem. Before Morton became the leader of Black Tammany, Du Bois argued, there had not been a single Negro on the New York City police force, nor any Negro representatives in the legislative branches of the state or city; now, however, the city was employing "fifty or more policemen, hundreds of Negro clerks, stenographers, typists, investigators, parole officers, court attendants. One Negro is an alderman; the state legislature includes a Negro." Morton, Du Bois conceded, "does not attempt to stop all gambling, bootlegging, and prostitution in Harlem. But he does limit these things and protects those who wish to be decent and he has helped make Harlem a far better residence quarter than it used to be."

Similarly, when in 1928 the Thompson machine in Chicago sent Oscar De Priest to Washington as the first Northern Negro congressman, Du Bois acknowledged "with bowed head" that it would have been nicer if De Priest stood for virtue. But, said Du Bois, if he stood for virtue, he would never have been elected, since the only organized interest that would support a Negro for Congress was allied with the rule of crime.

The Negro political advance was more rapid in Chicago than in any other city. In part this could be credited to segregation: the fact that virtually all of Chicago's Negroes were crowded into one compact residential area made them the dominant voting force in the city's First Congressional District. In Chicago, as well, the Republican party was torn by factional strife. As "Big Bill" Thompson was to demonstrate, a solid Negro vote could be decisive in winning the GOP nomination for mayor. Thompson, whose three terms as mayor have been called among the "worst" in Chicago history, was a showman politician—barkers would entice passers-by into his rallies by shouting "See Big Bill in Person" —and he played heavily to the ethnic galleries. German-Americans then constituted the largest single immigrant bloc in Chicago, and Thompson appealed for their votes by opposing America's entry into World War I. He also exploited Irish hatred of England through such antics as accusing the King of England of wanting George Washington's photograph removed from Chicago textbooks.

Still, neither of these performances had the sustained effectiveness of his bid for Negro support. Thompson had started in politics as a "reformer" alderman from the Second Ward—then, as now, the main area of Negro residence in Chicago. The first measure he introduced into the City Council called for a $1,200 appropriation to build a public playground—Chicago's first—in the Negro part of his ward. He promised Negroes, "I'll give your people jobs." He told them, "if any of you want to shoot craps go ahead and do it. When I'm mayor the police will have something better to do than break up a little friendly crap game." As mayor, Thompson banned the showing of *The Birth of a Nation,* which glorified the Ku Klux Klan. He passed out so many jobs to Negroes that his opponents often referred to City Hall as "Uncle Tom's Cabin." The Negro voters responded to this political courtship with the affection of a long-neglected spinster. In the 1927 Republican primary, the Second Ward gave Thompson a swooning 95 per cent of its vote; in the 1931 primary, 91 per cent of its vote. But by 1931, most of Chicago had wearied of Big Bill and his alliance with the Al Capone mob. He got only 40 per cent of the total vote in the 1931 election, even though more than 80 per cent of the Negroes in the Second and Third Wards remained loyal to him.

By far the most impressive demonstration of Negro party loyalty, however, came in the 1932 Presidential election. No other voting group in the nation had been hit harder by unemployment; also, during much of his administration Herbert Hoover had been widely criticized by Negro newspapers and Negro leaders. Nevertheless, Negroes defected in smaller numbers in the 1932 election than did any other group of Republican voters. In both Chicago and Cleveland, where nearly a third of all Negro males were jobless, Hoover drew more than three-fourths of the vote in the heaviest Negro wards; in Philadelphia, where more than a fourth of the Negro workers were out of work, the colored wards gave him 70 per cent of their vote. In Detroit's three Negro wards, Republican loyalty was thinned, with Hoover squeezing out only a bare majority. He also lost Harlem's two assembly districts and Pittsburgh's "Hill" wards by narrow margins.

In the nation as a whole, the really big Negro political break came in 1936, when the Republicans captured only 19 per cent of the Negro wards in New York, 25 per cent in Detroit, 17 per cent in Pittsburgh, 34 per cent in Philadelphia, 38 per cent in Cleveland, and 51 per cent in Chicago. At the time, observers credited

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this astonishing political conversion to work relief provided by the creation of WPA, which not only employed millions of Negroes, but also served as an economic floor for the whole Negro community. And indeed, rarely has any single government action so suddenly lifted the economic bargaining power of a whole race. As long as a Negro could go on WPA, he was not forced to accept work at any wage that might be offered him.

But the impact of the New Deal on the Negroes extended far beyond WPA. Thus, the CCC Camps drew something like 200,000 Negroes off the city streets, 30,000 of them living in integrated camps; PWA funds were allocated to build housing, schools, and hospitals for Negroes; and the swelling rosters of government employees included a record number of Negro appointees.

More significant, perhaps, than the increase in the number of Negro appointees was the change in the quality of this patronage. Under Republican Presidents a handful of federal posts had been reserved by tradition for Negroes. Invariably these positions—the recorder of deeds in Washington, D.C., and the register of the Treasury, or as envoys to Haiti, Liberia, and other parts of Africa—were far removed from any concern with domestic Negro problems. During the first few New Deal years, however, 55 Negroes were named to government posts, and by 1940 the number had risen to more than 100. These government appointees helped generate a sense of identification with the Democratic party among younger Negroes then in high school and college. An even more dramatic lift to Negro aspirations was provided by Eleanor Roosevelt, the first President's wife to demonstrate a warm, personal interest in Negroes. (During the 1936 campaign, the Negro Division of the Democratic party distributed a million photographs of Mrs. Roosevelt talking with Negro professors at Howard University.)

Impressive as was each of these actions, they were far less important than the truly revolutionary change Roosevelt effected in bringing the Negro into the newly formed New Deal coalition of big city voters, which established the Democrats as the normal majority party in the country. Before the New Deal, the nation's workers had been divided by racial, religious, and nationality differences. To all these elements once so hostile to each other, Roosevelt imparted a common sense of economic class consciousness. As a result, in every Presidential election from 1936 on, the voting in all our Northern cities would stratify sharply along economic lines. The lower the income in any neighborhood, the heavier the Democratic vote. As one climbed the rungs of the economic ladder, Republican strength would rise proportionately.

Three appeals cemented the Negro into the New Deal coalition: his stake in government programs; his attachment to the big machines which in city after city came under Democratic control; and the newly formed CIO, to which Negroes were admitted on the same basis as white workers.

OF THESE, the CIO was probably the most crucial, symbolizing as it did the most revolutionary change in Negro life touched off by the New Deal. Since the days of slavery, white and Negro workers had looked on each other as hated economic rivals. During the Populist agitation in the South, Tom Watson had tried to unite the poor white and poor black farmers, but when this effort failed he turned to "nigger baiting." In the Northern industrial cities as well, the AFL unions had traditionally barred Negroes from membership and Negroes had responded by serving as strikebreakers. In the CIO unions, however, the Negro was at last able to find a basis of common interest with white persons of the same economic class. Whether white or black, workers on the same job would draw identical pay and be governed by the same seniority rules.

It was no accident that the determination to write a new page in labor history proved strongest in the "open shop" industries like steel, meat packing, rubber, and automobiles. These were the industries in which sizable numbers of Negroes were already employed, and in which racial antagonisms had to be suppressed if a successful union was to be formed. The steel strike of 1919, for example, had been broken by the importation of nearly 30,000 Negro strikebreakers. Similarly, when the Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butchers tried to organize the meat packing industry, the employers set up a rival Negro union, the American Unity Labor Union, which declared: "This union does not believe in strikes. We believe all differences between laborers and capitalists can be arbitrated. Strike is our last motive, if any at all." By contrast, relatively few Northern Negroes had been able to break into crafts like carpentering and plumbing. Such unions faced no need to admit Negroes, for they could maintain a monopoly control of available jobs without changing their racial policies.

The fact that Negro workers were being accepted as the equals of white unionists fired the imaginations not only of the Negro masses but of their leaders. Many of them, like Walter White, wrote and talked of organized labor with evangelistic fervor as bearing the promise of complete racial and economic emancipation. Negro intellectuals, who had generally been pro-business during the 1920's, swung and tied their hopes for the future to the new Negro-labor-liberal alliance.

This exhilarating sense of being part of the majority coalition was strengthened by the ex-

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pansion of employment during World War II. Even after Hitler overran France, large numbers of Negroes still remained unemployed. But in 1942, after A. Philip Randolph had pressured Roosevelt into creating the Fair Employment Practices Commission, the color line began to give. Between 1940 and 1944, more than a million Negroes, many fresh off the farms in the South, found new jobs in industry. Some were employed in non-defense jobs deserted by white workers; other Negroes were admitted into the construction trades in government plants; still others broke into aircraft and defense work in general. Roughly 250,000 migrated to the Pacific coast. In four to five years, as Robert Weaver calculated, the number of Negroes in skilled jobs doubled. Many entered industries in which few if any Negroes had worked before. Those few war years, in fact, brought more diversification of Negro occupations than had occurred in the whole of the seventy-five preceding years.

WITH THE END of World War II, the political conversion of the Negro was all but completed. From a strikebreaker during the 1920's he had been transformed into the most faithful of union members; from the staunchest of Republicans into the most loyal of Democrats. In 1948, with the Dixiecrats bolting in the South, Negroes rallied behind Harry Truman with an even heavier percentage of their vote than they had given Franklin Roosevelt. Four years later, when nearly every other element in the Democratic coalition was breaking for Eisenhower, Negroes racked up a still larger percentage for Adlai Stevenson than they had for Truman, even though the selection of a Southerner, Senator John Sparkman of Alabama, as Stevenson's Vice-Presidential running mate irritated most Negro leaders. After the 1952 convention was over, Walter White wrote an article for *Look* magazine headlined "Win Our Vote or Lose," in which he argued that the Negro vote was still undecided and would be won over by the position taken by the candidates on civil rights during the campaign.

Actually there never was any indecision among Negro voters. Immediately after the conventions I started across the country interviewing voters on the election. The Negroes I interviewed in Los Angeles during early August were as firm in their intention to vote Democratic as were those I talked with in Harlem two months later. White's thesis of an independent Negro vote was being pushed as a bargaining argument in the hope that Stevenson and Eisenhower would compete against each other with promises of civil rights action. But my own interviews indicated that the Negro's attachment to the Democratic party was primarily economic, with civil rights exerting only a secondary appeal.

"I've been thinking of voting for Eisenhower," said one twenty-two-year-old Negro in Detroit, "but every time I mention it, my father and mother start talking of the terrible time they had in the depression. Listening to them makes you want to vote Democratic." In St. Louis, asked how he felt about a Southerner being on the ticket as Vice-President, a Negro laborer replied, "That don't mean anything. I'm a working man. How can I vote anything but Democratic?" The wife of a Pittsburgh redcap pointed out: "We've been able to buy our own home and move up out of the Hill [a slum district] under the Democrats. Why would we want to change?"

The Democratic loyalty expressed in these interviews, it is worth noting, extended beyond the Negro's interest as a labor union member. The comments also showed a general gratitude for economic gains and a preference for heavier government spending. "It's easier to earn a buck under the Democrats," said one Los Angeles musician. "When the Republicans get in, the money goes somewhere. The big fellows must hold onto it."

After Eisenhower sent troops into Little Rock, a sizable number of Negroes did begin to think that the Republicans might push civil rights more energetically than the Democrats. In a 1957 survey, when Negroes were asked which party was best for them on civil rights, a majority picked the Republicans. But these same Negroes named the Democrats as "the best party for jobs" by a 3 and 4 to 1 margin.

The Roosevelt and postwar years also brought tightened Democratic control of the larger cities. In Chicago, gratitude for the patronage which Thompson had extended remained so strong that the Second Ward did not give Roosevelt a majority until 1944, and William Dawson, the Negro boss, was not able to solidify his control until 1948. In Philadelphia, even while giving Roosevelt two-thirds of their votes, the predominantly Negro wards continued to turn in Republican majorities in elections for mayor. Not until the Democrats swept City Hall in 1955 did this gap between local and Presidential voting disappear. In New York City, the LaGuardia administration gained strong support in the Negro areas, but after his defeat in 1945, the Democratic hold on the Negro vote solidified.

The high Democratic percentages being cast by the Negroes do not mean that they are politically satisfied. However, these percentages do indicate that the bulk of Negroes remain emotionally committed to the Democratic party as the one that will best advance their interests. Put another way, Negro discontents do not seem to be operating to drive the Negroes out of the Democratic party or to break free of the big city machines or out of the labor unions. (In 1958 when right-to-work proposals were voted on in four states—Ohio, California, Colorado, and Kansas—Negroes went 9 to 1 against them, by far the heaviest opposition shown by any

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worker group.) For the Democratic coalition the political danger posed by the swelling Negro vote is not that Negroes will bolt to the Republicans, but rather that Negro demands may drive white Democratic voters out. Already the conflicts stirred in the North during the past few years over housing, jobs, and schools have weakened the ties that have bound the elements in the Democratic coalition together. In both the North and the South, shortly before the assassination of Kennedy, many normally Democratic voters were blaming him for the demands being pressed by the Negroes and talked of switching to the Republicans in 1964. (In Philadelphia, for example, on the eve of the 1963 election for mayor, my interviews showed that a fifth of the voters who had backed Kennedy in 1960 said they would vote against him in 1964.)

Nearly all this political anger died down after the assassination. Racial angers persisted, but no one pointed them at the new President. On the contrary: while to loyal Kennedy supporters the new President's opening speech to Congress was assurance that "he'll hold to the liberal line," to other voters the significant symbol was Johnson's being "a Southerner"—which to them meant, "he's bound to be more conservative" than Kennedy had been. And while Negroes were delighted with the President's pledge to fight for Kennedy's civil rights bill, most Southerners dismissed the pledge as "something Johnson had to say" and felt "he's bound to go slower" on civil rights.

THUS, the early voter reaction to Johnson left little doubt that he would be able to bring at least temporary unity to the Democratic party. Throughout the South, which had been rumbling with political fury against the Kennedy brothers, there was an immediate upsurge of enthusiasm. "He sounds like one of us!" exclaimed a limousine driver in Greensboro, N.C. "When Johnson quotes from the Bible I know he's like the people I was raised with," an airport attendant at Raleigh remarked. Other voters explained their shift to Johnson by saying, "I went against Kennedy because he was a Catholic. But I'm still a Democrat."

But probably the key reason for Johnson's popularity in the South was the almost universal expectation that "he won't push as hard" as Kennedy did on civil rights. A factory foreman in Birmingham summed up the feeling of much of the South when he remarked, "That was a rotten way for Kennedy to go, but I'll be frank with you, I think Johnson will be a big improvement. He understands the South." With this feeling, however, went a greater readiness to accept a civil rights program from Johnson than would have been the case with Kennedy. In the first few weeks after Kennedy's death, seven of every ten Southerners interviewed thought "some law has to be passed." ("I'd let Johnson have it," said one Louisiana builder, "if I thought he wouldn't enforce it.")

This readiness of Southerners to accept moderate civil rights legislation is not as surprising as it may seem. Actually, only a minority of Southerners, mainly in Mississippi and Alabama, believe desegregation can be halted completely. Their best hope has been to slow down the process. "We'll get it no matter who is President," was the commonly voiced feeling. "Maybe Johnson will do as well for us as anyone could."

Nevertheless, that Southern resistance could flare up again quite quickly was made clear by the responses given me to the question: "What if Robert Kennedy is named for Vice-President with Johnson?" More than a third of the Johnson supporters declared that they would vote against him if Bobby Kennedy were on the ticket. Remarks like these were typical:

"Running Bobby Kennedy would be hitting the South below the belt."

"I'll never take a chance on a Kennedy becoming President again."

"He's not for the white man."

In short, though agreement on civil rights seemed likely under Johnson, it could hardly prove more than a shaky truce, constantly in danger of being upset. As the past has shown, each new piece of civil rights legislation and each new court decision only sets the stage for a new, bitter struggle over enforcement. Johnson is thus likely to find himself facing the same critical test that confronted both Kennedy and Eisenhower: should he use federal troops to enforce integration in the South? Both Kennedy and Eisenhower suffered sharp drops in popularity in the South when they called out the troops, and in the future the political reaction could prove even more explosive. The new uncertainty is how white Northerners may react, particularly if Negro demonstrations and disturbances in the North coincide with violence in the South.

To put this another way, Negro militancy is transforming the civil rights struggle from what has been a North-South conflict into what could become a conflict of whites against Negroes across the whole nation. By opening, as they did, a second front in the North, the Negro militants exposed themselves to the counterattack of a Southern appeal for alliance with Northern whites who might be alienated by Negro demands. That this is a serious threat can be seen in the vote rolled up by Alabama's Governor Wallace in the 1964 Presidential primaries in Maryland, Indiana, and Wisconsin.

The full political effects of this change in the civil rights struggle may take years to register, but they clearly will add to the stresses and strains within the Democratic party. To keep the Democratic coalition from splitting will require strenuous political exertions—exertions which will not be confined to racial matters.

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In fact, the more difficult it becomes to quiet racial tensions, the more attention Democratic leaders are likely to give to bolstering the other ties that hold the Democratic following together.

First, increased recognition will probably be accorded the Negro in the big city machines. In New York City, for instance, some Democratic leaders are already making plans to turn their political clubhouses into "job agencies" for Negroes who would be employed on city projects. Other patronage favors will be extended to strengthen the hands of the faithful Negro Democrats against the more militant Negroes outside the machines. Of course, this strategy could backfire. In Philadelphia the new job preferences given Negroes angered even the staunchest party workers in white neighborhoods. In the 1959 mayoralty contest, there were 33 precincts which voted 90 per cent Democratic; in the 1963 mayoralty, the Negro precincts in this group voted 85 per cent Democratic, but the white precincts broke to only 65 per cent.

A second result of the struggle to keep the Democratic coalition from flying apart is likely to be an intensification of the pressures for nominating a Catholic as Vice-President, or as President, once Johnson is out of the running. East of the Mississippi, most Northern cities are fairly heavily Catholic and it is in the Catholic neighborhoods that the strongest resentments against Negroes are to be found. Hence, one probable consideration in the naming of the Democratic candidates will be the idea that a Catholic on the ticket might cut down any potential Democratic defection among white voters over racial issues.

Third, heavy reliance will be placed on actions designed to enhance the economic appeal of the Democratic party. My own interviewing has often disclosed voters who threatened to bolt the Democratic party in racial anger, but who would reverse themselves when asked, "What if the President came out strong for medical care for older people under social security?"

Still, there is no simple formula for reconciling the economic interests of all the Democratic voting elements. Negroes on the whole, being so dependent on government assistance, constitute a powerful force for government spending. But other Democratic voting elements are more divided. They tend to favor government spending to the level where it holds up employment, but are inclined to balk if it means higher taxes or rising prices. These differences over spending could prove a source of Democratic weakness, particularly in state and local politics. During recent years, state and local taxes have risen drastically as the states and cities have been forced to provide schools, hospitals, and other services for a rising and shifting population. One consequence is that taxpayer revolts have broken out in many communities—which helps explain why so many governors have been defeated for re-election in recent campaigns. To aggravate the situation, the financial squeeze in many localities will be screwed tighter in the hunt for extra funds to improve the schooling of Negroes and to ease their other problems. Thus for some years the pattern of political conflict promises to be much stormier at the local and state levels than at the Presidential level.

Being nationwide in its impact, the racial crisis requires national policies to equalize the treatment of the Negro in different parts of the country. At present, however, the Democratic majority seems unable to devise a program of effective racial unification for the nation. Perhaps the most that can be expected from a Democratic President under these circumstances is a remarkable performance in political acrobatics. At times it will appear that the conflicting elements and pressures within the party are certain to topple him. And yet, in coalition politics the party leader beset on all sides is often in a better position than if under pressure from only one direction. Conflicting pressures help define the range of bargaining that is possible, allowing the party leader to point out to each voting element that he can go only so far before he must compromise.

EVEN so, the tug of these conflicting demands could at some point prove too violent, beyond compromise—particularly if the right Republican candidate, with the right program, came along. Shortly before President Kennedy's assassination, in a talk at Oberlin College, I ventured the judgment that the Republican party was on the verge of making a historic, all-out bid for the political support of the South. Johnson's accession has dimmed the lure of this Southern adventure, but the forces moving the Republicans to court the South remain quite strong. For these forces are not simply those that have been stirred by the uproar over civil rights: long-building influences are also at work.

The basic fact is that of all parts of the nation, the South has been the one where the Republicans have shown the most consistent gains in political strength since the end of World War II. Between 1950 and 1962, for example, the Republicans increased their Southern seats in Congress from two to eleven. In Presidential elections from 1932 through 1948, the GOP drew only a sixth to a fourth of the South's vote, but Eisenhower drew 37 per cent in 1952 and 49 per cent in 1956, and Nixon in 1960 drew 46.

The consistency of this Republican showing in the South is worth some emphasis. In 1952 Eisenhower's victory was popularly attributed to his personality and war-hero fame. Yet when the election returns are analyzed precinct by precinct and county by county, two striking facts emerge: first, in all three elections—1952, 1956, and 1960—the Republican vote centered in much the same counties and precincts. Second, the

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voting followed the same pattern that prevails outside of the South.

Thus, it was in the cities of the South that Eisenhower and Nixon found their strongest support: of the South's 47 largest cities, Nixon carried 30 and drew above 40 per cent in the remaining 17. In all these cities it was always the better-income neighborhoods that gave Eisenhower and Nixon their heaviest vote. A selected group of Southern silk stocking precincts that I have followed through every election since 1948 voted 66 per cent for Nixon, as compared with 36 per cent for a similar group of labor precincts. In the rural counties the Eisenhower-Nixon strength was concentrated mainly in the towns, among the Main Street merchants. The farmers themselves tended to stick with the Democrats.

In both the Southern cities and in the countryside, then, the Republican gains of recent years have really been a projection of the tendency toward economic voting which started with the New Deal. Being bound to a Democratic tradition, the South was slower to realign than the rest of the nation. Although the beginnings of this new voting cleavage on income lines showed up faintly in 1944 and 1948, it did not really break through until 1952. In this respect, the historic significance of the Eisenhower victories will be found in the fact that they initiated the transformation of the Republicans into a truly national party with strength in every part of the country. The Republican showing in the South will rise and fall from one Presidential election to the next, but the habit of voting in terms of economic interests will persist and may even become more pronounced if the trends toward a managed economy intensify.

The 1962 elections revealed a tendency for this economic voting to be projected into state and Congressional elections as well. The eleven Congressional seats won by the GOP in 1962 were all districts that Eisenhower had carried in 1952 and 1956. In both Tulsa and Oklahoma City, the victorious Republican candidate for governor, Henry Bellmon, carried almost the identical precincts that had earlier been won by Eisenhower and Nixon. In Texas, where Jack Cox, with 46 per cent of the vote, made the best showing of any Republican candidate for governor in recent Texas history, support flowed along in precisely the same channels that were first grooved out by Eisenhower.

A sampling of rural Texas communities shows that Cox ran nearly 10 per cent stronger among the Main Street merchants than among the farmers in the countryside. Inside the cities his vote showed the same scaling by income as was exhibited in the 1952-1960 Presidential elections. Thus, where Houston's well-to-do River Oaks section gave Cox 79 per cent of its vote, worker precincts gave him less than 35 per cent. Of the 140 Houston precincts carried by Cox, all but four voted Republican for President in 1952, 1956, and 1960—and those four only narrowly missed giving Nixon a majority. In 1956, the Eisenhower-Stevenson vote broke even in precincts where homes are valued around $10,000. In 1962, the break-even point for Cox came in neighborhoods where the average home is worth around $13,000.

THE REALIGNMENT of Southern voting along economic lines is, then, well under way. The one thing that keeps this realignment from being completed is the unresolved racial struggle. In nearly every Southern state racial emotions are sufficiently intense to constitute the balance of voting power. When these feelings lie quiet, the political balance favors the Democrats, but a popular recoil against efforts to enforce integration could well swing much of the South out of the Democratic fold. In 1962, after Kennedy's use of federal troops at the Universities of Mississippi and Alabama, the Republican vote for U.S. Senator in Alabama hit an all-time Republican high: the three urban counties containing Birmingham, Mobile, and Montgomery voted 56 per cent Republican (as compared with 53 per cent for Nixon and 50 per cent for Eisenhower). Worker precincts in these counties that had gone for Kennedy 2 to 1 swung to give the Republicans a majority. Even more explosive was the reaction of the ten so-called black-belt counties, where Negroes outnumber the whites but do not vote. These counties had given Eisenhower a third of their vote, but they went 54 per cent Republican in the 1962 election for U.S. Senator.

When, after the Birmingham demonstrations, Democratic defection showed up in the Northern cities, some Republican strategists thought the political stage was set for an all-out assault upon the South and an effort to merge into a conservative coalition all the issues symbolic of resistance to "too much government." Johnson's accession bared the essential weakness in such a "Southern" strategy—its reliance on a relatively extreme sense of grievance which can wilt readily under the warming sun of moderation. To crack the South, the Republicans need to sharpen rather than blur political issues: something that Johnson's presence in the White House makes it hard for them to do. His much-publicized efforts to turn off electric lights in the White House and to cut the Kennedy budget by a symbolic billion or two, for example, could not have been better calculated if their purpose were to lull the more conservative voters in the South.

But the Republican need to sharpen issues in the South also clashes with GOP needs in many Northern states. The fact that so much of the Democratic following has climbed to tax-paying, middle-class status has brought into being a new moderate-minded generation of voters, who are neither fully comfortable with all the

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old Roosevelt slogans nor yet prepared to embrace Republicanism. That these voters can be won over by a strategy of blurring the differences between the parties is evident from the election of Republican governors like Nelson Rockefeller, William Scranton, and George Romney, and from the popularity of Senators like Thomas Kuchel in California, Jacob Javits in New York, and Clifford Case in New Jersey.

Rejecting the idea of an alliance with the white South, some "liberal" Republican strategists have urged that, on the contrary, an all-out bid be made for the Negro vote in the major Northern cities. But this course has tended to become less and less attractive to the Republicans in view of the solidarity of the Negro Democratic vote. Negro voting solidarity, in fact, has become a major pressure pushing the Republicans toward an alliance with the white South.

Consider the change in Congressional representation in the twelve largest cities in the nation. Since 1930 the northward migration of Southern Negroes has more than tripled the Negro population in these twelve cities, converting whole sections into virtually solid Negro precincts. By 1962, five of these cities were sending Negro congressmen, all Democrats, to Washington. But as more and more Negroes have moved into the central cities, more and more white families —most of them Democrats—have moved out, toppling previously Republican districts in other parts of the city and in the suburbs. As a result, between 1952—when the Republicans last held control of Congress—and 1962, the number of Republican congressmen from these twelve cities dropped from 22 to 8. Six of these cities—St. Louis, Baltimore, Detroit, Philadelphia, Milwaukee, and Boston—are now without a single Republican congressman. In Chicago from 1952 to 1962, the number of Republican-held seats dropped from 5 to 2, these last two being part-city and part-suburb; in New York the number of Republican seats fell during the same period from 7 to 3; and in Los Angeles from 4 to 1 (a partly suburban district).

Largely because of these urban losses, it has become virtually impossible for the Republicans to recapture control of Congress—unless they can pick up additional seats in the South. Of the 259 Congressional seats that the Democrats held in 1962, there were 152 which had not elected a Republican since at least 1940. Another 29 districts had been Democratic since at least 1948. Among the remaining 78 districts, 29 more could be considered "safe" seats in that they voted 60 per cent Democratic or better in 1962. This left only 49 Democratic seats, largely in the suburbs, the Western cities, and the semi-rural Midwest, which could be considered as really contested. To gain control of the House of Representatives, the Republicans would have to sweep all but 7 of these 49 seats, something unlikely to happen unless they are winning the Presidency by a landslide.

The probability of a Republican bid for the Northern Negro vote has been reduced still further by the new tensions and strains between white and Negro Democrats in the North. Thus the Republicans are more likely to try to win over white voters who may be alienated by Negro demands. This aim does not require an open bid for the South by advocating a do-nothing racial policy under the slogan of states rights. Actually a policy favoring a moderate pace of racial progress could prove acceptable to both Southerners and white voters in the North who feel that "the Negroes are pushing too hard."

Johnson's accession to the Presidency has given the Democrats more time to strengthen their defenses against another successful Republican onslaught in the South. Efforts to increase Negro voting in the South can be considered part of such a strengthening strategy. The ever widening acceptance of desegregation is another key influence making the South less vulnerable politically to Republican attack. Against that, however, the militancy of the Southern Negro and the resistance of the extreme segregationists threaten constantly to tear apart the forces of moderation, with repercussions that reverberate into the North. If Johnson remains in office long enough, the moderates may emerge triumphant in the South. But at this stage, with no racial settlement in sight, the South remains the exposed flank of the Democratic party through which it can be most effectively attacked.

As FOR the Negroes, theirs is a paradoxical political situation. Allegiance to the Democratic party has gained Negro leaders a sympathetic audience in the White House and considerable influence with Democratic Presidents. But this same voting solidarity has been somewhat self-defeating in that it has contributed to Democratic dominance in Congress, and hence to the power of the white South.

The Negro strategy for forcing racial change in the South has been built around executive action, on the belief that the President will intervene with troops if necessary in any showdown. But in the committees of Congress, Negro bargaining power remains weak. And since the Republicans, as a minority in Congress, are constantly tempted to enter into coalition with some Democratic faction, the interests of the Negroes are always in danger of being traded off for Southern support on issues of importance to Republican constituencies.

The disadvantage of too strong a commitment to one party has been recognized by many Negro leaders and scholars who, like Gunnar Myrdal, have urged Negroes to divide their support between both major parties. But the Negro's economic and social complexion makes it hard for

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him to follow this advice. For one thing, there is still comparatively little economic differentiation among Negroes, so that normal political divisions along economic lines do not take place. Higher-income Negro neighborhoods do show a larger Republican vote than working-class areas, but on the whole, the new Negro middle class in the Northern cities tends to knit the Negro more firmly to the Democratic party. One reason is that government workers constitute by far the largest single element in this middle class. The federal government employs one in every eighteen Negro workers—the figure was 300,000 in 1962. Of these, more than 1,400 held jobs paying over $10,000 a year, and another 34,143 held jobs paying between $5,000 and $10,000 a year.

Perhaps as important, the sense of common interest with "business," which pulls so many other voters to the Republicans, is extremely low among Negroes. Even among the best educated Negroes, few envision careers with a company, while the Negro financial stake in business is quite limited. Of the hundred Negroes rated as most influential by *Ebony* Magazine in 1963, only nine were clearly identifiable as businessmen. One, Jackie Robinson, is vice-president of a restaurant chain; another, S. S. Fuller, is a cosmetics manufacturer who has successfully competed in the white market. The other seven are in insurance and savings-and-loan companies, catering primarily to Negro customers. Negro wealth has been growing, but the few Negro businesses of any size remain primarily life insurance companies.

So many bonds hold the Negro to the Democratic party that it will be very difficult for even an impassioned sense of racial grievance to sever them. Temporary "bolts" by Negro Democrats may take place, but as of now these are not likely to shatter the basic Democratic loyalty of the Negro voter. Nevertheless, for some years to come the Negro will probably remain a disruptive force politically, weakening the Democratic coalition. The long-run fate of the Democratic party—the issue of survival or slow death—hinges on whether it will be able to unify the nation racially, and that means bringing the South into line with the rest of the nation. The first such effort, which involved an attempt to project the Negro-labor alliance into the South after Roosevelt's death, failed. Instead of allowing itself to be remade in the image of Northern liberalism, the South responded with a double insurgency: an economic revolt aimed at checking the power of labor unions and reducing government spending, and a racial policy designed to counter the influence of Negro voting in the North. This response by the South spurred the rise of a new militancy on the part of the Negro, a militancy unrestrained by the compromises of coalition politics. The same militancy, transferred to the Northern Negro, now threatens to alienate the white Democratic voters in the big cities.

One of two doors can be opened to the future. Either unrelenting pressure by the Negroes will force the Democrats to rise to the necessity of framing a program of racial unification for the nation, in which case the party—and the nation—will be saved; or the Democrats will fail to rise to the occasion, in which case the nation will suffer the throes and agonies that come with the slow deterioration of the majority party.

The second conclusion that arises from this analysis is that too heavy a reliance has been placed on the power of Negro voting. The absence of voting rights is intolerable, and as the South has shown, a minimum voting representation is indispensable to avoid being disregarded completely. But it does not follow that the bargaining power of the Negro will rise proportionately with each fresh increase in Negro voting numbers. For as more and more Negroes exercise the right of suffrage, and if they continue to vote as a bloc, white voters will unite against them. If political power is to be the deciding force, enough white resistance can be expected to keep Negro advances at limits acceptable to whites.

This prospect has its moral for white voters as well. Many liberals have deceived themselves with the belief that as Negroes gained political strength they would be able to demand and get better treatment. But the truth is that the Negro is not strong enough to make the white man do the right thing. If we are to resolve our racial crisis, a program for racial unification will have to be devised which extends beyond the trials of political bargaining power.

Can this be done? To date, the evidence indicates that it cannot.

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DAVID DANZIG

RIGHTISTS, RACISTS, AND SEPARATISTS: A WHITE BLOC IN THE MAKING?

If 1963 signaled the emergence of the Negro community as a significant force in American society, 1964 may well come to be regarded as the year in which white reaction to the civil rights revolution began to make itself felt on a national scale. The so-called "white backlash" has not as yet been dramatized in any single event comparable to the March on Washington, which marked the culmination of the impact of the Negro cause on the nation's consciousness, while at the same time providing clear and eloquent testimony to the achievement of Negro solidarity. However, the signs are now everywhere at hand that the civil rights movement is running into increased opposition from various sectors of the white community and, further, that the proponents of moderation—particularly on the local and state levels—are finding it more and more difficult to formulate, much less negotiate, a program under which racial equality in housing, education, and employment can be peaceably and effectively extended.

The most highly publicized evidence of Northern resistance has been the showing that Governor Wallace of Alabama made in the Wisconsin, Indiana, and Maryland primaries this past spring: roughly 34, 29.8, and 42.7 per cent respectively of the Democratic vote. Liberals, anxious to allay the fear that a "white bloc" may be coming into existence, have pointed to the success of other primary candidates who were identified with the civil rights position, and have also claimed that Wallace's vote in each state was swelled by factors having nothing to do with civil rights. Nevertheless, there is no question that Wallace's appearance in these states provided the first major opportunity the North has had to give political expression to the negative feelings about the civil rights revolution that are rapidly developing as the issues of federal intervention and Negro militancy begin pressing closer to home. This was particularly evident in Maryland. Not only did Wallace do well there, but a *Newsweek* poll found that 39 per cent of the state's Democrats agreed with him in thinking that the management of racial questions was a state and local matter that should not be deeded over to "the social engineers in Washington, D.C." *Newsweek* also estimated that the Negro demonstrations against Wallace in Cambridge increased his vote by nearly ten per cent.

Much has been made, particularly in recent months, of the harm that Negroes are doing their own cause in the North by adopting extremist tactics like school boycotts and rent strikes. However this may be, it is also true that opposition to such tactics has become a respectable cover for opposition to integration itself, once it begins to loom as an open possibility in the local school or neighborhood or union. Indeed, even before the passage of the civil rights bill, it was evident that the real struggle over integration would have to be fought out in the local rather than the national arena. The one mass protest by Negroes that has elicited strong white support was the March on Washington; as for demonstrations in particular communities, they are regarded as ineffective and harmful by the large majority of white Americans. In their recent study, *The Negro Revolution in America*, William Brink and Louis Harris find that whites stand "2 to 1 in opposition to lunch-counter sit-ins, 4 to 3 against Negro willingness to go to jail voluntarily for their cause, 5 to 3 against picketing of stores and over 10 to 1 against the 'lie-downs' in front of trucks or construction sites."

Given such attitudes, it is no wonder that in community after community the consensus on civil rights that exists on the national level should be breaking down. In Berkeley, California—hardly a bastion of prejudice or reaction—a fair housing ordinance that had been enacted six months earlier was subjected to a referendum and rescinded in what a local newspaper spoke of as "the most convulsive, bitter disagreement in [Berkeley's] history." In Seattle, Washington—another enlightened city with a large university population—an open-housing ordinance was defeated by a better than 2 to 1 vote, though the ordinance was supported by more than 75 civic and religious groups and opposed only by real-estate interests. In Detroit, a fair-housing ordi-

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nance also went down to defeat, and several hundred thousand signatures have been obtained appealing for a referendum which would limit the enforcement power in the new state constitution to bar discrimination in housing. In Illinois, a fair housing bill was unable to get through the lower house of the state legislature. In California, an amendment to nullify the Rumford Fair Housing Act and to bar any future restriction against discrimination in housing has been placed on the November ballot.

On the issue of school integration, Northern white resistance is becoming even more widespread and severe. In New York, about a hundred "Parents and Taxpayers" groups have been organized to oppose the Board of Education in its efforts to decrease racial imbalance in the city school system. The PAT has already filed 32 suits against the Board, and the extent of its popular strength was dramatically evidenced a few months ago by a demonstration of 15,000 members and sympathizers at City Hall. In nearby Mount Vernon, the PAT groups were able to muster enough support to defeat a proposed Princeton plan for local schools. In Boston, four of the five members of the School Committee campaigned for re-election on a platform of opposition to NAACP demands that de facto school segregation be corrected; all four were returned to office by overwhelming majorities. In Cleveland, demonstrations against new school construction in Negro areas, along with efforts to "diffuse" Negro children through the classrooms of white schools to which they had been bussed but within which they were still being kept separate, led to pitched battles that began to approach the proportions of a race riot.

And so it has gone in Chicago and San Francisco and Philadelphia and Los Angeles, with local white groups such as the National Association for the Advancement of White People forming to press *their* claims against those of the Negro community, and support for integrationist policies increasingly becoming a matter of Negro voting strength as against the voting strength of other minority groups. In Kansas City, for example, a referendum to repeal a city ordinance prohibiting discrimination in places of public accommodation was narrowly defeated by 1500 votes; more than half of the total vote against repeal was cast by Negroes, while the Italian community came out solidly in favor of repeal.

Thus, it has now become obvious that anti-Negro sentiment is a nation-wide rather than merely a sectional phenomenon. Just as the racial problem has been spread by the heavy migration of Southern Negroes to the cities of the North during the past decade, so, too, has resistance to integration begun to diffuse itself along the spectrum of American politics, creating strange new bedfellows as it goes. Commenting on Governor Wallace's showing in Wisconsin, an editorial in the Birmingham (Ala.) *News* suggested that "the white bloc may have finally come into being . . . if this becomes a widespread condition you will have to rewrite the book of American politics." However premature this suggestion may seem, the elements of such a bloc are already quite visible. For there is emerging in the North a new attitude which may or may not favor the cause of civil rights in general, but which opposes the enforcement of any specific measures aimed at creating closer daily contact or competition with Negroes. And like the segregationist in the South, the Northerner who holds this attitude—he can be best described as a "separatist"—is looking for some way to express himself politically, both on the local and national scenes.

To take advantage of their new potential allies in the North, eight Southern states recently established so-called "sovereignity commissions." The main instrument of these commissions is the Coordinating Committee for Fundamental American Freedoms, whose most notable activity to date has been an advertising campaign against the civil rights bill in more than 200 newspapers in Kansas, Oklahoma, downstate Illinois, Wyoming, West Virginia, the District of Columbia, and New Hampshire.

It does not seem a mere coincidence that the activity of the Coordinating Committee should have been paralleled by a concerted drive against civil rights on the part of the "radical right." The legal adviser to the Committee is John Satterfield, who performed the same role for ex-Governor Barnett of Mississippi, and who was once the president of Circuit Riders, Inc., an organization of laymen "opposing the propagation of Socialism, Communism, and all other un-American teaching in the Methodist Church"; the Committee's executive director is John J. Synon, formerly an officer of the widely-known public-relations firm of Selvege and Lee, which represents Portugal, Katanga, and several right-wing groups; the chairman is William Loeb, publisher of the arch-conservative Manchester (New Hampshire) *Leader* and a veteran of various radical-right organizations; the vice-chairman is James J. Kilpatrick, editor of the Richmond (Virginia) *News Leader*, and probably the most effective segregationist thinker in the South.

What we see emerging here, then, is a coalition of racists and rightists coming together under the banner of opposition to the exertion of federal power involved in enforcing the civil rights of Negroes. Indeed, as William V. Shannon and a number of other commentators have pointed out, the "racist theme" shows every sign of replacing the Communist conspiracy as the principal propaganda line of reactionaries in both major parties. I have already spoken in

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these pages* of how the radical right has come to provide a potential gathering ground for a broad body of Anglo-Saxon Americans who believe that the country has been stolen from them by the "minorities" and thereby betrayed into a posture of weakness and compliance abroad. Now that such developments as the withdrawal of Russian missiles from Cuba and the Sino-Soviet split have stolen much of the apocalyptic thunder of the crusade against Communism, the old conservative slogans that served in the fight against the New Deal and the welfare state—"federal tyranny," "preservation of the Constitution," "American individualism"—are being applied to the civil rights struggle and used as a new rallying cry for right-wing support.

EVIDENCE of a stepped-up effort by the radical right on behalf of the segregationist position is not hard to come by. The Manion Forum—a radio and television program that is carried by some 325 stations and has a mailing list of over one million—conducted a campaign against the civil rights bill as the "most insidious threat to American freedoms ever introduced in Congress . . . [one which] would destroy the personal and business rights [of] all citizens," while the John Birch Society was engaging in "the most massive protest . . . that we have ever undertaken with regard to any legislation." We, the People—another leading ultra-rightist group—also carried the Coordinating Committee's message to its followers, and, like the Manion Forum and the Birch Society, promoted extensive letter-writing campaigns to Senators and Congressmen. Gerald L. K. Smith's Christian Nationalist Crusade was active in the Wisconsin, Indiana, and Maryland primaries in Governor Wallace's behalf; so were the National States' Rights party, the John Birch Society, and the White Party of America.

As with the crusade against Communism, the anti-civil rights bloc fans outward from the radical right to the mass of "native" Americans, North as well as South, who feel encroached upon by an alien federal will, and to the ethnic minority groups who feel more immediately threatened by Negro demands. Governor Wallace's three campaigns give us a fairly good inkling of the complexion and strength of this incipient anti-integrationist bloc. Wallace originally entered the Wisconsin primary with the help of Mrs. Lloyd G. Herbstreith, whose husband is chairman of the Wisconsin Economic Freedom Committee, an organization devoted to the repeal of the federal income tax. Campaigning with extensive right-wing support and on a program of familiar conservative slogans and canards, he made a strong showing both in the ultra-conservative suburbs (where he outran Wisconsin's Republican governor) and in the rural areas which were formerly McCarthyite strongholds. But he scored almost as heavily in the Democratic wards of Milwaukee—the predominantly Polish, Italian, and Serbian neighborhoods that border on the Negro area of the city. Similarly, in the Indiana primary, Wallace carried Lake County, a heavily industrialized complex that includes Gary, Hammond, and East Chicago and that has a large East-European and Negro population. In Maryland, Wallace won in the Italian and Irish districts of Baltimore, piled up huge majorities in the outlying counties where racial feeling runs strong, and only lost Governor Brewster's own county by a mere hundred-odd votes.

Much the same pattern as is found here can be traced in local communities: traditionally conservative elements of varying hues backed by one or more of the ethnic minorities who have generally opposed their new allies on other domestic issues. In Mount Vernon, New York, the decisive force against the Princeton plan was the town's large Italian community. In Jackson Heights (Queens), it was the predominantly Jewish population that protested against a similar plan. In Boston, the heaviest concentration of votes in support of the anti-integrationist incumbents of the School Committee came from the Italian and Irish working-class wards. In Philadelphia, the same two ethnic groups lined up behind a Republican candidate for mayor whose main campaign appeal was directed against the strong civil-rights stand of the incumbent Democrat. And in Chicago, the Polish community has been heavily represented in "home-owner" demonstrations against a recently passed open-occupancy ordinance.

This is not to say that the ethnic minorities are especially racist. Often they are merely a more coherent and readily identifiable segment of the working- and middle-class urban population which may embrace integration as a plank in the Democratic platform, but which is becoming militantly "separatist" at the local level, where it lives under the heavy pressure of an expanding Negro population. The attempt of Negroes to penetrate adjacent white minority-group neighborhoods not only arouses personal prejudice and individual defensiveness; it also arouses the fear that the cherished neighborhood culture will be destroyed.

And indeed, there is good reason for these groups to become defensive about their place in the rapidly shifting urban structure. In Cleveland, Detroit, and Philadelphia, Negro school enrollment is approaching 50 per cent; in Washington, D.C., Baltimore, and St. Louis, it already exceeds that figure. Moreover, there is the homeowner's fear for property values, which, in Samuel Lubell's view, "may well be the strongest single source of white resistance in the North."

*"The Radical Right and the Rise of the Fundamentalist Minority" (April 1962).

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Lubell finds that while white sentiment for open employment runs as high as 10 to 1, white antipathy against having a Negro buy the house next door runs just as high. And given the evidence of Berkeley, Seattle, Detroit, and other communities, the president of the National Association of Real Estate Boards may well be right in saying that there has been "a dramatic turn of public opinion" against what he calls "forced housing laws." So far as schools are concerned, an analogous turn can be seen in the sudden discovery of the virtues of the neighborhood school.

BETWEEN the segregationists and the nativists of the radical right—who are opposed to integration on principle—and the separatists—who are opposed to it in practice on specific issues—there is, then, a large potential of political unrest that could very well undermine the national consensus expressed by the passage of the civil rights bill. While it is true that the widespread public turmoil over civil rights has up until now been exacerbated by the lack of a national law, it is also true that the enforcement of the law will give a powerful stimulus to the more determined factions of white resistance, and will provide fresh motives for their political association. The national figure who has now emerged to effect this association is, of course, Senator Goldwater. Quite clearly, Goldwater in his hopes for the Presidency is counting on a coalition of nativist, segregationist, and separatist elements that will cross the traditional party lines and group interests—much as they did for Governor Wallace. Hence his vehement final speech against the civil rights bill in which he raised the spectre of a "police state." The image of the bill that he wished to create, and that he will presumably exploit to the hilt in the coming campaign, is of a massive act of federal aggression against the sovereign rights of the states and the freedoms of the individual American, as well as a brutal attempt to coerce association between the races.

It is in this last issue that the dynamite of the "racist theme" is lodged. For the fact is that most white Americans draw a line at a certain point against further association with Negroes and are easily persuaded to defend it. In the recent attempt to repeal the public accommodation ordinance in Kansas City, the local tavern owners were able to marshal a majority of the white population to vote against the ordinance, despite a concerted campaign by the religious, labor, political, and business leadership of the city to preserve it. Since there were no private or group interests of home, school, job, or neighborhood being threatened by the law, one can only assume that the hostility it provoked was a consequence of the general white antipathy against mixing with Negroes. This assumption is borne out on a broader front by a *Newsweek* survey, published nine months ago. Nearly half of the whites polled said they would object to having their child bring a Negro friend home for supper, while nine out of ten objected to intermarriage. The *Newsweek* survey also showed that racial stereotypes still play a dominant role in white attitudes. Thus, 75 percent of the whites polled expressed the belief that Negroes are less ambitious than whites; 71 per cent that they "smell different"; 69 per cent that they have looser morals; 49 per cent that they want to live on handouts; 44 per cent that they breed crime. Further, 74 per cent said that the Negroes have been pushing too hard. To be sure, such responses were often found to exist in a state of ambivalence, mixed with a generalized sympathy for the Negro plight. Once the civil rights issue invades the local community, however, prejudice usually proves to be far more flammable than sympathy.

The political implications of the *Newsweek* survey were summed up by a Republican leader in Chicago:

> The key issue is white versus black, and it's much deeper than people realize. The Republicans don't have to do a damn thing. . . . We don't have to worry about losing the colored vote, because we never had it in the first place. We can just sit back and let the Republicans become the party of the white people: Goldwater is the natural symbol of this feeling. . . .

Indeed he is. In recent years, it is federal power which has mainly been responsible for the progress that has been made in meeting the Negro's demand for his rightful place in American society. The result of this state of affairs, however, has been a widening gap between the national will as expressed in the federal consensus and the will of the local community—between abstract support for civil rights and specific opposition to their implementation. Currently this gap is being exploited by Senator Goldwater in an effort to form a nationwide right-wing bloc. Whether such a bloc could gain him the Presidency remains doubtful. However, it does contain an alarming potential for spreading conflict between the races, for disrupting the national consensus, and for further immobilizing the already feeble reform impulses of contemporary America.

For if Negro militancy has produced a new opportunity for the rightists, it has produced a crisis among the liberals. As an advocate of the use of federal power to effect social reform, the American liberal in the 1930's entered into a natural alliance with labor—the first beneficiary of extended federal power. This alliance not only helped labor; it also vitalized liberalism. By contrast, the present alliance between the white liberal and the Negro is proving to be much less harmonious, inspiriting, and effective. True, the liberal has been successful at the national level in helping to bring federal power to bear

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on the establishment and protection of Negro rights. On the local level, however, his commitment has become indecisive.

Part of the problem is that the white liberal is white, and therefore subject to conditioning by the very prejudices he seeks to repress. Further, his own immediate self-interests are directly challenged by the Negro revolution, as they were not by the labor movement of the 30's. He is for open-occupancy laws, but would just as soon have his block remain predominantly white. He believes in integrated education, but if he sends his child to a public school, he would just as soon it be an "enlightened" one in his own neighborhood that segregates children according to "ability." He is for increasing Negro voting power, but does not wish to lose control over the objectives to which it is put. While in the 30's he more or less subscribed to the notion that what was good for labor was good for the country, he now finds that his principles are at odds with any such doctrine in relation to the Negro.

Thus the liberal has come under increasingly vehement attack from the more militant Negro leadership. His position is denounced as one of "gradualism," and his reliance upon the courts and limited federal legislation is dismissed as an evasion of the large-scale political and economic measures needed to cope with the Negro legacy of gross privation. Having adopted the strategy of overt social conflict—expressed by the slogan "Freedom Now!"—the militant Negro is inevitably led into asserting that "those who are not with us are against us." The white liberal, on the other hand, regards the "more militant than thou" attitude of his Negro critics as a reckless stance posing as a strategy, one that converts the civil rights struggle from a movement to unite Americans in support of the principle of equal rights into an open conflict between the races.

SINCE Negro strategy is becoming more responsive to the mood of the Negro masses and less concerned with the requirements of the liberal coalition, it must perforce rely upon marshalling the Negro's own economic and political influence, instead of waiting for the coalition to negotiate Negro claims with the society-at-large. Though the Negro is vague and reckless in his charges of betrayal—he fails, for example, to take account of the fact that the religious groups now in the forefront of the white opposition to segregation and separatism are made up of liberals too—he is nevertheless right in his feeling that the liberal coalition has no program for changing a society which grinds him down and seems reluctant to provide any better prospects for his children. To live for one day in Harlem is to realize that any contemporary Emancipation through civil rights legislation is going to require a Reconstruction of the welfare state to include the Negro, as the other ethnic minorities have been included. In this struggle to be included, the Negro lacks any major radical movement (such as the trade unions) to represent him. Consequently, he must continue to push hard—hard enough so that he will at last be felt.

In sum, as the impact of the Negro revolution spreads from Mississippi to Michigan, from the struggle to implement basic civil rights to the more difficult questions of economic and social integration, we can expect the national political consensus to come under heavy pressure from both sides. The ultra-right with its fundamentalist and nativist following is trying to make common cause with the Southern segregationist and Northern separatist in order to carry out an assault against the modern instrumentalities of popular democracy that largely reside today in the power of the federal government. And even failing the election of Senator Goldwater, the right can expect to gain strength in community and state politics where the white backlash is already taking strong effect, and where its own organizational program is most effective. When Senator Mundt declares, "Let's get together people who think alike in this country and who think conservatively into some kind of political party," he is talking, finally, about white racial solidarity in much the same fashion as did the Birmingham *News* after Wallace's showing in Wisconsin.

However, the political crisis toward which we are moving has been brought on not by the potential strength of the right-wing bloc, but rather by the pressures of Negro militancy. These, in turn, can be traced to the evil anomaly of American society whereby the minority that was most exploited and alienated has been the last to be compensated and integrated. More immediately, the crisis provoked by the Negro can be laid to the malaise of the political movement that has claimed to represent his interests: the liberalism of the New Deal. Having made the trade-union movement an escalator into the middle class, and having carried the religious and ethnic minorities to the point of virtually full participation in the society, the New Deal coalition ran out of steam. The massive job of educating and planning that was needed to bring the Negro into this new society was not done. The Negro is now demanding that it *be* done—that the welfare state be reactivated and expanded so that within it he can find adequate employment, housing, education, medical care, and other sources of the sustenance of freedom, including hope. It cannot be expected that the Negro should be responsible for creating and marshalling support for such a program, one that will require a revolution in social planning as well as public opinion. He can only agitate for it. As is, in 1964, the year of the Civil Rights Act, the Negro is more exposed to social reaction within the white communities than he has been at any time since Reconstruction.

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ALEXANDER M. BICKEL

THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964

At a news conference in 1962, John F. Kennedy coined the phrase, "sound public constitutional policy." It was an entirely original conception, a hybrid of constitutional law and public policy. Constitutional law is produced by the Supreme Court. Public policy is what the political institutions—the Congress and the President jointly, and often the President on his own—evolve and put into effect. Mr. Kennedy's phrase characterized with precision the civil rights commitment he had undertaken in the campaign of 1960. The broad and pervasive principle of the *School Segregation Cases* of 1954, he had then promised, would under his administration not only be the judicial policy of the federal government, but also the political policy of its executive branch. The executive department would be committed to "equal protection" as a rule of independent, self-starting political and administrative action, rather than merely as an obligation to uphold the courts.

Mr. Kennedy redeemed his pledge very substantially, making the best civil rights record of any national administration since Reconstruction. But such a statement, although entirely accurate, means less than it says. It means concretely that under Kennedy, whose posture was so very different from that of his predecessor, the pace of school desegregation speeded up, although it remained excruciatingly deliberate; that by litigation and the exertion of other pressures, the desegregation of interstate transportation facilities was about completed; that other problems, including employment and—after November 1962—housing, were freshly attacked by executive action, and were beginning to yield somewhat; and that a massive effort, different in kind from anything that had gone before, was being made through litigation to enforce the Civil Rights Acts of 1957 and 1960, and thus to enfranchise large numbers of Southern Negroes. It should be added that the administration was also trying to improve general economic conditions, and that it was well aware of the bearing of this attempt on the civil rights problem.

But the long-range philosophy that informed the first two-and-a-half years of the Kennedy administration could fairly be stated as follows: the Negro must be helped to gain political power in the South. The right to vote, said Attorney General Robert Kennedy, is basic, "and from it all other rights flow." Through the concerted efforts of the Department of Justice, the vote ought to be achievable within a decade. The effect would be felt in Congress as well as by state governments, and there could then be major moves on all fronts, by the executive as well as by legislatures; for, obviously, different attitudes in Congress would not only make it possible for the President to obtain legislation, but would also free him to act in areas in which he was now hesitating, even though theoretically he had sufficient independent power.

Accordingly, in the first two-and-a-half years, President Kennedy demanded little from Congress, and nothing very insistently. He asked and was not granted perfecting amendments to the Civil Rights Acts of 1957 and 1960, dealing exclusively with the right to vote. It was February 28, 1963 before he sent his first full-scale civil rights message to Congress. He reported on his past independent initiatives, and promised further ones. He asked again for improvement in the statutes guaranteeing the right to vote, and he added a modest request for authority to extend technical and financial assistance to school districts in the process of desegregation. That was all. Then, two months later—in April and May of 1963—came Birmingham.

Birmingham was not the first instance of violently resisted Negro demonstrations, nor even of mass marching through the center of a city. Albany, Ga., preceded Birmingham, as did the freedom rides of the spring of 1961. Sit-ins had started early in 1960. And before that, there had been the successful bus boycott in Montgomery, Ala., in 1955-56. Yet the marching in Birmingham became one of those events that seem to turn the course of history; or if that sounds insufficiently deterministic, then one of

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those events for which the course of history seems to wait before turning. Perhaps it was that Birmingham—with the notorious "Bull" Connor in charge (he is gone now)—had become something of a symbol of Southern racism. Perhaps it was that police reaction here was more brutal than elsewhere, and that the marching therefore seized the attention of more people over the country, and affected more consciences. Perhaps the murder from ambush, at about the same time, of Medgar Evers, the NAACP's man in Jackson, Mississippi, heightened the effect. And perhaps the consequences of Birmingham are explained by Aldous Huxley's remark that experience is not what happens to us but what we do with what happens to us. Birmingham, it may be, was a turning point not because it caused President Kennedy to register a sharp change in his policy on civil rights, but because that was what President Kennedy was willing and able to do with Birmingham. In the long run, very probably, broad new federal legislation was inevitable, but in the short run, John Kennedy surely had a choice. He could have stood on a platform of law and order, deploring not only violence, but all attempts, which are ever fraught with violence, to change the legal order without abiding the law's own procedures for advancing beyond itself. And he could have coupled this attitude with a promise to pursue more vigorously the executive program on which he was already launched. Further demonstrations and more violence were as likely to be avoided this way as any other, if they were at all avoidable.

Yet this was not the choice the President made. Instead, less than three months after his February message, he called off his old bets and went to the country and to Congress with eloquence and passion, setting radical new objectives. And so it was through John F. Kennedy that the Negro, without waiting for the vote, operating outside the law and also outside the customary political channels, touched the levers of political power. The result, thirteen months later, was the Civil Rights Act of 1964, a fundamentally new departure in federal legislation.

An omnibus civil rights bill, drafted in the Department of Justice, was sent down by President Kennedy on June 19, 1963. It led off with the President's proposals of February to strengthen the voting provisions of the Civil Rights Acts of 1957 and 1960, and it included also the proposals concerning assistance to school districts that were being desegregated. Then came the new matter. The bill prohibited discrimination in public accommodations, meaning privately-owned facilities catering to the general public. It authorized the Attorney General to bring suit to desegregate public schools (instead of letting the burden of such suits continue to fall in each district on private parties). And it authorized the President to exact promises of non-discrimination from recipients of federal financial assistance "in connection with any program or activity by way of grant, contract, loan, insurance, guaranty, or otherwise."

The bill contained no general fair employment provision, but it did enlarge the jurisdiction of a Presidential commission which had existed by executive authority since the Eisenhower administration, and which was putting pressure on the government's contractors, and its defense contractors in particular, to get them to institute and pursue non-discriminatory employment policies. Finally, with lucid awareness of the limited possibilities of enforcement through litigation, the bill established a Community Relations Service, whose function it would be, "in confidence and without publicity," by negotiation, persuasion, and other dark arts known also to labor mediators, to induce voluntary compliance with the public accommodations title of the bill, and to attempt to settle other racial disputes as well. The Service put on an institutional footing the function that had been discharged in Birmingham by Assistant Attorney General Marshall.

For the next few months, through the fall of 1963, tripartite negotiations took place, involving the Kennedy administration, the Republican leadership of the House, and a bipartisan group of liberal congressmen. In the wings was the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, a coalition of over 70 organizations interested in obtaining the broadest possible statute. At this stage, an excellent fair employment title, superseding but not displacing the Presidential commission which had been dealing with the government's contractors, was added to the bill. But at the same time, there were also two significant subtractions from the administration's draft. A section was dropped from the title on voting rights, under which federal courts would have appointed temporary referees to see to the speedy, if provisional, registration of qualified Negro voters in time for an impending election. And the Community Relations Service was killed. Perhaps—there is no other ready explanation—the Community Relations Service fell victim at this point to the most advanced liberals, who wanted, as the headlines called it, the "toughest" possible bill, providing for enforcement, not namby-pamby mediation. To be sure, there was enforcement power in the bill as it stood, but the idea may have been to afford the administration no alternative to the use of that power.

On the floor of the House, where it was passed handsomely on February 10, 1964, the bill suffered some further wounds, thin and quickly administered, but not altogether shallow. The provision, which had been rewritten and improved in committee, authorizing the President

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to see to it that there was no discrimination in federally financed programs, was amended to apply only to programs receiving federal assistance "by way of grant, loan, or contract *other than a contract of insurance or guaranty.*" This is and was intended to be an exemption for housing built or purchased on mortgages guaranteed by the Federal Housing Administration or the Veterans' Administration. Such housing was covered by an Executive Order on Equal Opportunity in Housing, issued by President Kennedy on November 20, 1962, in the exercise of his independent executive power. The purpose of the Order was not to coerce an individual homeowner to sell to a Negro. The Order was aimed at developers of real estate, and it was mean to exert pressure on banks to make mortgage loans to Negroes who have found a willing seller on the same terms as to whites, which is far from the prevalent practice. The great problem with the exemption in the House amendment is not so much that Congress has chosen to leave FHA and VA mortgages unaffected by this statute, but that the amendment may well abrogate the Executive Order to the extent that it does cover such mortgages. The managers of the bill disclaimed any intention to do this, and similar disclaimers were later entered in the Senate, but the result may nevertheless follow as a matter of law. For it is quite clear that Congress did not wish to deal with discrimination in FHA and VA housing. As a general legal proposition, the President may have and may enforce an independent policy of his own in matters like this so long as Congress has not legislated a contrary policy. He may fill a policy vacuum, or complement a Congressional policy, but he may not displace a Congressional policy, even a negative one. And so a portion of the Executive Order on Housing was, to say the least, thrown into doubt.

A NUMBER of further changes made on the floor of the House must be noted. The provisions dealing with education were amended so as to render them inapplicable to the Northern problem of racial imbalance. The House extended the fair employment title to prohibit discrimination based on sex as well as race, religion, and national origin. (This amendment, although conceivably a worthy one on its own merits, is concerned with a quite separate problem, which should have been dealt with separately.) The House also saw fit to safeguard an employer's right to refuse to hire an atheist, a pretty clearly unconstitutional proviso, which was later struck in the Senate. Again, the employment title was changed in the House to exclude assorted Communists and subversives of whatever race, religion, or sex from the benefits of the bill—another provision of doubtful constitutionality, which remains in the Act. On the other hand, the bill was repaired in one important respect on the floor of the House. The Community Relations Service, eliminated in committee, was put back in, although in somewhat crippled shape. It was finally restored to full health by the Senate.

The main event in the progress of the bill to triumphant passage in the Senate, under cloture on June 19, 1964, was a series of amendments evolved chiefly by Senator Dirksen of Illinois, the minority leader. Aside from tinkering with the bill here and there, and sometimes improving it, the Dirksen amendments were directed at the enforcement provisions of both the public accommodations and fair employment titles. As these provisions came to the Senate, both private parties and the government, through the Attorney General and a federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, were authorized to bring enforcement suits. For these simplicities, the Dirksen amendments substituted a labyrinth of procedures, intended to emphasize private as against government litigating initiative, and to give state authorities, where relevant ones exist, a first crack at settling or litigating any complaint.

Apart from Mr. Dirksen's package, the only other significant change made in the Senate was a provision granting jury trials to defendants charged with criminal contempt of court. The upshot of litigation under the statute will be a judicial decree ordering somebody to do something or desist from doing it—serve Negroes at a lunch counter and stop refusing them service; employ a given applicant for a job and stop excluding others because of their race; and the like. Such orders are made effective by the power of the federal courts to hold violators in contempt. There are two kinds of contempt. A court may put a person in jail or subject him to a fine until he obeys: this is called civil contempt, because it does not purport to punish, but merely to exact obedience. But a court may also, after the fact, punish a person for the crime of having disobeyed a decree in the past: this is called criminal contempt. The amendment in question, proposed by Senator Morton of Kentucky, does not affect the power of federal courts to enforce their orders by civil contempt proceedings. Nor does it affect voting cases, which are governed by a compromise embodied in the Civil Rights Act of 1957. It affects only—as to all titles of the Act save the title dealing with the right to vote—a judge's power, on his own, without a jury, to punish for criminal contempt.

Undoubtedly, for the foreseeable future, it will be difficult to make a charge of criminal contempt stick before a Southern jury in a civil rights case. But the civil contempt power is an ample one. Moreover, in the judgment of many lawyers, it is wrong on principle to dispense with juries in this sort of criminal case, which is not

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easily distinguishable from the common run of criminal cases, where trial by jury is a defendant's constitutional right.

THE ACT that emerged, from these origins and along this legislative path is a statutory booklet some 18,000 words long. It is divided into eleven titles or chapters. Title I, on voting, which is in the form of amendments to the Civil Rights Acts of 1957 and 1960, plugs loopholes that have turned up in the course of litigation under those statutes. It applies only to federal elections, and orders state registrars to use the same standards in qualifying Negro voters as in qualifying whites; it also forbids them to disqualify an individual for minor errors (those which are not really material to his qualifications) in an application to register. The title then deals in some detail with literacy tests. It provides that they may not be administered to any applicant for registration unless they are administered to all applicants, and that they may be administered only in writing, with a certified copy of the test to be furnished to the individual upon request. Thus the disqualification of Negro Ph.D.'s on grounds of illiteracy becomes more difficult. But the Attorney General may certify that these provisions shall have no effect in states in which he is satisfied that literacy tests are fairly used, so that the kind of quick oral test given in many Northern states is likely to be unaffected. As an additional safeguard, it is then provided that anyone with a sixth-grade education, obtained in any school in which instruction is carried on predominantly in English, is presumed to be sufficiently literate to vote in federal elections; if a state wishes to disqualify him, it must prove him to be illiterate—which is to say, it must prove to the satisfaction of the federal courts that its standards of literacy, as applied to such an individual, make sense. Heretofore, standards of literacy could be attacked only on the ground that they were unequally administered, even if they required the applicant to do such preposterous things as to render a legal opinion on the meaning of any provision of the Mississippi Constitution. (It is noteworthy that this new statutory presumption does not touch requirements that literacy be in English, under which Puerto Rican voters, literate in Spanish only, may be disqualified in New York, for example.) Finally, this and other titles—by enabling the Attorney General to get voting and other civil rights cases heard by three-judge courts, rather than by single federal judges—give him the means to circumvent delays and other obstructionist tactics to which he has been subjected by a few segregationist federal judges in the South. It is unfortunate that such a cumbersome procedure should have had to be imposed on a busy and over-burdened federal judiciary, and the necessity for it emphasizes the importance of care in the selection of federal judges in the South.

Title II is the public accommodations title. It defines a public accommodation as any inn, hotel, motel, or other establishment providing lodging to transient guests, excepting only what came to be known in Washington as Mrs. Murphy's boarding house (meaning an establishment which offers no more than five rooms for rent, and in which the owner also lives); any restaurant or other place that sells food for consumption on the premises, including lunch counters in retail stores; any gasoline station; any place of entertainment, including theaters and sports arenas; and any other establishment which is physically located within the premises of one of the places just listed, and which holds itself out as serving the patrons of such a place (this being the provision under which some barber shops, for example, may be included, and some not). A public accommodation, so defined, is subject to this title if "its operations affect commerce, or if discrimination or segregation by it is supported by state action."

Commerce is said to be automatically affected by all the establishments in the hotel category, on the theory that hotels serve transients, most of whom cross a state line or two, and that the movement of persons across state lines is commerce within the sense of the constitutional provision defining the powers of Congress. Establishments in the restaurant category and gasoline stations affect commerce if they serve interstate travelers, or if a substantial portion of the food or gasoline or other products they sell has moved across state lines. Places of entertainment affect commerce if the thing or performers they exhibit have moved across state lines. Discrimination or segregation is "supported by state action," and thus prohibited whether or not the establishment affects commerce, if it is required by a state, formally by statute or informally by official action or pressure.

All these definitions, however, are expressly made inapplicable to a bona fide private club or other establishment not open to the public, except as a club or the like may open some of its facilities to the general public, in which event the title is applicable to those facilities. In establishments covered, the Act declares all persons to be entitled to full and equal enjoyment of everything that an establishment offers, without discrimination or segregation on account of race, religion, or national origin. It is unlawful also for any third party to attempt to prevent an establishment from extending the privileges secured by this title to an individual, or to attempt to prevent an individual from claiming his privileges.

Persons aggrieved by a violation of this title may obtain from a federal court a decree directing that the violation cease. And there is a

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valuable provision authorizing the courts to appoint an attorney for a complainant in a suit under this title, and to allow him a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs awarded to him if he wins. However, if the violation occurred in a state which prohibits discrimination in public accommodations under its own law, complaint must first be made to the state authorities, and there can be no suit in the federal court until the state authorities have had thirty days to deal with the complaint. Subsequently, the federal court may stay its own proceedings until the termination of any local proceedings that may have been undertaken. But ultimately, if the complainant is unsatisfied with what the state has been able to do, he retains his essential federal right to redress. In a state which has no public accommodations law of its own, the federal court in which suit has been brought may refer the matter to the Community Relations Service for a total of no more than 120 days, if the court believes that a reasonable possibility exists of securing voluntary compliance. The Service may investigate and hold private hearings. Suits by the Attorney General on behalf of the government are possible only when he "has reasonable cause to believe that any person or group of persons is engaged in a pattern or practice of resistance."

TITLE III authorizes the Attorney General to bring suit to desegregate public facilities, other than public schools or colleges, which are owned or operated by or on behalf of any state—parks, golf courses, municipal auditoriums, and the like. Judicial decisions have long since made clear the law as to such facilities, which turns on a constitutional right to equal access, as part of the general right to equal treatment at the hands of all units of government. Hence, the point of this title is merely that the Attorney General is now enabled to bring suit, rather than private parties only.

Title IV is the education title. It requires the Commissioner of Education, who heads the hundred-year-old Office of Education in the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, to make a survey and report, within two years, on the availability of equal educational opportunities to individuals of all races and religions in public institutions at all levels throughout the country, North and South. It then empowers him to render technical assistance to local authorities in the preparation and implementation of desegregation plans. A national professional agency will thus be in a position to work out and validate methods for dealing with special educational problems arising from desegregation. The Commissioner is also authorized to arrange and finance institutes for special training for teachers and administrative personnel who have to deal with problems of desegregation. But desegregation is so defined that the Commissioner will be unable to concern himself with what are commonly called problems of racial imbalance; aside from the survey and report, the effect of these provisions will thus be felt mainly in the South, and only, if at all, in such school districts in the North as may be found to have intentionally gerrymandered school attendance areas for purposes of separating the races. The Attorney General's new authority to litigate school cases is similarly limited. One of the Dirksen amendments, moreover, was careful to provide that nothing in the title should be constructed to empower any court to order the achievement of racial balance through the transportation of pupils from one school to another.

Title V extends for four years the life of the Civil Rights Commission, an investigative body established by the Act of 1957, which has done some valuable fact-gathering in the past.

Title VI embodies the requirement that there be no discrimination in federally assisted programs (other than those assisted by way of contracts of insurance or guaranty), and empowers the President ultimately to withhold funds as a penalty for non-compliance. The title carries certain procedural safeguards, as it ought.

Title VII is headed "Equal Employment Opportunity." It applies to any individual or corporate or other legal entity regularly employing 25 or more persons; to employment agencies, including the United States Employment Service and the system of state and local employment services which receive federal assistance; and to labor unions. Employers and labor unions are covered only if their activities affect interstate commerce. Unlike the public accommodations provisions, this title does not spell out the meaning of the technical phrase, "affect commerce," for its own purposes, but adopts the well-established definition that has been evolved under the federal labor law, and that covers a very great deal, indeed. This title makes it unlawful for any employer to fail to hire or to discharge, or otherwise to discriminate, in compensation or other terms of employment, against any individual because of his color, religion, sex, or national origin. Similar prohibitions apply to employment agencies and to labor unions. The latter are also forbidden to cause an employer to discriminate, and apprenticeship and other training programs must be open to all without discrimination. Exemptions are provided for the case where religion, sex, or national origin may be a legitimate occupational qualification. With a view to demands recently voiced by Negro organizations in the North, the title specifically forswears any requirement of preferential treatment for the purpose of curing an imbalance in the racial composition of a given body of employees or apprentices.

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Complaints of a violation of this title may be made either by a person aggrieved or by a member of the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which the statute establishes. The initial federal addressee of such complaints is the Commission. The Commission is to investigate and, without undue publicity, make every attempt to secure compliance with the law. Its visitatorial powers are considerable. It is authorized to examine witnesses under oath and require the production of documentary evidence, and it may seek the aid of federal courts when it runs up against a recalcitrant witness. It may require employers, labor unions, and employment agencies to keep relevant records and to make periodic reports, and it may cause them to post conspicuous notices on their premises informing all concerned of their rights and privileges under this title. In a state which has a fair employment practices law of its own, the local authorities are given a period of up to 120 days to deal with any complaint, and before that period is up, the federal Commission may not intervene. Elsewhere, federal jurisdiction attaches immediately.

In either case, if the federal Commission, having investigated and tried persuasion, fails to achieve compliance, an aggrieved individual may bring suit in a federal court, which is again empowered to appoint a lawyer for him and to award him a lawyer's fee if he wins. The court may not only order the defendant to stop discriminating on pain of contempt of court, but may also give special remedies, such as an order of reinstatement of an employee with back pay. The Commission itself has no litigating authority, except that it may initiate civil contempt proceedings when a decree handed down in a private suit has been disobeyed. As under the public accommodations title, the Attorney General is authorized to sue to enforce this title only when he finds that there is "a pattern or practice of resistance."

Those portions of this title which establish the Commission and give it its investigatory powers went into effect, like the rest of the Act, when the President signed it. But the provisions defining and prohibiting discriminatory practices do not go into effect until a year later. There is that much of a period of grace and adjustment. Moreover, these provisions will become effective in 1965 only for employers of 100 or more. Another year will pass before they are applicable to employers of 75 or more, and they will be fully applicable to all employers covered after yet another year (that is, in 1967).

Of the remaining four titles, one (X) sets up the Community Relations Service; another orders a special census of voters, with a view to the highly remote and, on its merits, highly dubious possibility of applying Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which would cut down the representation in the federal House of states that deny the vote to some of their citizens. For the rest, there are some technical provisions, the most important of which, mentioned earlier, deals with jury trials.

WITHOUT question, this Civil Rights Act is a momentous statute, comparable in importance to the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 and the reforms of the first Wilson administration and of the first two administrations of Franklin Roosevelt. In the long view, the significance of such a statute rises quite above this or that inadequacy in its provisions. The point is that it commits the federal government, and particularly Congress—which can do things neither the President nor the judiciary, despite their prior commitment, could do alone—to a set of national goals that reach beyond minimal constitutional requirements. The commitment is not likely to be revoked, and the goals are not likely to be reduced. Over the years, an organic enactment like this trails further judicial and legislative law in its wake. There will be interpretations and amendments, all striving to make it, like the federal union itself, "more perfect." And they will be achieved, despite occasional setbacks, more easily than the initial step. Such a statute affects the expectations and aspirations of the people, and the sense of duty and function of the institutions of government. For everyone concerned, it changes the universe of discourse.

But that is the long view. More immediately, how will the Act be translated into everyday life, North and South? Its address is largely to the South. In its education and employment titles, and in some measure even in the voting and federal assistance titles, it explicitly excludes application to problems that are typically Northern. To be sure, grievances in the North are, by and large, difficult and in the short run often impossible to redress by legislation. They are rooted, on the whole, not in deficiencies in the legal order, or in blatant discriminations that can be stopped with immediately visible results, but in deeply intricate features of the society which can be reorganized only over time. For all that, however, it is regrettable that the Act on its face looks in many places like a regional measure, for this lays it open to the deadly charge that Northerners are mostly interested in dealing with the racial difficulties of others, but not with their own. Even so, the Act will not be entirely without effect in the North: it will have some supportive effect on extra-legal pressure applied by the Negroes themselves; the public accommodations and employment titles will activate similar laws that have lain in some disuse in many states; and these titles will be widely obeyed in the North, even by people who in the past chose to shut their eyes to the state statutes. Moreover, the Community Relations

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Service, which is not confined merely to seeking compliance with the mandatory provisions of the Act, may prove to be a useful presence in the North, too.

In the South, provided only that the Justice Department is given enough money to double or triple its staff of civil rights lawyers, registration of Negro voters and public school desegregation ought to pick up quite noticeably, even if there is no great movement toward voluntary compliance. Results should be forthcoming within a reasonably short time with respect also to federally financed programs, of which there are a great many, including hospitals, libraries, vocational training, aid to higher education, and more. The public accommodations and employment titles, affecting as they do the actions not only of officials but of many thousands of private persons and institutions, must, like all such pervasive regulatory measures, gain general acceptance, however grudging, in order to be effective. It will take, said Senator Goldwater, a police state to enforce this law, and he was almost right; it *would* take. Absolute enforcement of any statute that is resisted consistently and on principle by substantial numbers of people would require a police state. But we do not expect absolute enforcement in such circumstances. By means of occasional enforcement, *pour encourager les autres,* and by other means of inducement and persuasion, we undertake rather to reduce the number of those who resist. That is what is in prospect in the South for the public accommodations and equal employment titles, and that is why the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the Community Relations Service, which are inducing rather than enforcing agencies, are so important. Of course, inducement, persuasion, and mediation would not be very effective if the law did not declare in mandatory fashion some standard of behavior to which the mediators can urge people to measure up. And persuasion is not unnaturally hampered if an adamant refusal to be moved by it is known to be an alternative that never costs anything. Yet, while enforcement is a sword that is sometimes wielded, its chief uses are Damoclean.

At the beginning, however, litigation will play a role out of proportion to its eventual significance in rendering the public accommodations and equal employment titles effective. For although there will be some voluntary compliance almost immediately, some of it will await the outcome of the first round of litigation. As with all new statutes, there are issues of meaning and application about which doubt is legitimately possible, and which only litgation can authoritatively resolve. We may expect that the constitutionality of the titles dealing with public accommodations, employment, and federal financial assistance will be attacked at wholesale—the constitutionality of other provisions being for the most part quite specifically settled by existing decisions. Despite assertions to the contrary, there is no doubt that the public accommodations and employment titles are constitutional on their face and in general application, and that they will be so held by the Supreme Court in very short order. They rest on the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce, a concept broadly defined in many contexts in the past, some of which—for example, wages-and-hour and child-labor legislation, the Pure Food and Drug Act, labor legislation in general, and the Mann Act—are quite analogous. Nor is there any doubt of the power of the federal government to set conditions on the disbursement of federal funds; indeed, under decided cases, there is considerable doubt whether the federal government may constitutionally allow its funds to be used in discriminatory fashion.

Beyond the constitutional issue, there will be questions of construction. Such questions, becoming increasingly marginal, will continue to arise throughout the life of the statute. A number of initial ones can be foreseen. There are sure to crop up in the South things like "intrastate hotels" accepting no interstate travelers, "intrastate theaters" offering only local entertainment, and all varieties of private clubs. Their *bona fides* will be subject to litigation, as will the question, assuming *bona fides,* whether the statute was intended to cover them. In one instance—in the case of restaurants—the statute speaks of a "substantial" connection with interstate commerce. It remains for litigation to determine just exactly what that means, and the concept of a substantial connection may be read into other portions of the statute as well. Again, the Attorney General's authority to sue is limited to cases where he finds a practice or pattern of resistance, under both the public accommodations and the employment titles. What does this phrase mean? What is its geographic coverage? Are statistics a sufficient proof of a pattern of resistance?

Before as well as after the first round of litigation, but particularly after, much will depend on the amount of pressure exerted by Negro communities, and on the effectiveness of the Community Relations Service and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The quality of the President's appointments to those bodies, and the kind of public support he gives them, will be extremely important. The President's first appointment—that of former Governor LeRoy Collins of Florida as head of the Service—and the prominence he gave it, augur well for the future. But in any event, the goals are set and they are set high. They will be attained, sooner or later. This statute was the point of no return.

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MORDECHAI AMER

THE YOKE OF THE TORAH

A Memoir

I WAS BORN in Morocco, in the village of Uled Musur which sits high up on a cliff. Below the village flows a river that can be reached only by descending a steep, winding path. Where it passes our village the river's banks are broad and flat, but further on they grow narrower and the water laps right up against the stones.

The river is of great use. Besides irrigating the fields and vineyards, it provides power to run the mills in the hundreds of Arab villages along its banks. It also swarms with fish of all kinds, some weighing as much as five pounds, and is important as a source of food and livelihood for the Jews in the area. They supply the fish to fellow Jews living in villages further inland. The Arabs do not eat fish, and hence are not fishermen. Some of the Jews also own plots of land on the river banks which they cultivate alongside their Arab neighbors.

The entire river plain is dotted with Arab villages, a half hour's journey by donkey from one to another. The few Jewish villages on the plain are several hours' riding time apart. Distances are reckoned in this way because the donkey is the main local means of transportation, and no one travels by bus except perhaps to get to the capital city of Marrakech, which is about sixty kilometers away.

MY MIND lets go of many things, but one dark day is forever imprinted on my heart, the day which separated me from my mother and kinfolk and eventually was to send me wandering from village to village and from town to town like some solitary wild bird.

I remember that as soon as I stepped down from the bus behind my father I was confounded, for I had never seen anything like it before. The streets throbbed with passers-by of every description, the dark and the fair, the lowly and the arrogant, the halt, the lame, and the blind. Crippled beggars held canes in one hand and thrust out wooden plates with the other—they stood shoulder to shoulder, blocking the narrow, cramped way. Men of affairs trod on the heels of ne'er-do-wells, and sharp-eyed characters who seemed to be pickpockets roamed around, on the alert for any rooster flown into their coop.

As we set out for the *mellah,** my father seized me so hard by the elbow that I felt as though my skinny arm was being pulled from its socket. I stopped walking and knelt on the ground, like a goat at the drinking trough.

"Father," I cried, "let go! There's no need to hold me so tight. I'm not a wild animal trying to get out of its cage."

"Be quiet," he roared, "and get moving!"

I began to tremble at his violence.

"Do you want to get lost in this crowd?" he continued, but more softly this time. "I could go on searching for you all day and never find you. And what would I do then?"

I tried to believe that my father had grabbed me so fiercely because he was solicitous of my welfare, so I tightened my lips and allowed myself to be dragged along like a dog on a rope. But it was a long way to the *mellah,* my legs ached and I was frightened. Finally, I could bear it no longer. "Please, father," I cried, "Shorten your steps. My legs can't carry me any further. Please!"

"We have no time to lose. The rabbi won't wait for us. In an hour he'll leave the yeshiva and our trip will have been for nothing."

"But there will be other days, father, won't there? The rabbi will come back tomorrow, won't he? It isn't like missing a *chuppah* or coming too late to usher in the Sabbath bride."

Father flew into a rage. "Be quiet, you bone of a donkey! If you were down by the river now, you'd be skipping and jumping from rock to rock like a deer on the mountain peaks. But here where patience is needed, you complain. You and your crooked legs!"

Having reminded himself of my faults, my father raised his arm and hit me so hard on the back that I saw stars. I held my tongue, but from that time on, I hated him. The image of my mother came to me and I longed for her with

MORDECHAI AMER (1927-1961) was a poet and writer who was born in Morocco and later emigrated to Israel. A year before his death he began writing his memoirs, parts of which have appeared in the Israeli journal *Ammot* and from which the present piece has been excerpted. It was translated from the Hebrew by Jacob Sloan.

*The Jewish quarter—ED.

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all my soul. Yet I followed behind my father. What else was there to do? "Should the axe pit itself against him that heweth therewith?" I wept to myself but made no sound. I was still wiping the tears from the corners of my eyes, when we finally arrived at the *mellah*. I looked up at the sky and held out my arms. "May this place turn to ruins," I cried, "for the suffering it has caused me. I have been beaten for no fault of my own."

FROM A distance we could hear the sound of the students reciting in chorus. It grew louder as we approached the yeshiva. "Thank the good Lord," said my father, slowing his steps, "the rabbi must still be there. Now we can both be happy, my son. Let us wait for him." My father sat down on a bench and motioned me to join him, but I lay down at his feet, like a calf—I heavy of heart, he heavy of flesh. My father placed his hand on my head, stroked it, and gave me his blessing: "May God favor you and fill all your needs." Then he reached into the straw hamper we had brought with us from home and took out a cloth, which he spread out on the bench between us. Next he peered with eyes as keen as a vulture's into the depths of the hamper, which was filled with bread, fowl, fish, figs, and grapes. After rummaging around inside for a while, he came out with a whole chicken and some fried fish, which filled me with homesickness. Only yesterday I had caught them myself and my mother had decreed that they must come along with us in the hamper. My father cut the chicken into pieces, finished laying the table and urged me to eat before the rabbi appeared.

"I'm tired," I said, "let me rest a while. 'I don't want your honey, and I don't want your sting.' "

My father sighed heavily, perhaps regretting that he had struck me. He rose and put his arms around me. He stroked my head and shoulders and embraced me so hard I felt my ribs cracking. I put my head between my knees. "Let me alone, father," I said. "You had no pity on me before—you squeezed my arm, and you pushed me, and you hit me—do you think I am made of iron? For two hours, the sun beat in on me through the windows of the bus. When the journey was finally over I was drenched with sweat and dead tired, and the right thing would have been to rest before we went further. But you would not permit it. And here we have come too early, and the rabbi is still in the yeshiva!"

Father looked at me and said sadly, "You are right, my son, but if I forced you to hurry, I had my reasons. Had the rabbi departed, I would have had to delay my return home until late tomorrow. Then I would have failed to meet the Arab tomorrow morning at the marketplace as we agreed. And he—God forbid—would have sold the cow and the sheep shearings himself, taken the money and then—*you* go search for him!"

My father implored me with his gaze but I would not forgive him, for there was not a word of truth in it. My cousin was studying there at the yeshiva, and if worse had come to worse he could have interceded in my behalf with the rabbi. I told my father so and he grew silent. Then he took hold of his beard with one hand, dug his thumb into it and twisted it all the way around, all the time keeping his eyes fixed on me. When I said nothing, he repeated the whole performance. Finally, he let go of his beard, put his hand in his pocket, took out a 20-franc note, and handed it to me. As the proverb says, "Money answers all questions."

Instantly I hit upon a plan. Very well, I would pretend to be soothed. My father would be leaving that same afternoon; on the very next morning I would make my way back to the village and to my mother. I took the 20-franc note, tied it in a knot in the tails of my striped shirt, and joined my father at his meal. After a few minutes the students began emerging from the yeshiva, and one by one as they passed, they looked at me. Here's another victim, they seemed to be thinking. Suddenly my father stood up. "Prepare to greet the rabbi," he whispered urgently. I was altogether confused. What was I to do? I started fumbling at my clothes. "Don't take your shirt off," he hissed. "Kiss his hand!" I felt like laughing. Was that what my father called "preparing" to meet the rabbi? Why, the smallest child in Morocco knows that when you meet a rabbi you kiss his hand—what else is there to do? As a matter of fact, you kiss the hand of any man with a long enough beard, even if his head is empty.

The rabbi continued down the steps, with my cousin following respectfully behind. Father hurried over, bent his head, seized the rabbi's hand, and kissed it. I did the same. The rabbi glanced in my direction.

"This is the boy I told you about," said my cousin coming between us.

The rabbi looked me over for some time in silence. Then he placed his hand on my shoulder, felt along my arm for the elbow, and pressed it softly and delicately. Without moving my head, I stole a glance at his hand. The skin was white as goat's milk and soft as silk. The rabbi had probably never done a hard day's work in his life.

"What's your name, lad?"

"My real name is Mordechai," I stammered, "but I am called Maridoch—it's my nickname." I was unable to hide anything from him. If he had asked me what my father did for a living, or any other intimate questions about my family, I would have answered without a moment's hesitation.

But he asked nothing that was not directly to

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the point. He must have understood with whom he was dealing. Here was he, who spent his days poring over the most intricate treatises, pondering the most subtle of paradoxes, called upon to examine a child who had neither learning nor breeding, a child like a threshed sheaf, hollow and seedless, which the smallest breeze could uproot.

The rabbi paused for a moment. "Here your name will be Mordechai," he said. "Tell me, Mordechai—have you studied the Five Books of Moses?"

"Yes."

"And the Ethics of the Fathers?"

"Yes."

"And the Proverbs of Solomon?"

"Yes."

"Mordechai, where does it say: 'This is the way of the Torah—a morsel of bread with salt shall be thy portion, and water in measure to drink'?"

"In the Ethics of the Fathers."

To myself I thought: "Ah yes, Maridoch—the exile in a strange city is beginning for you. 'A morsel of bread with salt. . .' "

"And where does it say: 'Go to the ant, thou sluggard, study her ways and be wise'?"

"In the Book of Proverbs."

THERE were many other questions. The examination lasted a long time, and I was frightened and anxious. I could not take my eyes off the rabbi. How well-fed he looked, how well-dressed. He seemed to glow with learning. But though everything about him was respectable and dignified, I was fiercely angry at him. Why did he torment me with questions? What is the ant to me, I thought, that this beardless man dwells so upon him—when my ancestors, perhaps all the way back to the Spanish Exile, never put a razor to their faces? I had imagined the rabbi would have a beard down to his navel.

At last it was over. The hand, soft as oil, stopped stroking my own. The rabbi turned to my father, stretched his neck, breathed deeply, opened his mouth, and delivered a judgment. "Since he has studied the Five Books of Moses, and a little of the Prophets and the Chronicles as well, it should not be too hard for him to study a bit of Talmud also." Whereupon he bade us all farewell and departed.

The rabbi's decision filled me with consternation, but my father's face beamed, and his beard trembled with delight. "Dear son," he cried, "who would have imagined that you would pass the test without a single error!" His cry of affectionate pride saddened me. I was already smarting with loneliness and thinking only of how best to carry out my plan of returning to mother. Money was no problem—I had more than enough tied up in my shirttails. But who could show me the way back to the bus station through the streets that wound like snakes, thronged with big city people of every kind?

I was preoccupied with these thoughts when my father, who had been deep in conversation with my cousin, turned his attention to me. He put his hand on my shoulder and tried, with soft words, to paint a glowing picture of my future:

"My dear son, heart's-ease and light of my eyes, do this thing for your own sake and not for mine, for the sake of your future and your honor. Study hard, day and night, and though your beginnings are humble your end will be lofty indeed. You will be maintained in comfort and property. From village and town the people will come unto you to pour water on your hands. Your name will be revered, and your whole family will share in its blessing. Oh source of my strength, first-born of my power, listen to what I have heard from the lips of my masters: A man must be willing to give his life to the study of Torah. For it is more precious than pearls and it cannot be valued with the gold of Ophir. And I for my part will send you enough every month to meet your needs. My beloved, I have told you my deepest feelings. I am sure you will take them to heart."

Having finished his sermon, my father seized my cousin by the hand and drew him aside once again, motioning me away when I made as if to follow. Whatever secrets they were discussing clearly had to do with me, and I was determined to listen. It turned out to require no effort at all. So piercing was my father's stage whisper that every passerby was soon informed of the secret thoughts troubling his heart.

"Hear me, nephew, kinsman mine," he hissed. "What I ask is that you keep a sharp eye on this lad of mine, since it is quite likely he will try to escape and return home. Don't for a moment imagine that he is the innocent lamb he appears to be. He's a devil, an outlaw deer, one of the *green* devils"—Father believed only in devils of that particular color. "Let him have his way and he'd be out on the river all day, and never bother to study at all."

Waxing indignant, my father raised his right arm and flailed the air.

"How many nets of his have I torn to pieces, how many fishhooks have I thrown away, how many times have I beaten him with all my strength—but it does no good! No sooner is the punishment over than he's back by the river again with the devil twisting his net. And all I want is for something to come of him in the future, for him to be a credit to the family, and to bring back the old days."

Father's secret stung me to the quick, causing my heart to beat faster and my knees to shake. And my cousin's reply only increased my despair. "Return home in peace," he told my father. "There is nothing to worry about—my cousin

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will not escape my watchful eye. Beginning tomorrow he will take up the yoke of the Torah. In this place there is neither river nor sea to attract his heart and befuddle his mind; there is nothing to distract him from his studies."

Father was delighted. He clasped Jacob by the shoulders and led him toward me, his face beaming with reassurance. It had not occurred to my father that another soul might have been privy to his confidences.

Seizing my reluctant hand in his own, he launched into another hymn of sweetness, turning now and then to wink at Jacob: "Oh heart's-ease and light of my eyes, crown and garland for my head! I was just talking to Jacob about you, and I told him to fulfill your every wish. Any time you need money, go straight to him. I will not be sparing with you. I shall sell our fat, heavy-treading cow; she will fetch a good price, and I shall send the proceeds to you."

Mark you, he seemed to be telling Jacob all the while, how a shrewd man can put a pretty face on the most devious scheme.

When father had concluded this piece of hypocrisy, he delivered me into the custody of my cousin, urging him once again to attend to all my wants. Then he bade us farewell and set out on the homeward road. I did not take my eyes from his retreating figure until it had completely disappeared from sight.

My cousin and I threaded our way through the marketplace of the *mellah,* which was so noisy and crowded that, in the words of the proverb, "if you threw away a needle it would surely fall on someone's head."

The air was filled with the fragrance of grilled meat and the shouts of the vendors describing the delicacies they had for sale: "Come and taste the heart, kidneys, and liver of a tender young calf!"

"Are you a connoisseur? Are you an epicurean? Taste the sea fish called *buri* which is the most delicious in the world. Incomparable! Sweeter than honey! Guaranteed to cure all afflictions."

Continuing on our way, we passed a row of stores that were set back into the wall. Across their doors were bars as thick as railroad ties and locks weighing several pounds. My cousin looked down at me. "Have you ever seen such wonders in your life before? And this is but a drop in the sea."

I whispered under my breath: "It's not enough to change my mind about going home."

"Speak up," said my cousin.

"It's all very fine, but there's too much noise."

My cousin was silent for a moment. "Time will do its work," he said.

IT WAS already ten-thirty at night when Jacob and I left a tavern where we had eaten a strange dish—hash with pickled lemon. Again I followed him through the narrow twisted streets of the *mellah* as he conducted me to the lodgings we were to share during my stay at the yeshiva. When we arrived, Jacob opened the door and preceded me in, pausing to light a candle while I waited in the doorway. "Welcome to your new home," he said. "You must be tired from all your travels today. Your bed is already prepared for you. Lie down and go to sleep and I'll be back quite soon." I was terrified. How could he go off and leave me alone in a strange place? He explained that courtesy required him to visit his "master of the house"—as the yeshiva students called those at whose homes they regularly had their meals—and explain why he had failed to appear for dinner. Promising that he would be gone only briefly, my cousin departed.

By the flickering candlelight I examined my new surroundings. The room was large and bare with a high ceiling and whitewashed walls. In the center was a round table piled high with books and next to it stood two chairs. A few wooden pegs knocked into the wall formed a makeshift closet covered by a curtain.

I lay down on the bed, put my head on the pillow, and began talking to myself. Yesterday at this time I had been safe at home, asleep in a room together with my brothers. Now I was all alone. I shut my eyes and tried with all my might to fall asleep, but I could not stop thinking. I thought first about my father and his exhortations to study. Then I thought about His Honor the Rabbi and the verses he had tested me with, and about the meaning of it all. Finally I thought about my plan of returning home to my mother.

By squinting as hard as I could, I was able to conjure up a picture of the river near my village and of myself standing right there on the bank casting my net in front of me as I had been doing only two days before. How happy I had been! After a while I realized there was no point in trying any longer to fall asleep, so I got out of bed and sat down at the table. Leafing through my cousin's books in the hope of finding some distraction, I came across a psaltery. I read a few psalms aloud to myself and grew calm enough to go back to bed. But still I could not sleep. A voice inside me talked on and on: "Maridoch, you poor fellow, did you notice what quotations the rabbi chose to examine you on? What is the meaning of the verse, 'A morsel of bread with salt shall be thy portion, and water in measure to drink . . . '—and how does it go on?—'. . . a life of suffering shalt thou live in an alien city.' Why did the rabbi choose that particular passage and not some other one? The answer is clear. He chose it so that there would be no recriminations against him in the future. If you ever come and complain to him about your hard lot, he can always reply: 'You knew the verse that first day you came to the yeshiva, you knew

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the fate of the student of Torah—so what right have you to complain to me now?' And what will your fate be at the end of it all, Maridoch—when you have completed all the suffering and the toil and the labor? If you're lucky, you won't have to grow a terribly long beard and wander from town to town and village to village. You'll find some old ramshackle synagogue where you can teach pupils Talmud so you won't have to go canvassing from door to door armed with a letter of recommendation from some rabbi or other in Jerusalem. No, Maridoch!"—the voice grew much louder—"This life is not for you! Let the rabbi find someone else to train for the wretched life of a scholar. There is another verse, far more appropriate to your temperament—why didn't the rabbi ask you about that one, the verse that reads: 'He that tilleth his ground shall have plenty of bread'? Pick up your legs, Maridoch, and run back to the village of your birth as fast as you can. Grasp the plow with one hand and the reins with the other—as your fathers did before you and their fathers before them!"

How TRUE it all was—yet how often does it happen that when a person begins to examine his plan of action too carefully, he discovers obstacles he hadn't dreamed of at first. For instance, how was I to face my father when I finally got back to my village—my father who had brought me all the way to the city in order to revive the dying reputation of our family, in order to restore our honorable lineage? If I were to thwart his desire by running away from the yeshiva, it would be as though I had wilfully flung sand in his face—and who would be there to defend me? Not my mother, surely, who is as meek as a lamb. One shout from him would be enough to make me an outcast forever.

As I lay there pondering these questions, my cousin Jacob suddenly returned. "Are you still awake?" He sounded surprised, though he had no reason to be. He had promised faithfully to come back at once, and had left me alone for more than an hour.

"I can't fall asleep. At this very time last night I was sound asleep in bed with my brothers, but here my eyes refuse to shut. I don't know why."

I was not the only one who was lonely, Jacob replied—he, too, had wandered far from home. He assured me that the same thing happens to everyone who finds himself in a strange bed in a new place. "On the first night," he declared, as though it were a law, "sleep escapes you."

So saying, Jacob sat down at the table, opened one of his books and began to study. I was amazed. "He who wishes to gain knowledge of the Torah must work by night as well as by day," he said, "for it is written: 'This book of the Law shall not depart out of thy mouth, but thou shalt meditate thereon day and night.' Besides, our sages, of blessed memory, said: 'At night a man's mind is clearer and he is more capable of grasping things.'"

His homily concluded, my cousin returned to the volume and sank deeper and deeper into contemplation. After a time, his eyes closed and his head drooped, but when his chin landed on the pages of the open book, he awoke with a start and sighed deeply. "Time will come to an end, but the words of the sages are eternal." And with that, he closed the volume, put out the candle, and climbed into bed. In a moment, he was sound asleep.

At the break of dawn, he awoke. He sprinkled water on his hands and face, dressed, and picked up the velvet bag containing his phylacteries, prayer shawl, and prayer book.

"Are you coming with me to the synagogue?"

I hesitated. "I don't have to. I am not yet *bar-mitzvah*."

My cousin looked dubious, but he did not press the matter and left without me.

I watched through the window until he had disappeared from sight and then climbed back into bed. Suddenly I remembered my plan of the day before, and leapt out again. There was no time to lose. I dressed as quickly as I could, slipped into my shoes, and was checking to make sure that the 20-franc note was still tied in my shirttails, when there was a knock at the door.

I was amazed. Who could it be? I hesitated, not knowing whether to answer.

There was another knock.

"Open up, Mordechai," a woman's voice called, "it's your neighbor."

How did she know my name? After all, it was my very first morning there and I had arrived when it was already dark. No one had seen me come in. "What do you want, please?" I asked, confused and uncertain.

"Jacob asked me to bring you a cup of tea while he's away at the synagogue."

So that was it! How cunning my cousin was, keeping me under surveillance so that I could not slip away to the river and my fishing net while he was off praying. Yet how could I refuse such a kind invitation? I followed the neighbor woman into her room, and she bade me sit down and wait until the tea was ready.

There was a low humming sound in the room from a copper kettle that was just coming to a boil. It stood on a special pan filled with pieces of charcoal, red hot and shooting off sparks. Most of the room was taken up by a huge bed that seemed to be full of children. Three babies lay fast asleep while two older boys who were already awake quarreled over which of them was to jump out of bed first. Their shouts soon awakened the babies, who promptly burst into tears. The bed swayed back and forth like a ship

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in a stormy sea, and the room grew more and more noisy.

The mother grimaced and waved her hands at the children, but it was no use. Finally she raised her voice: "Moshe! Abraham! That's enough!" she shouted. "You should be ashamed of yourselves, acting that way in front of the new yeshiva student." But they paid not the slightest attention and went on hitting one another, draping the blanket around them and running up and down the room straight up to where the pot stood boiling on the fire; it was a miracle that no one was hurt.

In the meantime the kettle had quieted down and the boiling water sent a flow of steam through the spout. My neighbor wiped clean a few cups and a small incense kettle, into which she threw a handful of tea leaves. Then she stirred the leaves and added a handful of sugar. She stirred the concoction again, added still more sugar and finally after a good deal of further boiling and stirring, the tea was ready. She placed the spout of the incense kettle to the rim of my cup and a stream of brownish liquid flowed out—half water, half froth.

"Drink, Mordechai, don't be ashamed," she said. I gulped the strange liquid down as best I could, thanked her, and returned to my own room.

I HAD been there only a moment when Moshe, the older of the two boys, made an unexpected appearance. He came straight into the room without a word, went over to the books lying on the table—Jacob's treasure—and began rummaging through them for all the world as though they belonged to him—opening them, riffling the pages, slamming them shut. I was quite sure it would end badly. He would tear Jacob's books or at the very least get them dirty, so I asked him kindly to please go back to his mother.

Moshe looked up at me with big, innocent eyes. "To my mother? But she was the one who sent me in here to make sure you don't go away."

So Jacob had gotten not only our neighbor but her whole family to guard me. I was still reflecting on his cunning, when my cousin returned from the synagogue, full of solicitude about my breakfast. I told him I had had tea and he assured me that it would not be long before I would have a "master" to provide for my meals just as he did. Then I would be able to concentrate entirely on my studies. He, too, had suffered from hunger at first and had slept on a bench at the yeshiva without even a pillow for his head or a blanket to cover him. There were days when he hadn't even had the money to buy a piece of bread. But now he was well off. He had a place to eat as well as a place to sleep. So saying, my cousin produced a gold watch from his vest pocket, pressed down on a lid which made the cover spring open, and informed me that it was time to leave for the yeshiva.

Along the way, we met many other students, all hurrying to get to the yeshiva on time but even as they trotted along avidly discussing a problem in dialectics that had been raised by a student the day before. Was the problem, they asked one another, a genuine one, or had a solution already been achieved by the sages of the past? When we arrived, everyone took his assigned place on the bench, opened his book to the Treatise on Divorce and awaited the entrance of His Honor the Rabbi. When he appeared, all the students stood up and bowed their heads. I did the same. The air was filled with reverence and awe. His Honor the Rabbi sat down and motioned with his hand for us to do likewise. Then he proceeded to explicate the passage we had reached in the treatise, citing the wisdom of the masters, both early and late, *Tannaim* as well as *Amoraim*. The lesson went on and on until two o'clock in the afternoon.

TO BE a complete scholar it was necessary not only to be thoroughly familiar with the Bible and the Talmud but also to know by heart at least a few *piyutim** suitable for the various occasions when they are needed—at weddings, for example, or when one is called upon to read a portion of the Torah scroll. But the teaching of *piyutim* is not part of the yeshiva curriculum. Those who wish to learn them must seek out a hymnist of repute and study with him privately.

After a few months at the yeshiva, I was suddenly seized by a strong desire to study this art, for it seemed to me I had an undeniable gift for it. Before long, I thought to myself, who knows—people may be coming from far and wide to marvel at the melodies that come welling from my lips. I asked about among my fellow students and one of them proposed the name of a master hymnist who lived not too far away—and was a tinsmith by trade. I was doubtful at first. Could a man with a gift for composing *piyutim* labor also as a common smith? But my friends who had heard of the man reassured me. Some day, they promised, his hymns would make me famous.

Thus it came about that three of us met one afternoon and made our way together to that quarter of the city where the hymnist was to be found. I was taken aback by the squalor and the poverty that I saw all around. The tinsmith's shop was at the end of a kind of underground passageway through which a stream of sewage coursed, tossing and seething like some subterranean spring. The stench was overpowering. Leaping from one stone to another we arrived at last at a sort of cubicle at the far end of the passage, with a broken-down door that

*Liturgical hymns.

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was held in place by two iron bars. Fastened to it was a crudely lettered sign: "Primuses, Keys, Everything Repaired. Completely Reliable." The rest of us waited outside while the leader of our expedition—who had met the hymnist once before—went inside to explain why we had come. After a few moments, he called us in. What an incredible mess met our eyes. The place was piled high with hardware of all sorts, scrap metal, and ancient primuses dating back to the old days before the arrival of the French—our "redeemers"—in Morocco. The walls were hung with row upon row of old rusty keys, all the way up to the ceiling which was black with soot. What a place to find a singer of hymns! Yet there he was—with scarcely room enough to stand up in all the clutter—looking at us over the rims of his eyeglasses, and plucking at his rust-colored beard. When he opened his mouth to speak, the few teeth he had left showed yellow. "I am Shemtov, the maker of *piyutim*," he said. "You have made no mistake in coming to me, for I am famous. I have taught dozens and dozens of students and all of them have won wide acclaim. Let there be no haggling over the fee. Every hymn I teach you costs twenty francs. You can each pay me ten francs in advance and then on Sunday, God willing, be at my house and we'll have our first lesson." He extended a hand stained with spots of rust, like everything else in the store. The three of us looked at one another, shrugged, exchanged nods of agreement, and paid the teacher what he asked.

On the following Sunday we met at *Adon* Shemtov's house. He placed a mattress on the floor, invited us to be seated, and the lesson got under way. Mainly it was a matter of learning to follow the movements of his hand. When he raised his hand thus, we were to raise our voices; when he lowered his hand thus, we were to lower our voices. Was that clear? Clear as the sun, we replied. Next he recited a hymn and bade us note it down in our copy books: "Oh Lord, have compassion on me, have pity on me, for my hope is in Thee." Though the text was by no means that hard to remember, we did as we were told, after which he demonstrated how the hymn was to be sung, urging us again to keep our eyes fixed on his hand: "Oh please, please, please, oh please, oh please!" he chanted, his hand climbing ever upward . . . "Oh please, oh please, oh please," he continued, "have compassion on me." Down it came. Over and over again he repeated these two phrases, and over and over again we sang them after him. After about twenty attempts we seemed to have mastered half the first line at least, whereupon the hymnist consulted an ancient timepiece and pronounced the lesson over. The next time, he assured us, we would do much better, for beginnings are always the most difficult. On the way home, I expressed some doubts to my friends about the quality of our teacher's *piyutim*, but they urged me to have patience.

By the third or fourth lesson, however, it became clear that our hymnist was a fraud. The *piyutim* we were laboring over were merely fragments pieced together from the penitential hymns of the Yom Kippur service, and they were quite without interest or originality. There was nothing in them likely to charm a bride and groom at their wedding, for example, or a father at the circumcision of his son, nor did they seem particularly appropriate for any other occasion.

We consulted with one another and decided there was nothing to do but give up our lessons and demand the return of our ten francs. But this proved a lot more difficult than we had anticipated. Not only did *Adon* Shemtov refuse point blank to give back the money, he would not even listen to what we had to say. Instead he railed bitterly against us, hurling curses and imprecations. What right had we to cast aspersions on his hymns—we who were merely ignorant provincials, knowing nothing of such things?

"Do you want to hear the same *piyutim* year after year?" he argued. "I compose new ones each season—and what's more they're in rhyme. And those are the main things in a hymn—the rhyme and the rhythm, for the words matter least of all. But you ignoramuses understand nothing of this," he shouted. "You understand only the old-fashioned *piyutim* you heard in your backwoods villages—which sound utterly ridiculous here in the big city, quite out of the question. With us it's new *piyutim* every year, just like the ones I have been teaching you."

AND THEN quite unexpectedly his wrath began to subside, to be replaced by a strange melancholy. Slowly he ran his fingers through his stained, unkempt beard, then felt around in his pockets for a small metal cigarette box, which he held tenderly in the palm of his hand. Then he leaned back with his eyes closed and seemed to be lost in all sorts of sad reflections, as though his whole world lay in ruins because of what we had done. Suddenly he opened his eyes and pressed the sides of the box together; it popped open, offering one cigarette at a time in a most ingenious fashion. It occurred to me that perhaps the hymnist had designed the box himself. Selecting a moldy match from a carton lying nearby, he lit the cigarette, inhaled deeply and breathed the smoke out through his nostrils. Then he sighed, nodded once or twice to himself, and rubbed his hands together.

Seeing that further negotiations would lead nowhere, the three of us turned and left. He did not even seem to notice.

Thus it was that my desire to become a singer of *piyutim* was disappointed, and my strange new life continued as before.

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RICHARD HOFSTADTER

ANTITRUST IN AMERICA

DURING the decades of rapid industrialization that closed the 19th century, it was Americans alone among the peoples of the industrial West who believed deeply enough in the principle of competition to try to protect it by statute. No other country produced anything comparable to our antitrust movement, and it is only very recently that respectful attention has begun to be paid abroad to the methods of big business control embodied in the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 and its supplementary laws. Yet both the antitrust enterprise itself and the American faith in competition have undergone ironic transformations during the 20th century. Fifty or sixty years ago, hostility to big business combinations and the desire to protect or restore competition were among the central themes in American liberal thought. Today the American liberal has largely lost interest in this side of his tradition and has embraced the modern world of organization. Now it is the self-styled conservative who bewails the decline of the entrepreneur and the rugged competitive spirit. If, like the liberal, he fails to show much of the old American suspicion of big business, it is only because he is obsessed with his opposition to the growth of governmental powers. However, while the liberal and the conservative, each for his own reasons, largely accept the present business structure, the antitrust enterprise has in recent decades flourished as it never did in the pristine days of the antitrust movement. At the very time when its function seems to have lost compelling public interest, it has become firmly institutionalized. What is more, it has become for the first time a force of real consequence in influencing business behavior.

IN AMERICA competition was always more than a theory: it was a way of life and a creed. From its colonial beginnings through most of the 19th century, ours was overwhelmingly a nation of farmers and small-town entrepreneurs—ambitious, mobile, optimistic, speculative, anti-authoritarian, egalitarian, and competitive. Americans came to take it for granted that property would be widely diffused, that economic and political power would be decentralized. The fury with which they could be mobilized against any institution that even appeared to violate these expectations by posing a threat of monopoly was manifest in the irrational assault on the Bank of the United States during Jackson's Presidency. Their most respected thinkers habitually assured Americans that the order of society they enjoyed was God-ordained or natural, and they probably thought it would last forever.

Then, with extraordinary rapidity as historical time is reckoned, that order was overwhelmed by the giant corporation. In the last three decades of the 19th century a whole new economic order came into being. This transformation happened so fast that the mind could not easily absorb it. An entire people could hardly be expected to cease overnight to dream the dream of the small entrepreneur. In 1900 the problem of big business and the threat of monopoly were still so new that it was hard to get one's bearings. Bigness had come with such a rush that its momentum seemed irresistible. No one knew when or how it could be stopped.

Not surprisingly, the men of the first antitrust generation made frightening projections into the future. A nation that had gone so fast from competitive small enterprise to corporate giantism might readily develop with equal speed from corporate giantism to a system of monopolistic tyranny. Hence, discussions of big business in the last decades of the 19th century and the opening decade of the 20th were full of anxious forecasts. Most of them were plausible enough at the time, but hardly any of them have been realized.

On this point, Theodore Roosevelt was both shrewder and less anxious than most of his contemporaries. With the exception of railroad regulation, Roosevelt was not profoundly interested in the economic issues that agitated the American

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public during his Presidency; indeed, he was quite candid in confessing his reluctance to tackle them head-on. When in difficulties, as in 1907, he was disposed to trust to the judgment and the political and financial leadership of the conservatives in the Senate or the economic powers in Wall Street. But the trust problem, he realized, was something that must be dealt with on the political level; public concern about it was too urgent to be ignored. He understood how important it was to assure the public that the government of the United States had the will and the power to assert its authority over large corporations. Accordingly, his antitrust prosecutions, although few, were in some cases appropriately spectacular. When he assessed the significance of the Northern Securities Case in 1904, he did not say that it would open the way to a general assault on bigness, but rather that it was important for showing that "the most powerful men in this country were held to accountability before the law." His fundamental solution for the problem—that bigness must be accepted as a part of the modern industrial and social order, and that its behavior should be subjected to administrative control under full publicity—comes somewhat closer than the views of most of his political contemporaries to anticipating the future course of antitrust procedure.

Woodrow Wilson spoke more feelingly for the village democracy, which seems to have been at the center of popular antitrust feeling; but by the same token he illustrated more clearly than Roosevelt its intellectual difficulties. Speaking in the campaign of 1912, he asserted that he too was not against size as such. He was all for bigness as an inevitable and natural growth, whenever it was the outcome of superior efficiency. But he was against "the trusts," which had grown out of illicit competition. Wilson was never very successful, however, in explaining why a business that had grown large through legitimate methods might not become just as menacing to competition as one that had grown large through illicit competition. His statement, "I am for big business and I am against the trusts," seems hardly more than an attempt to evade the argument that there is a self-liquidating threat inherent in competition.

IN A SENSE the Sherman Act was simply another manifestation of an enduring American suspicion of concentrated power—a stage in the perennial American quest for a way of dividing, diffusing, and checking power and preventing its exercise by a single interest, or by a consolidated group of interests at a single center. Thus, the political impulse behind the Sherman Act was clearer and more articulate than the economic theory. Men who used the vaguest language when they talked about "the trusts" and monopolies—who had not thought through the distinction between size itself and monopolistic practices, who had found no way of showing how much competition was necessary for efficiency, who could not in every case say what competitive acts they thought were fair or unfair, or who could not state a rational program that reconciled their acceptance of size with their desire for competition—were nevertheless reasonably clear about what it was that they were trying to avoid: they wanted to keep concentrated private power from destroying democratic government.

One of the glories of the competitive model had been that it purported to solve the question of market power by denying any particular location to it. The decisions of the market were beautifully impersonal, since they were only the averagings of the decisions of thousands of individuals, none of whom enjoyed any decisive power. Hence, the market mechanism met the characteristic desire for the diffusion of power and seemed to be the perfect economic counterpart of American democratic pluralism.

The most articulate expression of the Progressives' case against the political power of monopoly was made by Woodrow Wilson in 1912. It was the burden of his argument, as against T.R., that once the existence of large-scale combinations is accepted, their regulation by government becomes impossible, because the political power of business combination will be great enough to nullify all attempts at its control. Wilson played artfully on the fears and suspicions of the small entrepreneurs. Even some very powerful men, he said, knew that "there is a power somewhere so organized, so subtle, so watchful, so interlocked, so complete, so pervasive, that they had better not speak above their breath when they speak in condemnation of it. . . . They know that somewhere, by somebody, the development of industry is being controlled." He pictured concentrated capital as being already in control of the government: "The masters of the government of the United States are the combined capitalists and manufacturers of the United States. . . . The government of the United States at present is a foster-child of the special interests."

This "colossal 'community of interest'" was a thing that the laws must "pull apart, and gently, but firmly and persistently dissect." Otherwise, under Roosevelt's plan for accepting and regulating monopolies, there would only be a union between monopoly and government: "If monopoly persists, monopoly will always sit at the helm of the government. I do not expect to see monopoly restrain itself. If there are men in this country big enough to own the government of the United States, they are going to own it."

Scarcely less important than the other objectives of antitrust action was the psychological

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and moral objective, which sprang from the traditionally Puritan conviction that competition has a disciplinary value for character, quite aside from its strictly economic uses. America was thought to have been made possible by the particular type of character that was forged by competitive individualism, a type which had flourished in the United States because competitive opportunities had been so widespread that alert men could hardly fail to see them, to grasp and use them, and hence to be shaped by them. For this process to take place, it was important that business be carried on fairly—the sporting vocabulary was never far below the surface—and that newcomers be able to enter the game as entrepreneurs on reasonably open terms.

Here again one looks to Woodrow Wilson for the most articulate expression of this emphasis on the economic foundations of character, and especially to the masterful speeches of 1912 in which he expressed his concern for "the beginner," "the man with only a little capital," "the man on the make," upon whose genius he thought the country had always been built. "The treasury of America," he argued, "lies in those ambitions, those energies, that cannot be restricted to a special favored class." Under large-scale organization it was possible, Wilson hinted, that the country would turn its back on its past, which he evoked in poignant terms:

> . . . the ancient time when America lay in every hamlet, when America was to be seen in every fair valley, when America displayed her great forces on the broad prairies, ran her fine fires of enterprise up over the mountainsides and down into the bowels of the earth, and eager men were everywhere captains of industry, not employees; not looking to a distant city to find out what they might do, but looking about among their neighbors, finding credit according to their character, not according to their connections, finding credit in proportion to what was known to be in them and behind them, not in proportion to the securities they held that were approved where they were not known.

The prospect that these "fine fires of enterprise" were about to be quenched suggested that the old kind of character would be destroyed, that the old America was about to die—a reason even more imperative than mere industrial efficiency for seeking out the possibilities of antitrust action.

THERE are two salient differences between the problem of bigness as it was perceived in the Progressive era and as it is perceived now: first, it is no longer a new problem; and second, the economy has performed in a way hardly dreamed of before World War II. In 1964 we are as remote in time from the passage of the Sherman Act as the men of 1864 were from the first term of George Washington. The public has had almost three-quarters of a century of experience in living with big business, and analysts of the big business problem no longer make the frightening projections of its future dangers that were made with entire plausibility sixty or seventy years ago. At the same time, the public is hardly unaware that a great rise in mass standards of living has occurred during the period in which the economy has been dominated by the big corporation. Whatever else may be said against bigness, the conception of monopolistic industry as a kind of gigantic, swelling leech on the body of an increasingly deprived and impoverished society has largely disappeared.

About the change in public attitudes from those prevailing sixty years ago we can only make an educated guess. Today we can check our impressions of the public mind against opinion polls; for the earlier era we have impressions alone. But anyone who reads widely in the political literature of the period 1890-1914 can hardly believe that public concern today over big business has anything like the sense of urgency it had then. In 1951 the Institute of Social Research of the University of Michigan published the results of an illuminating survey, *Big Business as the People See It*. Its findings show some residues of the old popular suspicion of bigness, but the noteworthy thing is public acceptance. Americans have always had to balance their love of bigness and efficiency against their fear of power and their regard for individualism and competition. The survey indicates that this ambivalence has been largely resolved in favor of big business organization.

A quarter of the population, as represented in the Institute's national sample, showed some concern over big business and were aware that it had an important effect on their lives. But a substantial majority reacted favorably to big business. Asked to characterize its social effects, the respondents answered as follows:

The good things outweigh the bad things	76%
They seem about equal	2%
The bad things outweigh the good things	10%
Don't know	5%
Confused; evaluation not ascertainable	7%

Plainly, big business was no longer a scare-word to the public at large. Questioned on particulars, respondents spoke with especial favor of the productive powers of big business and its ability to give jobs and keep prices down. The most critical responses about big business dealt mainly with its effect on "the little man" and the destruction of competition. Very little concern was expressed about the power of big business over its workers (it is commonly regarded as a good employer), and surprisingly little about its influence on government. In addition, stronger feeling was shown against labor unions than against big business.

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To what can we attribute this public acceptance of big business? Not much, I believe, to the efforts big businessmen have made to cultivate a favorable "image" for the large corporation. As the fate of the postwar campaign to sell "free enterprise" suggests, such efforts—when they represent nothing more than an attempt to make the public take seriously the blather with which business sometimes comforts itself—can miscarry badly. What has really made bigness palatable is the remarkable performance of the economy since the beginning of World War II. Something too must be credited to the emergence of countervailing bigness in government and labor, whose effects on public attitudes emerge clearly from the Michigan survey. Moreover, anyone who is aware of the historical circumstances under which hostility to big business flourished must be aware that big business has not lived up to the horrifying billing that it got in the age of the muckrakers. It is not merely that no business today treats competitors as they were treated in the early days of the National Cash Register Company or Standard Oil. What is important is that a whole range of fears, expressed in the Progressive generation and based largely upon preoccupation with an unknown future, has vanished. We now live in that future, and although it has fears of its own—nightmarish beyond anything anticipated in the days of Bryan and Wilson—they are of a wholly different origin. Probably the worst of the Populist-Progressive nightmares was the notion—expressed in the Pujo Committee's inquiry, in Brandeis's *Other People's Money*, in Wilson's speeches, and in Jack London's *The Iron Heel*—of the formation, under the auspices of the investment bankers, of a giant syndicate, a combination of the combinations, which would rule the country with a tyrannical grip. The self-financing character of the great corporations, the survival of competition in investment banking, and the failure of investment banking to remain a power of the first order after the crash of 1929, have set this spectre to rest.

If no sinister central syndicate had to be feared, it did at least seem reasonable at the turn of the century to anticipate a steady, growing concentration of industry that would eventually deprive the country of every advantage of competition. And here, insofar as the antitrust enterprise was directed against size itself or against concentration, it was beaten before it ever got started; American industry was already highly concentrated in 1904, when T.R. was boasting about the lessons of the Northern Securities Case. But insofar as the Progressives were worried about what the economists later came to call "workable competition" in industry, they might well have been reassured as time went on. The investigations of such economists as M. A. Adelman, G. Warren Nutter, and George J. Stigler have cast considerable doubt on the idea that either the scope of monopoly or the degree of concentration has, in fact, grown since the beginning of the century. "The extent of concentration," Adelman concluded in an important study, "shows no tendency to grow, and it may possibly be declining. Any tendency either way, if it does exist, must be at the pace of a glacial drift."

Another typical fear expressed in Progressive writing was that the possibility of individual advancement would be frozen out, that the upward social mobility that had refreshed and inspired American development in the past would come to an end, when the business of the country was fully dominated by the large corporation. I know of no very certain information on how the American public regards the prospects for social mobility today, although our concerted scramble for educational position and advantage suggests that the middle-class public and even much of the working-class public are rather well aware that mobility still exists; and they are equally aware of the mechanisms through which it can be pursued. What can be said with greater confidence is that informed observers no longer speak so glibly of the decline of mobility or opportunity.

Indeed, there is strong evidence that the opportunity of middle- or lower-class men to rise to top positions in business has somewhat increased over what it was fifty or sixty years ago, and there is reason to believe that the increase, or at least the persistence, of occupational opportunity has impressed itself on the public mind. In fact, the modern corporation has proved to be a better medium for social mobility and opportunity than the old system of individual and family entrepreneurship, whose openness in this respect was always much exaggerated. Oddly enough, the concentration of capital and the divorce of ownership from the entrepreneurial function may prove in the long run to be more conducive to the lowering of social tensions and to political stability than diffused individual ownership. The ways of achieving occupational advancement and economic success have changed; individual entrepreneurship is a much less sure and satisfactory path than a bureaucratic career. The acquisition of specialized skills has become more important, and with it the seizure and exploitation of educational opportunities.

I do not mean to suggest that the old ideal of self-employment, or the old confidence in the entrepreneurial path to success, have been entirely abandoned in favor of the bureaucratic career. The incidence of self-employment and the proportion of the population that actually lives by the competitive ideal have shrunk very considerably in the three-quarters of a century since the Sherman Act; but most of this is attributable

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to the numerical decline of family farmers, who in 1890 still comprised nearly half the population and today comprise about a tenth. The farmers, with their contemporary dependence on subsidies and governmentally administered prices, can hardly be looked upon any more as vigorous exponents of the competitive way of life. But the dream of self-employment that dominated the agrarian-entrepreneurial society of the 19th century is still alive. It has been estimated that about 20 to 30 per cent of the American working force has been at some time or another self-employed. The growth of small business over the past dozen years or so has roughly kept pace with the growth of the adult population, and the aspirations of small business have been institutionalized in Senate and House committees as well as in some antitrust activities.

Although small business holds its place as a segment of the economy itself, its role as a sector of society committed to the entrepreneurial ideal has declined. Small business can no longer be idealized for its independence and hardihood, or its devotion to competitive principles. It, too, looks to government intervention for sustenance, whether in the form of resale price maintenance, anti-chainstore legislation, or the Small Business Administration. Small business, which used to be, as one writer has put it, "a symbol of opportunity, enterprise, innovation, and achievement" and of "an independent way of life," has been driven largely into the marginal areas of economic life, where it often tries to maintain itself by waging its own assaults upon the competitive principle. Various segments of small business, in their pressure for support for the Robinson-Patman Act of 1936 and the Miller-Tydings Amendment of 1937, have shown how quickly they can be rallied against competition, when it impinges upon their own interests. Vigorous advocates of the Sherman and Clayton Acts where big business is affected, they turn their backs on competitive virility when it suits their purposes. If there is anything rarer than a small businessman who will question the merits of competition, it is one who can understand and abide competition when it really afflicts him.

Not only can the small businessman not purport, in the eyes of any well-informed observer, to be a vigorous and consistent exemplar of the competitive ideal; he can no longer be idealized by progressive-minded men from other walks of life, as he could, say, in the era when Woodrow Wilson waxed rhapsodic about the new men out of "unknown homes" who had really made America. In the United States and elsewhere, liberal intellectuals now cock a suspicious eye at him, if not as a potential stronghold of support for fascist movements, at least as the backbone of the reactionary wing of the Republican party. An occasional big business leader may stand out for his enlightenment and urbanity, but the small businessman more often than not proves to be a refractory anti-union employer, a parochial and archaic opponent of liberal ideas, a supporter of vigilante groups and of right-wing cranks. As a figure in our economic society, the small businessman still plays a part of some considerable importance, but as a partner in the American liberal coalition, he has all but disappeared, and with him has gone much of the pristine anti-bigness feeling of the Progressive tradition.

Still, the conviction that American democracy will survive only if small business enterprise survives to sustain the American character has not disappeared. It has been inherited from the Progressives of yesterday by the conservatives of today. It is a conviction that flourishes less among the young than among the old, who are often troubled that they cannot persuade their juniors of its importance. "For the development of self-reliance," say two authors of a manual for small business operation, "for making men as well as money, small business excels."

During the 1940's and 1950's there was evidence of a widespread uneasy conviction that years of war, depression, and bureaucratic expansion had finally drained away the old regard for entrepreneurship among the young, and that the spirit which animated the old competitive ideal had finally succumbed to the world of the large corporation. The signs and portents are numerous, but a memorable article of 1949 in *Fortune* may be taken as a landmark. Surveying "The Class of '49," *Fortune*'s editors pointed out that it was perhaps the most significant college graduating class in our history. It was one of the largest, most mature (with a high proportion of veterans), and responsible; but its distinguishing feature was its aversion to risk, its passion for security. "The class of '49," the editors reported, "wants to work for somebody else —preferably somebody big. No longer is small business the promised land. As for the idea of going into business for oneself, the idea is so seldom expressed as to seem an anachronism." Only in the Southwest, which seems socially and intellectually to lag behind the rest of the country, was there any sign of significant exceptions to this generalization. The generation who had been impressionable children during the Depression and who had come of age in the shadow of the war rendered a firm verdict in favor of security, service, and the good life (measured in modest income expectations) rather than risk, self-assertion, and the big prizes. The emergent young man, the editors reported, "is not afraid of bigness; where his father of the twenties, fearful of anonymity, was repelled by hugeness in an organization, he is attracted."

This was the response of a generation raised in an economy of giant corporations, educated

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very often in universities with thousands of students, disciplined by army life, and accustomed to the imperatives of organization, mass, and efficiency. No doubt they often saw in big businesses the promise of laboratories and market research to which the atmosphere of the universities had already accustomed them. Because of its army experiences, the class of 1949 may have been unusually security-minded, but there is no reason to doubt that its acceptance of large organization represented a secular trend. Not long after the *Fortune* piece appeared, the Youth Research Institute Survey put to 4,660 high school and college seniors, recent college graduates, and veterans the question: "Do you feel that you will be able to achieve all of your economic desires by working for someone else?" 61.1 per cent said yes, 20.4 per cent no, and 18.5 per cent were uncertain. In his essay, "The Found Generation," an analysis of the expressed life ideals of the class of 1955, David Riesman reported not only a bland acceptance of the large corporation as a place in which to do one's life work, but also a depressing complacency about the terms and rewards of the corporate life. The class of 1949 had at least been aware of making a somewhat difficult choice in which their individuality might be at stake. The class of 1955 took the bureaucratic career for granted.

It is this acceptance of the bureaucratic career that, more than anything else, tells us why there is no longer an antitrust movement. It is far more revealing than the law cases or the books on the control of monopoly. And it is also a perfect illustration of how the problems of yesterday are not solved but outgrown. Only a few people today are concerned about how to make the large corporations more competitive, but millions are concerned about how they are going to live inside the corporate framework. The existence and the workings of the corporations are largely accepted, and in the main they are assumed to be fundamentally benign. What is questioned, when anything is questioned, are matters of personal style: what can be salvaged, in the way of either individualism or individuality, in an age in which the big corporation has become a way of life? This concern marks the transition from an age in which *The Curse of Bigness* and *Other People's Money* set the tone of the prevailing anxieties, to an age in which everyone reads *The Lonely Crowd* and *The Organization Man.*

LONG-PREVAILING systems of values do not usually go under without a fight. The young may be losing the concern of their elders with the virile virtues of enterprise. Certainly they are now much more disposed to ask of the economic order not whether it is raising a nation of enterprising and hardy men, but more matter-of-factly whether it is maintaining an adequate level of employment and producing a sufficient increase in the Gross National Product. Along with the new acceptance, however, there is a persistent uneasiness about the corporate life, which has its manifestations both on the Left and Right. The Left, if it can be called that, rebels in the name of non-conformity and simply opts out of the whole bourgeois world in the manner of the beatnik and the hipster. The Right, in the manner of Barry Goldwater and his enthusiasts, rebels in the name of the older individualism, which believed that economic practices should inculcate discipline and character. Though they would hate to admit it, they are both bedevilled by the same problem; each of them is trying to make its variety of non-conformism into a mass creed—which is a contradiction in terms. The beats opt out of corporate uniformity in their own uniforms and erect themselves into a stereotype. The right-wingers sing the praises of individualism in dreary, regimented choruses and applaud vigilantes who would kill every vestige of genuine dissent.

In politics, of course, it is the right-wingers who really count—it is they who have the numbers, the money, the political leverage. They can also invoke the old American pieties and can appeal to the kind of old-fashioned American who believes that federal fiscal policy is just like the family budget. Much of our conservative writing echoes with concern over the decline of the older kind of economic morale, which it identifies with small entrepreneurship. But conservatives understandably fear to make the large corporation the object of their criticism; this smacks too much of subversion. They have a safer and more congenial outlet for their animus against the organization of modern life in the form of denunciations of big government. In this way, the large corporation escapes its proper share of odium.

Historically, however, it was the giant corporation far more than governmental policy that eclipsed old-fashioned economic morality, and it is here that conservatives and liberals have all but reversed their former positions. In the main it is conservatives who are disgruntled with the style of contemporary economic life, while liberals complete the paradox by springing to its defense, and in particular to the defense of big business. Who, after all, has written in our time more full-throated rhapsodies on big business than the ex-New Dealer, David Lilienthal? Who has more consistently urged liberals to reconsider their hostility to big business than A. A. Berle, the protégé of Brandeis and associate of Franklin D. Roosevelt? And who has done more to reconcile the contemporary American liberal mind to the diminished role of competition than John Kenneth Galbraith with his alternative of countervailing power?

To be sure, liberal intellectuals have not

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ceased to be critical of business civilization, or of big business. The point is that big business no longer occupies, as it once did, a central place in their concerns. A variety of other problems—foreign policy, urban development, civil rights, education, and the like—have pushed it to the periphery. And where these problems are involved, liberals do not always find themselves in a simple antagonistic confrontation with big business, as they regularly did in the past. In any event, even when they do, the last thing they are interested in is the restoration of competition to solve the main social evils that they see. Even a scandal like the General Electric-Westinghouse affair, though it may confirm their view of what may be expected from businessmen, no longer excites them very much. In short, that "gale of creative destruction" about which Joseph Schumpeter wrote so eloquently when he described the progressive character of capitalist technology, has driven both the liberal and the conservative ideologies before it.

INSTITUTIONS are commonly less fragile than creeds. In the face of the collapse of antitrust sentiment among those who were once its most enthusiastic spokesmen, the antitrust enterprise, as a legal and administrative fact, has persisted and grown. During the past twenty years it has been far more alive, and far more meaningful, than it ever was before. The revival that took place in the closing days of the New Deal under Thurman Arnold was hardly an immediate or unqualified success, but antitrust operations were stepped up to new levels, and they have never since been relaxed. T.R., the so-called trustbuster, had an Antitrust Division with a staff of five lawyers. In the year 1940 alone, Arnold's greatly expanded staff prosecuted almost as many cases as had been brought during the first two decades of the Sherman Act. Today the Antitrust Division, with its 300 lawyers, is still more active than it was under Arnold, and since 1945 the courts have repeatedly handed down decisions that have made successful prosecutions easier. Hardly anyone expects any longer that the activities of the Antitrust Division will in any serious degree alter the structure of American industry, but they have now attained a measure of effectiveness that does seriously alter conduct within that structure. Business itself, while it violates the laws, has never mounted a campaign to have them modified.

In our time antitrust has ceased to be an ideology and has become a technique, interesting chiefly to a small elite of lawyers and economists rather than the public at large; it has gained in effectiveness at the very moment when it has lost general interest. Some key to the cunning ironies of history must be found in the fact that in the days when there was an antitrust movement among the public at large, there were (to speak with only slight exaggeration) no prosecutions, and that today, when there is no antitrust movement, prosecutions of real consequence finally take place.

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RAYMOND ARON

EUROPE & THE UNITED STATES

GOETHE, if we can take his own word for it, wrote on the night of the battle of Valmy: *"Von hier und heute fängt eine neue Epoche in der Weltgeschichte an"* ("Here, today, a new epoch of world history begins"). It matters little whether the illustrious writer made this extraordinarily lucid observation at that time or fashioned in retrospect a remark that would redound to his glory. Goethe's remark is so often quoted and its authenticity so often discussed just because nothing is rarer than the immediate comprehension of events and their meaning. Many historians like to say there is no history of the present because the future alone can show us the exact import of the facts and changes with which we are contemporary.

It seems to me that this commonplace difficulty is increased in the case of the relations between the Old Continent and the New World. These relations are hard to understand both because of changes which have occurred only gradually over the last ten years and because of two events of the year 1963: the press conference of January 14, 1963, in which General de Gaulle vetoed Great Britain's entry into the Common Market; and the tripartite treaty of Moscow for the partial suspension of nuclear tests. These are but symbols, and equivocal ones at that, of a new juncture. They have not transformed the world, but they have shown that the world is no longer the same.

In 1945 Europe lay in ruins—I might even say, from the Atlantic to the Urals. The Red Army occupied East Europe to the middle of what had been the territory of the Reich. West of the line of demarcation, Great Britain lay exhausted from its victory and France from its catastrophe of 1940, as well as from the occupation, the liberation, and the internal fissures provoked by this series of dramatic reversals. No one could tell whether parliamentary democracy would be established in post-fascist Italy and post-Hitler Germany.

In 1963, fifteen years after the beginning of the Marshall Plan, the prosperity of Western Europe rivaled that of the United States. In the course of the 50's, the growth rate of the six countries of the Common Market was dramatically higher than that of the United States or Great Britain.*

Of course, the wealth of the United States, if by that one understands the gross national product (GNP) per inhabitant, remained greatly superior to that of France and Great Britain (about double).† But American abundance no longer seemed out of the reach of Europeans. On the contrary, Europeans had dispelled the pessimistic clouds of the 30's; they had come to understand the nature of the modern economy as progressive and to aim at constant growth. Thus, French planners, figuring annual growth rates of the French GNP at 4% to 5% per year, estimate that the French GNP per inhabitant by 1985 will be superior to the present GNP per inhabitant of the United States. Will the American rate of growth remain henceforward below the European, and thus allow the economic difference between the two continents to shrink? Or, on the other hand, will the gap be maintained either because the American growth rates rise or the European tend to fall? Economists differ among themselves, and here there is no need to choose between these two hypotheses. The decisive fact is that, at the present time, the French, Italians, and Germans no longer believe that the economic achievement of the United States is bound up with the peculiar circumstances of the New World (immensity of space, priority of concern for productive activity, in-

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*The computation of rates of growth presents difficulties and equivocations. We give by way of example an evaluation ordered by the French Planning Commission (it indicates the relative growth in productivity per man-year between 1949 and 1959).

	Germany	*Italy*	*France*	*United Kingdom*	*U.S.A.*
Agriculture	5.6	5.4	4.7	3.9	3.8
Industry	5.6	7.1	4.5	2.1	3.7

†The French GNP per inhabitant, calculated by American prices, is 63% of the American GNP. Calculated by European prices, it is only 47%.

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stitutions of national culture). Continental Europeans to the west of the Iron Curtain are today convinced that they, no less than the Americans, can build an industrial society and distribute the benefits of an increased productivity of labor to all classes of society.

That, it seems to me, is the main and the new fact. Perhaps the awareness of it would not have been so clear, the restoration of European confidence so rapid, if there had not been at the same time a spectacular, though perhaps temporary, change: for the past four or five years it is American currency which has seemed vulnerable whereas European currencies (the West German mark, the French franc) have been solid. The gold reserve at Fort Knox has fallen from twenty-two billion dollars to fifteen, and the greater part of this gold has gone to increase the reserves of Federal Germany, France, Italy, and Holland. During the same period, foreign dollar balances have more than doubled, rising from ten to twenty-three billion dollars.

This reversal has struck many observers, but I see it as only of secondary significance. Monetary phenomena are essentially unstable and subject to rapid fluctuation. The French franc was soft in 1957, hard in 1959. It may perhaps become weak a year from now if internal inflation persists. The United States has long-term foreign investments which amount to more than the total deficit of its balance of payments. The dollar, after a more or less brief period, could again become a hard currency. But in any case, it is certain that Europe on the economic level has become an equal partner and competitor with the United States.

However, disparity remains on the military level. To the degree that, in this thermonuclear age, the notion of deterrence is substituted for that of defense—the point being to deter aggression and not to repulse or arrest it—Europe still relies for its security on the United States, in 1964 as much as in 1953, since only the United States possesses a strategic nuclear force worthy of being called a deterrent force. To be sure, Great Britain has thermonuclear bombs and V-bombers, and this on paper constitutes a national deterrent force. But the bombers are relatively vulnerable on the ground, and they may not be able to penetrate the Soviet line of defense made up of ground-to-air missiles. Moreover, the British organization is linked to the American detection and alert network. Thus the British force is independent in theory rather than in practice. As for the French force, it is scarcely born and until 1969-70 will include only supersonic bombers (Mach 2.2) of limited range (2500 km.) and carrying A-bombs.

The contrast between the economic strength and the military weakness of Western Europe is at the root of the political malaise and the type of crisis haunting relations between Europe and the United States. In the course of the past few years, economic considerations have interfered many times with military considerations and vice versa.

From 1950 to 1963, American diplomacy supported, without hesitation and without break in continuity, the European unification movement, launched in 1950 by Robert Schuman with the Coal-Steel Community and resulting in the Common Market of today. In this respect, there has been no difference between the Democratic and Republican administrations. Whether it was a question of the Coal-Steel Community, the European Defense Community, or the Treaty of Rome; whether the Secretary of State was Acheson, Dulles, or Herter—the support, discreet or impassioned, of the American representatives was given to the party called "European" of which Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet of France were the guiding spirits and to which Chancellor Adenauer adhered with enthusiasm.

In the negotiations concerning the free-trade area, American diplomacy did not officially opt for the French as over against the English position, although it seemed more favorable to the French position. The Common Market was animated by an ideal of integration or of federation; it presented perhaps certain inconveniences from a strictly commercial point of view (certain American exports ran the risk of being affected if the Six* granted privileges to one another), but the inconveniences were insignificant by far compared with the political value of a coherent and solid Europe and of a France and Germany definitely reconciled in the midst of a unified continent allied with the United States.

The place of Great Britain in this global vision was never precise. The governments of Her Majesty, Labor and Conservative, had both refused to join either the Coal-Steel Community, the European Defense Community, or the Treaty of Rome. They raised two main objections to joining: on the one hand, they resisted supranational institutions and the transfer of sovereignty that these entailed; on the other hand, they placed the American alliance and solidarity with the Commonwealth above ties with continental Europe. The degree of application of the Treaty of Rome, the rapid growth of the economies of the Six, the relative stagnation of the British economy during the 50's, led opinion and the British governments to question the principles of traditional diplomacy. Their formula for the free-trade area (free exchange of products without external common tariff) would have been too favorable to Great Britain to be acceptable to the Six. Driven finally to a choice between participation or non-participation in the Com-

*The Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Western Germany, France, and Italy.

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mon Market, the Macmillan government chose participation, or at least, candidacy.

At that moment, President Kennedy conceived what was called the Grand Design and, in place of a neutrality marked by sympathy with the position of the Six, American diplomacy became openly engaged in favor of British entry. The President saw as a first step an enlarged Europe; then, as a second step, an association between this great Europe and the United States. But simultaneously he insisted both on the uselessness, even harmfulness, of national deterrent forces and on the indispensable retention of a unified strategy. The conjunction of these two ideas—partnership between an enlarged Europe and the United States, and American or Anglo-American nuclear monopoly—made conflict with Gaullist France inevitable.

French opinion on the consequences of British entry into the Common Market was divided, more divided than the opinion of its partners in the Common Market. An important part of the industrial community feared the dilution of the Common Market into a vast free-trade zone, the lowering of the common external tariff (which on the whole is not very high), and the resulting competition with American industry (which enjoys substantial advantages from its size). Some supporters of European unification, precisely because of their federal ideal, feared British entry, since the British government had always been hostile to supranational formulas. Finally, General de Gaulle himself was doubtful about British participation for a number of economic, political, and military reasons. On the economic level, the General is inclined to favor a self-sufficient European community, insofar as that is possible, more than a community open to the outside. Politically, he wants the maximum of autonomy for Europe within the Atlantic alliance. Militarily, he believes that France and Europe must possess the means of their own defense—that is, they must have an instrument of deterrence; and cannot accept the present situation as definitive.

I do not think that the Nassau agreement between Great Britain and the United States, concluded some weeks prior to the press conference of January 14, was the cause of his veto. The President of the French Republic had probably made his decision, either before or after the meeting with Mr. Macmillan at Rambouillet. Yet it remains true that the nuclear agreement between the United States and Great Britain, added to American hostility to a French nuclear force, was the symbol of a policy that General de Gaulle detests. In his eyes, Great Britain, in seeking first of all to reach an agreement with the United States on atomic matters, had given proof that she was not European, or, at any rate, not truly European.

To be European, in the eyes of General de Gaulle, it is not necessary, whatever some may say, to be anti-American or anti-Atlantic; but one must put one's nation's ties with Europe before all others. Whether it is a question of the Common Market or of a deterrent force, the supporter of European unity, as conceived by the old chief of fighting France, ought to aim at enabling Europe to be as self-sufficient and as independent as possible of exterior powers. Once again, these formulas do not imply a break with the Atlantic alliance. There is no reason to reject the General's affirmation that the Atlantic alliance is, for the moment, indispensable to world stability and therefore to the security of France. But in his eyes the military presence of the United States on the Old Continent is provisional and will be contrary to the nature of things once the unity of the Old Continent is a permanent fact. In the light of such a philosophy, it becomes understandable that Great Britain, for whom the Atlantic alliance is the supreme imperative, does not appear authentically European, whatever her contribution to the culture of Europe. The Europe of which General de Gaulle dreams is first of all political and military, but, in these matters, Great Britain is first of all Atlantic.

THE MAJOR question posed by the foregoing analysis can be briefly formulated: do Western Europeans, France's partners in the Common Market, share these Gaullist conceptions? Or again: does Europe wish to be European after the manner of General de Gaulle? To which without hesitation I reply: on the whole, *no*.

Let us be as precise as possible. The whole of Europe is conscious of its recovery, and because of it aspires to occupy once more a place on the global scene that is worthy of its past. In this limited sense, all Europeans are Gaullists. I would go even farther. There is hardly a European who is not Gaullist in some recess of his soul, who does not dream of a united Europe capable of providing its own security and of dealing on an equal basis with the Soviet Union and the United States. When they feel like Don Quixote, Europeans are Gaullists; but most of the time they are like Sancho Panza.

They compare the figures of national defense budgets: during the year 1962-63, the United States allocated fifty-five billion dollars to its defense; Great Britain, Germany, France, and Italy together, seventeen billion. The French budget of 4.5 billion dollars represents less than a twelfth of the American and 6.3% of the GNP (the American percentage is around 9.9). In 1962-63, the United States spent more than fifteen billion dollars on its deterrent force alone: that is, nearly as much as the four principal states of Europe together spent on their armed forces. But the United States already has behind it the research necessary for constructing bombs and missiles. In other words, most observers on

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the Old Continent doubt that Europe could add much to the American deterrent force by its own efforts within the next ten years.

That is not all. Suppose, hypothetically, that Great Britain, Germany, France, and Italy were united in a single state; such a state would have the resources necessary for constructing a deterrent force. But Great Britain is bound by agreements with the American Atomic Energy Commission and, therefore, could not co-operate with France without the consent of the White House. Germany is bound by the Treaty of Paris in which it pledged itself not to manufacture atomic bombs. The Bonn government could in no way take the risk of participating in the setting up of a European deterrent force against the wish of the American government; the Federal Republic is too strictly dependent on the United States for the freedom of two million Berliners and for its own existence. As for Italy, finally, she does not seem to have the least concern in the world for the autonomy of European defense. She is indifferent or hostile to the French policy on defense and in particular to national deterrent forces.

It is, therefore, absolutely false to suggest, as reputable commentators on both sides of the Atlantic have, that de Gaulle "speaks for Europe." The claim is not true on the level of defense, and it is no more true on the level of economics. Among the Six, two, Holland and Germany, were favorable to Great Britain's entry into the Common Market and are today in favor of lowering the common exterior tariff at the end of the commercial negotiations baptized "the Kennedy Round." The divergence of economic concepts, French on one side, German-Dutch on the other, is such that at the end of 1963 the future of the Common Market itself had become uncertain.

Is this to say that the current crisis is artificial and accidental, wholly imputable to the French government? Again, this interpretation would be false and excessive in the opposite direction. The diplomatic-military situation has changed since 1949, the year the North Atlantic Pact was signed. And these changes have raised two kinds of problems. The one arises from the British and French desire to possess their own deterrent forces. The other arises from the unrest felt by the Germans, especially as the two Super Powers draw together and conclude at least symbolic agreements to reduce as much as possible the risks of a war (the Moscow Treaty on partial suspension of nuclear tests, the hot line between the Kremlin and the White House).

Officially, in the House of Commons and in the French Assembly, English and French ministers speak exactly the same language. Both repeat that a nation of the first rank cannot entrust its fate entirely to an ally, no matter how close the alliance. They add that the United States would use its deterrent force when its vital interests were involved but that the vital interests of France or of Great Britain, viewed from Washington, would not always appear to be vital interests of the United States. Finally, some analysts estimate that the American response has less "credibility" now that American territory is itself vulnerable. Such are the three arguments —one involving national sovereignty; another, possible divergence of interests of allied states; the last, the efficacy of a deterrent exercised by a state on behalf of a state other than itself. Government spokesmen in London and Paris never tire of raising them to justify national deterrent forces.

The British ministers came to put such a value on the "independence" of the deterrent force that the Skybolt episode provoked a crisis of the first magnitude in relations between the United States and Great Britain, as if the security of the latter would really have been compromised should several years intervene between the time V-bombers became obsolete and another model of plane or missile were put into service. As a matter of fact, Mr. Macmillan never for a moment thought that the abandonment of Skybolt exposed Great Britain to added danger. He was as convinced as his American conferees that British security is based on America, the contribution of the English force being more or less marginal.

WHAT WAS at issue, in the fall of 1962, was the fiction of the independence of the British force. It was a loss of face on the part of the British government that the abandonment of Skybolt threatened to bring about. That government, in the event that it had not extracted a replacement program from President Kennedy, would have had to recognize that after ten years of efforts, after more than two billion pounds' expenditure, it did not have, or had no longer, a deterrent force independent even on paper. For all that, Great Britain would not have been in peril, but the Conservative government would have been shaken and left without answers to the criticisms and sarcasms of the Opposition, which had denounced the gamble made on Skybolt and the vanity of pretensions to a national deterrent force.

The successive American administrations, moreover, had never adopted the attitude of hostility toward the British force that they adopted toward the French force. There are many reasons for this difference, and they are understandable historically if not theoretically. The construction of the atomic bomb was the result of a common Anglo-American project, and the British effort played an important part, although scientists of all European nationalities participated in it. Moreover, Great Britain was the first to fulfill the conditions, provided by law, where-

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by a foreign state was able to lay claim to aid from the American Atomic Energy Commission. Finally and most important, military cooperation between the two countries was intimate and trusting. SAC uses bases in Great Britain, American atomic submarines have bases in Scotland, the English force is the "client" of the American detection and alert network. Put differently, the British government tried verbally to impress public opinion and the ignorant by representing its deterrent force as independent, whereas in fact it strove to give assurance to the American government that it would never fail in its Atlantic commitment. By a kind of double play, perhaps more naïve than cynical, it wanted to retain both the prestige of an independent deterrent force and the special ties with the United States resulting from a never failing Atlantic loyalty.

Verbally, Gaullist France is as careful to stress its indifference to the Atlantic alliance as Great Britain is anxious to emphasize its integration with it. In fact France acts as if, once possessing a deterrent force, she alone would decide on her strategy. The Gaullists, finally, if not General de Gaulle himself, like to emphasize the "non-credibility" of the American deterrent and the necessity for France and Europe to possess a force of their own.

American hostility to the French force is not only due to the character of the suitor or to French diplomacy. The English force was, at least partially, an heir of Anglo-American cooperation in the last war. It was less the first step of an indefinite proliferation than the consequence of a past alliance. If one granted the same aid to France as to Great Britain, how refuse it tomorrow to Germany or Italy? Certainly from the French point of view, the American position was difficult to accept: under the pretext of the future risk of discrimination between Germany and France, a present discrimination between Great Britain and France was made. But the Kennedy team judged that this discrimination was less dangerous in the last analysis than acceptance of the principle of national deterrent forces—and giving aid to France would have been a symbol of this acceptance.

Germany, on its side, has never demanded sovereign possession of atomic or thermonuclear arms and the right to use them on its own decision. But Bonn ministers were disquieted by both the diplomacy and the strategy of the United States. The doctrine of flexible response, the refusal to instal IRBM's on the continent, raised objections and fears in Bonn. Was not the reinforcement of conventional arms going to weaken the efficacy of the deterrent by making the Soviets believe that military operations below the atomic threshold were possible without any real danger of escalation? Would not the McNamara doctrine, on the pretext of preventing the apocalypse, bring in its train the possibility of limited wars—limited as seen from Washington, but catastrophic for Europeans themselves?

These controversies, at once technical and political, on the relative merits of massive retaliation and graduated response, were renewed by the controversies over the tripartite Treaty of Moscow on partial suspension of nuclear tests. For the first time since Yalta, Russians, Americans, and English found themselves together to sign an agreement by which they wished to involve the rest of the world. The Yalta agreement had appeared, retrospectively and symbolically, as the origin and cause of the partition of Europe into a zone dominated by the Soviet Union and a zone protected by the United States. Was not the Moscow Treaty a sanction by the same three states of the violence done Europe nineteen years before?

So far as its signatories were concerned, the Moscow Treaty involved only an agreement not to continue nuclear tests in the atmosphere, cosmic space, and under water. And the agreement could be revoked by any of the signatories whenever it judged its highest interests were endangered, with each remaining the sole judge of its own interests. But this three-way agreement, as well as the setting up of the hot line between the Kremlin and the White House, illustrated a major fact that humanity dared neither condemn nor approve without reservation. Whatever enmities might exist between them on the level of ideology and power, the two giants had a common interest not to destroy one another. And, in certain respects, this common desire not to enter into a battle to the death takes precedence over other considerations. But if other states rejoiced in the promise of no war, if not of peace, they were still dubious about the Russo-American condominium over the planet. Were Europeans, and particularly the Germans, going to be political victims of a *rapprochement* between the giants? By an irony of history, they were in the position of fearing peace, as they had feared war, between the two. In case of war, they would be exterminated. In case of peace, they were given over to impotence and the support of an unnatural partition. Unquestionably they feared peace less than war. Yet they dared not rejoice in a peace which would definitely recognize the Sovietization of East Europe, above all of East Germany.

THE PRECEDING analysis, schematic though it be, will probably give the reader a sense of uncertainty and confusion. In effect, it justifies neither of the extreme interpretations coming from one quarter or another.

It is not true that the bi-polar conjunction to which we have become accustomed has radically changed. Europe, Germany, Berlin remain di-

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vided. But so long as this division lasts, the United States and the Soviet Union remain face to face in the middle of the Old Continent and, on the military plane, two blocs persist based on thermonuclear systems over which two men, in the Kremlin and the White House, have sovereign control.

These two men are in direct contact with one another, symbolized by the hot line, and in fact by their common resolution to prevent the total war in which their respective countries would be the first victims. What is more, the two great enemies have the same concern to prevent the dissemination of atomic arms and to maintain strategic authority over their allies. The Soviet Union does not want China to acquire atomic armament, and the United States wants it even less.

Within the Soviet camp, the Soviet Union, despite its atomic monopoly, is unable to impose its will either on China or even on the states of East Europe for the simple reason that enormous arms are an instrument of deterrence and not of persuasion. Khrushchev cannot dictate foreign policy to Rumania by brandishing ballistic missiles. Whether it is a matter of ideology, agrarian collectivization, or liberalization, each so-called socialist state possesses a certain amount of autonomy, just as each Communist party in the world chooses between diverse models or diverse tactics, from Yugoslav revisionism to Chinese dogmatism.

The polycentrism within the so-called socialist camp, as well as the diplomacy of deterrence adopted by the Kremlin, give westerners an increased sense of security bolstered by the awareness of an accomplished recovery and refound prosperity. The allies of the Atlantic Pact are now less concerned with maintaining a coalition than with defending their own particular interests. *Nevertheless the view of a Europe so self-confident that it is willing to forgo American protection is pure myth.* All Europeans, the French included, are convinced of the need, at least temporary, of the Atlantic alliance, since this alone is capable of balancing Soviet power.

As for assessments of the future, Europeans do not all see it in the same way. On one side, the Germans, by reason of their geopolitical situation, have understanding with the United States as their primary objective. They hope to influence the outlook of the Pentagon and participate in the setting up of a common strategy; they have no desire to possess their own deterrent force (since they are not unaware of the common opposition of the United States and the Soviet Union to such an eventuality); they do not even want a French or European deterrent force if this would risk weakening the American commitment to protect the Old Continent.

On the other hand, Great Britain and France assert their will not to depend wholly on the American deterrent force for their own security. Therefore, it would be wrong to oppose the European desire for military autonomy to the Atlantic Pact, an inheritance of the cold war. It is within Europe that two concepts of the destiny of Europe oppose one another. Likewise, in the economic order, it would not be correct to oppose the Old Continent and the New World. Within the Old Continent, even within the Common Market, two tendencies are coming to light. Both use the same words and lay claim to the same ideal: promoting the unity of Europe, maintaining the Atlantic Pact, lowering custom duties on a world scale. But Germany and the Netherlands, on one side, France and, in part, Italy, on the other, do not recognize the same hierarchy in their preoccupations. The first two countries look to the outside and export to the entire world. They fear that by reducing their imports of certain products (particularly foodstuffs) from third countries, they would reduce the outlets for their industrial products. France, for its part, does not envisage a common market limited to industrial products, but counts on exporting its agricultural surplus to its partners in the European community and hence fears too great or too rapid a lowering of the common external tariff.

WHAT conclusions for the future can be drawn from these various phenomena, here and there contradictory in appearance, but in the end complementary? Here, by way of summary, are a few:

(1) As long as the Soviet Union will not modify its German policy and maintains an army in the center of Europe, the Old Continent will remain divided and, on the military plane, two blocs will continue to exist in the sense that equilibrium will be established between the two thermonuclear complexes, Soviet and American. For the next ten years, the British and French forces will be too weak to exercise any perceptible influence on the course of diplomacy.

(2) The two great powers will each be engaged in preserving their respective blocs and, together, in preventing total war. In particular, the central problem of American diplomacy consists in concluding no agreements with the Soviet Union which undermine the confidence that the Germans have in the United States. If Germany looks to the East for the reunification which the West is incapable of imposing on the Soviet Union, on that day the security and the existence of Europe and the West will be compromised. Politically the United States and the Soviet Union are enemies, though they recognize a common interest in avoiding mutual destruction by fighting one another.

(3) Unable to be reconciled and anxious not to make war, each of the two great powers assures the security of its satellites or allies against aggression from the other; but it will exercise less and less control over the camp of which

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it is the head. East of the Iron Curtain, the Communist parties cannot and do not wish to reform in a fundamental way the established regime, because their own power could not resist a complete liberalization; but they will adapt to national circumstances and, particularly because of commercial trade, will no longer be held prisoners of the bloc to which they belong. In the West, the partners of the Atlantic alliance have never been subject to the American will either in internal affairs or in diplomacy outside the zone covered by the pact.

What is new is less the emphasis on European autonomy than the complexity of the relations between the Six and Great Britain, between the Six and the United States, and among the Six themselves. None of the Six wants to break up the Common Market, but the desire to continue its construction is not as strong as it was. The United States has not become hostile to the Common Market, but it is not as favorable toward it as before. At the moment, it is no longer a question of an Atlantic alliance based on two pillars, a united Europe and the United States; many combinations seem possible, none of which imposes itself absolutely.

Where would a diplomatic revolution come from? Either from a change within the Soviet Union such that she would subscribe to the reunification of Germany according to conditions acceptable to the West, or from a change in Germany such that she would subscribe to reunification on conditions acceptable to the Soviet Union as it is at present; that is to say, on conditions which would assure to the Soviet Union the domination of the whole of Eastern Europe.

The first revolution would be a sign of a Western victory, the second a victory for the Soviet camp. Neither one is at the present time foreseeable.

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BREAKTHROUGH?

David Daiches

"WITH THE coming of age of the children of Jewish immigrants, we find that quite a few of them are taking their place in the front ranks of American literature. They function in every sphere of literary creation—as poets, novelists, playwrights, and critics. Their work is part and parcel of the national literary product, and this is clear evidence of the fact that the American Jews have reached the stage of integration with the native environment. They are spectators no longer but full participants in the cultural life of the country."

These words appeared in the *Contemporary Jewish Record* (COMMENTARY's predecessor) of February 1944 as part of an introduction to a symposium on "American Literature and the Younger Generation of American Jews." The writers who contributed—all of them then under forty—gave various accounts of the influence on their writing of their Jewish background, but the majority minimized these influences and suggested that they were rather escaping from a Jewish background than using it. "I do not think of myself as a 'Jewish writer,'" wrote Lionel Trilling. "In what I might call my life as a citizen my being Jewish exists as a point of honor . . . I can have no pride in seeing a long tradition, often great and heroic, reduced to this small status in me, for I give only a limited respect to points of honor: they are usually mortuary and monumental, they have being without desire. . . . Surely it is clear at once how minimal such a position is." Many of the contributors to the symposium seemed to think that their Americanism had subsumed their Judaism. One writer went so far as to equate the Declaration of Independence with certain Jewish prayers, and Lincoln with Hillel.

Twenty years later the situation has changed. American Jewish writers are no longer concerned to prove that "they are spectators no longer but full participants in the cultural life of their country." They take that for granted, and go on (many of them, at least) to explore aspects of their own past which can provide something special to their vision as modern American writers. The change is interesting, and has more than one cause. Even in the 1944 symposium the late Isaac Rosenfeld had noted that the Jew, being an expert in alienation, could speak to the condition of the artist and intellectual of his time, who was inevitably alienated. The Jewish writer today does not want to fly from his parents' or grandparents' status as unadapted or only partially adapted immigrants to a cozy, all-embracing, inter-faith Americanism. He is aware that there is never anything cozy about being a writer and that there is a sense in which, in the modern world, all sensitive men are Jews. Joyce's Leopold Bloom, both citizen and outsider in Dublin, both member of a community and rejected by it, is not only a Jew in Ireland: he is Man in Society. Thus not only is the artist alienated; all men are, if not alienated, at least torn between isolation and communion. The individual self can never wholly communicate with other selves: Bloom in a Dublin pub engaging in one of the oldest of all ritual gestures of companionship (compotation or drinking together) is at the same time cut off from his fellows, dwelling in a unique and lonely consciousness. To be a Jew is part of the human condition.

But to realize this is hardly an invitation to an American Jewish writer to emphasize, or even to use, his Jewishness. If all sensitive men are Jews, he can be a Jew simply by being a sensitive man. (Isn't that the theme of Malamud's *The Assistant*?) There is more to it than this, however. To emphasize one's Jewishness may be, in this environment, to emphasize one's sensitivity, one's awareness of the intractability of human destiny, one's refusal to subscribe to any facile optimism about the rapid movement of modern industrial democratic society to Utopia, one's involvement in the contradictions and paradoxes of human nature. Twenty years ago there was still enough vitality in the left-wing traditions of the 1930's to enable many American Jewish writers to feel that human problems were soluble through the cultivation of sympathy and intelligence, and thus they used their Jewishness only if they could in some way equate it with a tradition of sympathy or a tradition of intelligence. And in so equating it, they lost it. Today we know that both sympathy and intelligence, though admirable qualities, can be merely ways of avoiding a genuine confrontation of the deepest truths of experience. What is needed by the artist in our time is an inwardness with suffering, a genuine personal recognition not only of what Hitler did to European Jews but also of how this throws light on, say, the Negro problem in America and how American Jews regard Negroes, and an awareness of what all of it means for an ethical and psychological understanding of man. On this view, the Jewish artist has the advantage over his Gentile neighbor: he can draw on his own traditions of alienation, of suffering, of being on the *other* side of a dividing

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line, and use his knowledge to investigate and to project the nature of man.

Is MODERN American literary Jewishness, then, simply a stance of the sensitive man? To some extent it is; but this is far from the whole story. The characteristic critical activity of the 1930's and 1940's was intellectual and anti-emotional; it emphasized the ability to discriminate, to analyze, rather than the capacity to feel. The "New Criticism" (as Norman Podhoretz has so well explained in his essay, "Jewish Culture and the Intellectuals," included in *Breakthrough*, a new anthology of contemporary American Jewish literature*) was no more hospitable to the claims of feeling than traditional Jewish teaching of Hebrew literature was hospitable to the claims of dispassionate critical analysis. But some time in the late 1940's the pendulum began to swing in the other direction. Mr. Podhoretz records what happened at Columbia: "Meanwhile something was happening in the world of Columbia that seemed too good to be true. Hasidism, ushered in by Martin Buber and Gershom Scholem, like a surprise witness in a sensational murder trial, exploded on the intellectual consciousness of New York. One suddenly found a rash of articles not only on Hasidism, but also on Maimonides, written by people who only yesterday were deep in Eliot, Original Sin, and Kierkegaard. . . . I remember too with what a sense of personal triumph I first heard that Lionel Trilling was writing an essay on Wordsworth and the Rabbis."

As I write this, I reach out to my bookshelves and take down a copy of Martin Buber's *Tales of the Hasidim* presented to me by Norman Pearson of Yale in 1950 with the inscription: "This past for the present." Yes; writers—and not only Jewish writers—were discovering a "useable past" in Jewish traditions (or in some selected Jewish traditions) and this corresponded to something interesting that was happening all along the American literary front. Is it an accident that at the same time American writers on history and civilization were discovering Edmund Burke and dropping Tom Paine? And that myths, symbols, archetypes were replacing paradox and ambivalence in the language of criticism? It became academically and critically respectable to discover an organic relation to your past rather than to believe that the American destiny was to reject the past and build a future free of the errors and tyrannies of Old World history (though of course some American critics, from the South especially, had done this all along). Now the Jews are the people with a past *par excellence*; as Philip Rahv explains in his admirable introduction to *Discovery of Europe* (also reprinted in *Breakthrough*), America sees her share in the older European civilization as "now fully equal to that of the Europeans," and as Leslie Fiedler puts it in another valuable essay ("Negro and Jew: Encounter in America") in the collection: "The Jew . . . is the gateway into Europe for America; for he has carried with him, almost against his will, his own history, two thousand years of which is European." In the 19th century it was the New England prophets of high culture who preserved the links with Europe; in the first half of the 20th century, with some significant exceptions, the most "progressive" of American writers tended to turn their eyes away from Europe; in the beginning of the second half of the 20th century a new kind of emotional implication in Europe was discovered—a kind that made American Jewish writers its natural mediators. Whether this is related to America's political involvement in Europe since the end of World War II, I shall refrain from trying to guess. I should think that it was at least as much related to the growing sense that it is not only a "complex fate" being an American, as Henry James had maintained, but that it is a complex fate being human, that the deepest human problems are not easily and perhaps never fully soluble, and that the dilemma of being a Jew is therefore worth exploring as a paradigm of the general dilemma of being human.

There were obviously other and less easily definable impulses at work. It would be impertinent of me to speculate on what led Lionel Trilling to write the essay news of which so excited Mr. Podhoretz in his undergraduate days, but it was presumably some desire to associate his Jewish heritage with his interest in English literature, a desire sharply at variance with what he said in the 1944 symposium. It is not, in my opinion, a good essay; the analogies are forced and the whole argument strained; it reads to me like something Trilling wanted to make himself believe rather than something he really discovered. But Trilling is represented in *Breakthrough* by his brilliant essay on Isaac Babel, which is the record of genuine, excited discovery associated with shock and disturbance. The Jew as Cossack—and Babel served for a time as a supply officer in a Cossack regiment—is absurd, counter to all our expectations; the Jew forcing himself to violence outrages our notions of the Jew as passive sufferer. "It is not easy for us—and it is not easy for Babel. Not easy, but we must make the effort to comprehend that for Babel it is not violence in itself that is at issue in his relation to the Cossacks, but something else, some quality with which violence does indeed go along, but which is not in itself merely violent. This quality, whatever it is to be called, is of the greatest importance in Babel's conception of himself as an intellectual and an artist, in his conception of himself as a Jew." These conceptions are not

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as simple as we once thought. To accept the self-contradictory varieties of Jewish consciousness is one way of responding to the realization that experience is more intractable than had been dreamt of in our philosophy. The rediscovered Jewish consciousness of American Jewish writers is thus not a religious thing and not a national thing; it has something to do with Keats's "Negative Capability, that is, when a man is capable of being in uncertainties, mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact and reason." Dwelling among the uncertainties and mysteries of Jewish experience, the modern American Jewish critic is dwelling in the world that the modern American imagination, sadly awakened at last from the dream of the *Aufklärung*, has recognized.

Is THE SAME true of the modern American Jewish novelist and poet? Is there really a "breakthrough" in American Jewish creative writing? I find it less easy to answer this question with respect to creative writing than with respect to criticism, where the achievement is evident and formidable. The selection here provides uncertain evidence. Philip Roth's "Eli, the Fanatic"—about the respectable, assimilated Jew in a prosperous Westchester community who adopts the dress and pose of a pious Old World immigrant out of a sense of guilt—falls uneasily between story and parable; the hero's change is not sufficiently probed or presented with enough specificity to carry imaginative conviction. The description of the Einhorn family from Saul Bellow's *Adventures of Augie March* is sociologically and psychologically observant but adds up to no real Jewish insight. (The working of a Jewish consciousness in Saul Bellow's work as a whole presents a much more complex question; but I do not see how it can be said to be part of a general Jewish breakthrough.) Many writers represented in *Breakthrough* do little more than present neatly etched (and sometimes moving) documentaries of the tensions between the older, immigrant generation and the younger American one; some give examples of the contradictions involved when, say, a Jewish child has to participate in a Gentile environment at school (Christmas is the standard theme here). Isaac Rosenfeld is represented by a strange and oddly powerful symbolic story about Solomon and Sheba, but the level of probability keeps wavering; Ivan Gold has an impressive story of a Jew carrying his persecution with him to Japan; Paul Goodman has a beautifully drawn little sketch of a rabbi conducting an auction for the honor of opening the Ark for *T'filas Tal*, the prayer for rain, with a thunder-storm raging outside; there is an extract from Norman Mailer's *The Naked and the Dead* giving a sketch of Joey Goldstein's life until he joins the army; Bernard Malamud (perhaps the most deliberately Jewish of all American writers of his generation) is represented by a sad little story of pity, pride, and despair which comes straight out of the Yiddish tradition and, though extremely effective, lacks the teasing, exploratory dimension of his best work. As for the poetry, there are a few interesting poems on biblical themes, or on the symbolic role played by the Jew in our time and always; and there is Allen Ginsberg's self-pityingly exclamatory *Howl*, which I cannot take seriously as poetry or as anything else. (Ginsberg's images of revolt, suffering, defiance, despair, lunacy, bad luck, persecution, exhibitionism, and distortion are so hopelessly jumbled and so slackly expressed that the poem in the end means nothing at all.)

The editors in their discursive introduction to the anthology try to trace themes and find unity, with doubtful success in spite of some illuminating observations by the way. "The overriding problem," they conclude, "is not God but self-identification, the problem of locating the self within the community of other men." I suppose the question "Who am I?" does recur in this literature, and I suppose, too, that it is a question always likely to be asked by a Jew in Western society. To ask the question, however, is not enough; it must be answered in such a way as to illuminate both the Jewish and the general human situation if it is to be taken seriously as literature. There is a kind of great documentary like Zangwill's *Children of the Ghetto*, which brilliantly fixed a moment in the history of English Jewry; and there is the Yiddish tradition (most ably discussed by Irving Howe and Eliezer Greenberg in their "Introduction to Yiddish Literature," reprinted here) which plays with resigned irony—an irony born of too much knowingness, too much experience—amid the tensions set up by religious pride and optimism on the one hand and suffering on the other, and by the interpenetration of Yiddish and Hebrew, of pilpulistic argument and daily life, of the lost Temple and Holy Land and the facts of the Ghetto, of messianic hope and present despair. The American Jewish writer today is reaching out beyond the Zangwillian documentary and beyond the dated and restricted (for all its glories) ghetto literature in Yiddish. Yet there is still a lot of the sociological documentary in this recent work, and, in a few writers, still much of the Yiddish tradition. There is some very good and much interesting writing. Does it add up to a movement, a real comprehensive breakthrough into new art forms, higher literary achievements? I should say rather that the American Jewish writer has been liberated to use his Jewishness in a great variety of ways, to use it not aggressively or apologetically, but imaginatively as a writer probing the human condition (one cannot avoid using clichés here), and that we have recently had some exciting evidence of this. But, in spite of some admirable individual works, an

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achieved literature based on this liberation is something we must still wait for. The paradox is that if and when it comes, it may well not be recognized for what it is, for literature has a knack of transcending origins and categories. Perhaps so long as we can talk of a "breakthrough," the achievement is incomplete.

DAVID DAICHES, *the well-known English critic, writes frequently on Jewish cultural affairs.*

* * *

SPANISH ANTI-SEMITISM TODAY

Ray Alan

THE MAN at the next table was once a notorious Belgian fascist. The magazine he is reading contains a glowing feature on the life and work of Adolf Hitler. The journal at my elbow has an advertisement for the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion* ("Judaism's most famous document"), price 125 pesetas, with a thirty per cent discount if you also take its companion volume *Anti-España,* a revelation of "the conspiracy against Spain by the forces of evil," this time English as well as Jewish (a favorite and, for Englishmen at least, rather flattering fascist combination). The morning paper reports a right-minded gathering in Madrid to attend a solemn mass for the repose of the immortal soul of Benito Mussolini: guest of honor, Otto Skorzeny . . . It was an effort not to write "the late Otto Skorzeny." The very thought that such people still exist seems grotesque. But General Franco's Spain is something of a political waxwork museum. As in all such places, one shudders one minute and laughs the next.

Take, for example, this recent issue of *Qué Pasa?,* an ultra-Catholic right-wing weekly. Its cover-photo shows the back of the head and one shoulder of a mysterious, balding, apparently one-eared man. The photo is captioned: "The men in the shadows." The cover-story is a two-page spread, the first of a series, headlined starkly: "THE ANTICHRIST IN ACTION. Who promotes confusion and discord? Extract from a sensational secret report . . . revealing to the world the existence of a vast satanic organization." A long hyperbolic introduction to the story proclaims:

> Recently an important secret—"strictly secret"—document has been discovered which . . . throws light on the activities of a group of men who now stand unmasked as mortal enemies of the most precious traditions of Christian civilization. . . . The report reveals that millions of dollars are being spent in order to brainwash the average American and secure control of all information media, schools, labor unions, Protestant churches, etc. . . . Never before has the light of day been shed onto so perfect, so diabolical, so systematic a plot, prepared by the few to dominate the many. Never before have such huge sums of money been available for such catastrophic ends: the waging of an underground war on Christianity . . . war to the death against the Christian world.

The nerve-center of the plot, one learns (after several hundred words of breathless build-up), is in the United States, and *Qué Pasa?* quotes "an important speech delivered in February 1955 by Senator William E. Jenner" in which Mr. Jenner is alleged to have declared that the United States "has two governments—one visible (the President, Congress, etc.), the other invisible, with its own members and agents inside Congress, the President's office, the Supreme Court and other official bodies." Who are these invisible plotters? Spinning out the suspense, *Qué Pasa?* replies: "Neither the Communist party nor the Mafia, though their ramifications extend to both these groups." The "strictly secret" document which gives the whole show away is "nothing less than the annual report of the American Jewish Committee."

The villains are, in short, "the Jews." The American Jewish Committee merits special attention because it is "the most powerful visible instrument of organized Jewry" and "much can be learned about the Jews' aims and methods by studying its publications: these include a review named *Commentary,* a year-book, and various secret reports not for general distribution." The aims of the American Jewish Committee are:

> To influence the policy of the United States government;
> To control the press, radio, cinema, etc., and exert pressure on writers, film-producers, etc.;
> To control the thoughts of Americans by brainwashing and other psychological means;
> To control the churches of the United States.

Much is made by *Qué Pasa?* of Jewish-Protestant cooperation in cultural and social affairs, and the National Council of Churches is stated to be peculiarly vulnerable to Jewish penetration. (This theme is echoed in other papers. *Religión* reports—under the headline, "Eighty million Catholics in the USA"— that "the so-called National Council of Churches," representing "nearly two hundred Protestant sects," has adopted a version of the Bible "edited by two Jews, Simon and Schuster," and "substantially altered, especially in the passages referring to the virginity of the Most Blessed Virgin and the divinity of Christ.") Members of the American Jewish Committee will probably be agreeably surprised to learn that they have a "singularly powerful" hold on Methodist women.

ON THE WHOLE, Jews have had an easier time than Protestants in Spain during General Franco's "quarter-century of peace." True, early

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Falangist propagandists tried more than once to popularize the anti-Semitic attitudes of German and Italian fascism. Franco himself denounced in a public speech, in May 1939, "the Judaic spirit which brings about the alliance of capitalism and Marxism"; and official propaganda distributed to the Spanish Blue Division, which fought with the Nazis in Russia, said of the enemy: "Your family names are democracy, Marxism, and plutocracy, but your baptismal name is without doubt Judaism." But the regime always had a more than ample supply of left-wing, liberal, and anarcho-syndicalist scapegoats, whereas Jews were thin on the ground.

Press and pulpit in Spain have nevertheless exuded a steady drip of anti-Jewish—in particular, anti-Zionist—propaganda over the last twenty-five years. General Franco's postwar ambition to succeed Mussolini as "protector of Islam," and his efforts to break the Western democracies' partial boycott of his regime between 1945 and 1950, led him to flirt with the Arab League, and his propagandists applauded Arab efforts to destroy Israel. (Interestingly, British broadcasts to the Arabs during this period warned them that their cause would be discredited by association with Franco.)

The flirtation continued throughout the 1950s, and as recently as March 1964, the Caudillo's Minister of Information, Sr. Fraga Iribarne, gushed in Cairo over "the similarity between Egypt's revolution and Spain's" and concluded an agreement for the exchange of news-services and press and television features between Egypt and Spain. The new Arab leaders, Nasserist and Baathist alike, saw in Spain's Falange and government-controlled trade unions models for their own single-party regimes. General Franco withheld diplomatic recognition from Israel, and his press and radio portrayed the Israelis as hard-faced atheists, Marxists, and capitalists. A characteristic three-column headline over an article on Israel published in November 1962 (by the relatively moderate Catholic daily *Ya*) read: "Atheism is the common denominator of the overwhelming majority of [Israel's] citizens."

Catholic publicists have been a particularly potent source of anti-Semitic and anti-Israeli sentiment in General Franco's Spain. For a representative moderate view one might quote the Rev. Ramón Cué, well-known Jesuit lecturer. Don Ramón praises the Israelis for one achievement: the revival of spoken Hebrew. But he has told audiences in Bilbao and elsewhere: "The Jews are above all materialists. Money is the one thing they respect. Hence their terrible economic power." He criticizes Orthodox Judaism for being "as always, the enemy of Christianity." Somewhat inconsistently, he also criticizes "the Jews" for their indifference to religion and the fact that "they consider all the religions of the world to be of the same value."

Farther out, but more influential, is the Rev. Venancio Marcos, the principal religious commentator of *Radio Nacional de España,* the official Spanish broadcasting network. Lecturing in San Sebastian earlier this year, Padre Venancio expressed the wish that "the times would permit a revival of the Holy Inquisition." He warned his packed audience to beware of false legends about the so-called crimes of the Inquisition. "The Spanish Inquisition committed fewer crimes in its whole history than English Protestantism in one year." And he warned against the enemies of Spain: the Communists, the freemasons, all Protestants, and the Jews. The Jews were dangerous because the world's news-agencies were in their hands. "Isabel the Catholic had to expel the Jews because they were taking over the nation's wealth, occupying key posts, and spreading heresy. They took their revenge by spreading lies about Spain: it is they who have done us the most harm."

Pope Paul's visit to Jerusalem last winter inspired a more objective approach to Israel. His journey was covered by some of Spain's most competent reporters, and in the articles they sent back, professional conscience generally overcame political and religious prejudice. A current of opinion in favor of establishing diplomatic relations with Israel became perceptible in the Spanish Foreign Ministry, always sensitive to trends within the Vatican. The Catholic medievalist Don Ramón Menéndez Pidal, president of the Spanish Academy, suddenly accepted a long-standing invitation to visit Israel and returned to give the Madrid press an enthusiastic account of Israeli hospitality and to advocate closer cultural ties between Spain and the Spanish-speaking Sephardic Jews. "One Israeli in seven speaks Spanish," proclaimed *Ya* and other Catholic papers; "Spain must help the Sephardis to preserve their culture."

A few weeks after Pope Paul's pilgrimage, a small Catholic lay monthly, *El Ciervo,* boldly criticized another Catholic paper, the organ of an influential religious order, for having printed an article justifying Hitler's "punishment" of the Jews. (*El Ciervo* is published by a group of young intellectuals in Barcelona, where the struggle to preserve the cultural identity of Catalonia has generated sympathy for the Israelis and other beleaguered peoples.) In an editorial note that probably has no precedent in Spanish Catholic journalism, but was passed in its entirety by the ecclesiastical censorship, *El Ciervo* declared:

> . . . Anti-Semitism has been nourished for centuries on tortuous, pernicious lies which have attempted to establish a connection between Judaism and freemasonry, the Anti-Christ, and, more recently, Communism. . . . But it is as absurd to condemn all Jews because a few Jews are Communists as it would be to claim that all

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> Jews are divinely inspired because Christ, the Virgin, Saint Joseph, the Apostles and the early Church Fathers were Jews. . . .
>
> When speaking of Catholics who are persecuted by those who hate religion, one cannot overlook the fact that sometimes in the past Catholics have been the persecutors and Jews, among others, the victims.

WHAT OF THE small hard core of unrepentant pro-Nazis, admirers of the *Action française,* and other right-wing extremists still to be found in Spain? They are less harmful than priests like Padre Venancio because they are, on the whole, less "respectable" and therefore less likely to corrupt the innocent. But they are still a fecund source of poison, and the Falange's thirty-nine daily newspapers are usually willing to record their views and to interview itinerant ex-fascists and neo-fascists from other countries. The anti-Jewish French writer and former socialist deputy Paul Rassinier, for example, was interviewed during his last vacation in Spain. The press reported him—at length—as denouncing Jewish "lies" about the Nazi concentration camps:

> It was the inmates themselves who ran the camps, under the supervision of German and Polish Communists, not the Nazis. . . . The so-called gas-chambers were a propagandist fiction. The one that is exhibited at Dachau was built after the war on the orders of the Allies. . . . The Jews have made a fuss about these camps purely for financial reasons. German reparations are vital to Israel's economy. The more terrible the stories they can tell about Nazi persecution, the more reparations they can get. Hence the myth of the six million murdered Jews; hence the Eichmann trial.*

Several thousand French Algerians, many of extreme right-wing views, have settled in Spain, and some of their money appears to have been invested in one or two small publishing enterprises that produce works by neo-fascist theorists, including Spanish translations of books by M. Rassinier and Dr. Lefévre (the notorious Algiers plotter who played an important role in certain of the conspiracies that brought General de Gaulle to power). French-Algerian funds are also thought to have helped launch the new illustrated fortnightly *Juanpérez* (an English equivalent of its name would be *Johnsmith*) which dedicates itself to "anti-Communism, anti-capitalism, Catholicism . . . and the truth, the truth above all things." As a specimen of the "elemental truths" in which it believes, *Juanpérez* declares editorially: "We believe that Catholicism will prevail. But it is gravely menaced, for behind Communism is that other powerful enemy of the Catholic Church, Zionism . . . We consider that in the last world war Germany and its allies were defending Europe from Communism, which was able to advance only with the support of the plutocratic democracies."

Juanpérez has much in common with the French weekly *Rivarol.* It describes as an historical injustice "the odious treatment the victors inflicted on the vanquished in 1945 and the continual revival of war-crimes charges." It mourns "the millions of Anna Franks on the German side, coventried—to use that typically English gutter-verb—by Allied bombers." It claims that in 1940 there were only two million Jews in German-occupied territory and that Hitler and Pétain would have let most of them go to Madagascar had the Allies been willing. It flays the German dramatist Rolf Hochhuth (*The Deputy*) for promoting anti-clericalism and serving Israel "for an abundant price."

At first sight, this sort of thing seems aggressive, even mildly alarming. Reading it more carefully, one senses the almost pathetic realization of its authors that they have no future. Fundamentally, like all fascists, neo- and otherwise, they are on the defensive, their eyes fixed obsessively on the past. General Franco's regime is their last major European redoubt, and even its stout walls are at last crumbling.

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* Cf. Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser: "German reparations are the lifeblood of Israel. Yet the lie about the six million murdered Jews is no longer taken seriously by anyone, not even by the simplest man in our country."

RAY ALAN *has contributed many articles on Mediterranean and Near-Eastern affairs to* COMMENTARY *and other leading American and British periodicals. His first suspense-novel* My Bonny Lies under the Sea, *set in the Eastern Mediterranean, was published recently in London.*

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SOME DEDUCTIONS

THE GREAT TREASURY RAID. By PHILIP M. STERN. *Random House. 361 pp. $5.95.*

THE COLD WAR AND THE INCOME TAX: A PROTEST. By EDMUND WILSON. *Farrar, Straus. 118 pp. $2.95 (also Mentor, $.60).*

Reviewed by DAVID T. BAZELON

WE HAVE HERE two very strenuous efforts at clarification of the federal system of taxation, written by two upper-class purists who have been horrified unto death by their discovery (or rediscovery) of certain of the qualities of American social reality, especially as revealed in the Internal Revenue Code.

To begin with Mr. Stern: *The Great Treasury Raid* is probably the best popular survey of the federal tax system yet published. It is also easy to follow and substantially entertaining—largely because Mr. Stern includes so many of the choice anecdotes that are among the happier by-products of the Code. The best of them all, for me, is taken from the transcript of a 1946 case involving a man and his wife who claimed to be partners in a company along with their four children (ranging in age from seven years to three months). The wife was interrogated:

> Q. Now, do you participate in the management of the business of the LaSalle Livestock Company?
>
> A. Well, I have been producing partners.
>
> Q. Beg pardon?
>
> A. I have been too busy producing partners so far.

For those who are not in a position to produce partners, there is the more broadly-based production of little $600 exemptions. A dynamic detail relevant to this production, which Mr. Stern did not find the space to fit in, is the swarm of expectant mothers who regularly enter maternity wards throughout the country for induced births on New Year's Eve. (The timeliness is worth $80 or more, and it's a shame to throw the money away.)

MR. STERN, however, is not himself entertained by the Internal Revenue Code. At bottom, he is overwhelmed by its monumental irrationality and unfairness, and after describing the absurd inequities of the law, he proposes a return to a "pure" definition of income to which a graduated tax would be applied, with *no* exclusions or preferential rates. This means, among other things, doing away with the oil depletion allowance and abandoning the capital gains rate (in favor of an averaging device to account for the "bunched" income problem); it also means taxing Social Security payments. Mr. Stern calculates that all in all, under such a system, taxable income would be increased by $115 billion annually and the additional $40 billion the Treasury would collect thereon (at pre-1964 rates) would allow an across-the-board rate reduction of nearly half.

Thus, proceeding on the assumption that every time one citizen walks through a "loophole," all *other* citizens have to pay more to the gatekeeper, Mr. Stern manages to paint a vivid picture of the internal revenue mess. But that is not the same thing as painting a picture of the economic realities involved in the creation and operation of the law, or of the political realities to be faced in any possible reform of it.* Here, Mr. Stern has not done so well. The moralistic tone of the book is heightened as it progresses, and finally becomes wearing, at least to this reader. Moreover, Mr. Stern knows better, as he indicates in the excellent chapter he calls "The Heavy Odds Against Reform." Why, then, did he succumb to the moralistic purism of his proposal for reform? Because the *only* alternative is to embrace the irrationality of the Code—and indeed of American life itself, which that exfoliation so ardently expresses—in an act of despairing love. To embrace the irrationality means to live with it, in and among it; it means pinpointing our anger, both for political effectiveness, and to keep from ending up consumed with hatred for the whole crazy system—as, indeed, Edmund Wilson has ended up.

What happened to Wilson was that he neglected, for one reason and another, to file any tax returns from 1946 through 1955. On one level, that's what happened to him. If we note what happened to him on another, more important level, however, his failure to file returns or pay taxes seems perfectly proper. He had departed from the contemporary American reality, and therefore could not be bothered to support it financially. What drew him back

*For example, the best functioning opportunity for reform during the past decade or so would have been the reduction of the top rate to 50 or 60 per cent. The immediate cost to the Treasury would not have exceeded $1 billion; the ritualistic cover would have been denied the high-income complainers; and the genuine unfairness to professionals, who have less room to maneuver in, would have been overcome. But even more interesting is that, beyond the obvious advantages, the lowering of rates would itself have "closed loopholes" and have been of distinct disadvantage to many upper-income types. Why? Because Uncle Sam would thereby have become a 60 per cent instead of a 91 per cent risk partner in numerous tax-tailored enterprises: many of the code preferences are useful only when played off against 91 per cent income. This is the kind of true economic and political complexity that one must deal with in reforming the tax system. (Yet imagine how the unions and the ADA would have screamed at any such proposal!)

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was that he made a bit too much money in the mid-50's (writing about the Dead Sea Scrolls) and was thus led to inquire of a lawyer-friend as to what this tax-return business was all about. The lawyer (who later died of a stroke while worrying about this and other matters) came up with only one positive suggestion—namely, that Mr. Wilson leave the United States in physical fact, and become a citizen of some other country.

The key to this book (and perhaps to Mr. Wilson's entire career) is that he did not accept this excellent advice. Charlie Chaplin left us owing close to a million dollars in unpaid taxes. But then Chaplin, born in England, was a make-believe American. Mr. Wilson is not a make-believe American: he is one of the realest Americans ever. If there is a written American language that honest men can admire, then no list of its creators and preservers could begin with any other name. But in the course of disclosing his discovery of the literary character of the Internal Revenue Code, he employs the phrase, "in the midst of all this pedantry." Oh, no, Mr. Wilson! In America we do not use the term "pedantry" to describe any aspect of the system that permits an annual theft of $40 billion. That is not the term to use in referring to the brilliantly functional obscurity of the Code.

The Cold War and the Income Tax: A Protest is one of the zaniest books ever written, and absolutely fascinating. It is Edmund Wilson, one of the living glories of our literature, discovering present-day America—that place from which he has steadfastly refused to separate himself in a physical way while withdrawing from it spiritually and intellectually. This act of political discovery—ending with another and further spiritual withdrawal: "I have finally come to feel that this country, whether or not I continue to live in it, is no longer any place for me"—means that to the renewed interest in us recently evidenced by the Rockefellers and Stevensons and Clarks and Scrantons, we may now add the active and still Olympian contempt of our great native stylist. Why, it is almost like having Mencken back home again! And the fact that Wilson had to find out about the extent of federally financed research by reading a piece in an *English* magazine (the *New Statesman*) by an editorial writer for the Washington *Post* (Karl Meyer) is a minor matter. Just so he noticed at last.

Of course, he was dragged back by his tax delinquency—not, he wistfully avers, by any principle. And then it was not exactly in the best of taste to go on about the Cold War and the Bomb and the half-hidden horrors of CBR at just the moment when it became most useful to note that the taxes he didn't pay would have been spent on homicidal junk. And if he had to discover the bureaucratization of American society at IRS offices rather than at GM or the unemployment compensation office, so what? It is hard, however, to forgive his sentimental glorification of Major Eatherly, or his abysmal ignorance concerning the centrally American subject of money. He doesn't begin to understand that there is a society existing in which he makes the money on which the taxes are due *because* they are due . . . and paid . . . and spent . . . even on homicidal junk. Indeed, in his hysterical devotion to American Individualism (meaning *me, me, me*) come hell or high water, and whatever the historical facts of the matter may be, he is only a few ideological inches away from the right-wing amendment on the income tax—to preserve the integrity of the individual against the encroachments of an overweening federal bureaucracy, etc.

Still, he finally noticed. I'm grateful. And we can all be grateful to Philip Stern for his lucid and useful popularization of the Code. Although both books constitute all-out attacks on the Code, they are almost beyond comparison. Mr. Stern, enlightened heir to a great post-Civil War fortune, is in effect complaining that he has not had to pay enough tax. Mr. Wilson, honored heir to our pre-Civil War culture, couldn't be bothered paying any at all; when he got caught, he screamed. No, the books are beyond comparison.

HOW TO CARRY NEW YORK

Order of Battle: A Republican's Call to Reason. By Jacob K. Javits. *Atheneum. 328 pp. $5.95.*

Reviewed by Andrew Hacker

Jacob Javits's Republicanism has confounded his constituents since he first ran for Congress in 1946. Democrats wonder how he can be a Republican, and Republicans wonder whether he really is one. Yet despite all the musings, he has won every election he has entered—and always at the head of his ticket. Javits has his varied constituencies well in hand. He manages to assure conservative Republicans that, no matter what else he may be, he is a loyal Republican. And he has little difficulty in convincing liberal Democrats that he is about as liberal as our politicians come. The formula is unbeatable.

Order of Battle is an address to the Republican party in which Javits recounts his series of victories in enemy territory—or, How to Succeed in New York Politics Without Being a Democrat. To a party that has had the distinction of losing most of its elections in most places most of the time since 1928, such advice might be worth attending. However, Javits's only counsel to his fellow Republicans is to be more liberal: on civil rights and civil liberties, on welfare legislation and economic planning, on foreign aid and the Cold War. What he is really saying is that Republican candidates represent the minority party and should therefore make a pitch for Democratic votes. Of course, this has already been done, with some success, by several of his colleagues in and out of the Senate: Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania, Clifford Case of New Jersey, Thomas Kuchel of California, Mark Hatfield in Oregon. But the trouble is that all too many Republican candidates don't seem to want to win with Democratic votes. Ballots cast by Negroes, Jews, eggheads, and other unsuccessful Americans seem a trifle tainted, and any Republican who makes a pitch for them must be somewhat suspect himself.

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Republicans worry about the company they keep. While they realize as well as anyone that votes are weighed by quantity rather than measured in quality, they would prefer at heart to keep the club membership exclusive.

Once anyone decides to be a party man he must create for himself an image of his party that allows him to live comfortably with it. Thus, according to Javits, the Republicans are the party of Henry Stimson, Robert La Follette, Fiorello LaGuardia, and George Norris. Such a depiction is what the psychologists call "selective perception": it leaves out Karl Mundt. Similarly the Democrats become an admixture of Tammany Hall, the Ku Klux Klan, A. Mitchell Palmer, and John Nance Garner. And why not? Only if we engage in such good-humored caricatures, deluding no one but ourselves, can we vote a straight party ticket with a straight face.

JAVITS HAS ALWAYS been a Republican. His father was an Orchard Street janitor, who got two dollars from Tammany Hall for each vote he delivered from his tenements. "I saw at close hand the evils of the Tammany-run Democratic machine in New York City —its flabbiness, its corruption, its cynical exploitation of the needs and hopes of immigrants like my family and neighbors." Being repelled by Tammany has not made Republicans out of many New Yorkers. Yet Javits chose the Republicans and stuck with them. He voted for Herbert Hoover in 1928, not for Al Smith. He voted for Hoover again in 1932, not for Franklin Roosevelt. In 1936 he supported Landon, and in 1960 he lined up with Nixon rather than Kennedy.

Yet no matter how Javits votes in the polling booth, his voting record as a Senator hardly differs from that of liberal Democrats like Joseph Clark and Paul Douglas. On the face of it either of these men could have written *Order of Battle,* with only the most marginal of changes. But one thing does distinguish Republicans from Democrats, however liberal both of them may be. Liberal Democrats are essentially anti-business. They believe the values of business to be inherently corrupting and the steadfast pursuit of profit a barrier to the achievement of a rational society. Such Democrats are especially mistrustful of our large corporations, and they are at their best in conducting investigations of business skulduggery. It is here, and only here, that Javits parts company with them. He can be enlisted in liberal causes on all fronts save that which seriously criticizes the business community. For he is willing to assert, perhaps more candidly than are conservative Republicans, that theirs is "the party of business":

> "Business," properly understood, is so central to every aspect of our civilization that Republicans should proudly anounce that they are indeed "the party of business."

It is not clear whether Javits, when campaigning for re-election, makes this proud announcement on Lenox Avenue or outside the gates of the U. S. Steel factories in Buffalo. But he does tell us here, using Jacques Barzun for authority, that the "businessmen" of Greece and Rome and the Renaissance were the underwriters of art, culture, and humane learning. Whether General Electric and Gulf Oil are to be cast as the new Medici is not made clear. Javits does suggest that the Republicans—"as the party of business" —can take a more effective lead in the civil rights struggle than can the Democrats.

He may have a point. What Negroes want is simply to be admitted to a society that has hitherto denied them full membership. This is the meaning of "integration." Yet Negro Americans will never be equal citizens until they can move as freely as white Americans can. No amount of civil rights bills will overcome the fact that the great majority of Negroes will continue to be ghetto-bound for many years to come. Integrated neighborhoods are out of the question for the foreseeable future because there just are not enough whites—liberal or otherwise—willing to live alongside Negroes. And so long as neighborhoods are either black or white, so will be schools and so will be people. But U. S. Steel and General Electric are in a position to do what white liberals cannot do. Being autocratic enterprises they can, without having to worry about the consequences, hire and upgrade Negroes. And these corporations, arms of "the party of business," can do more for the cause of civil rights by putting white collars on several tens of thousands of Negroes than does all the lip service of liberal Democrats who scurry back to the other side of town at night. Better and steadier jobs are not integration; but they will have to do until the day comes when white Americans are willing to have darker-skinned Americans as their neighbors. Considering that Republicans like Roman Hruska voted for the 1964 Civil Rights Act, it may be that Republican executives at General Motors will follow suit.

In 1946 Javits agreed to serve as his party's candidate for the House of Representatives. The district, stretching from Columbia to the Cloisters, was and is a Democratic stronghold. Yet Javits won it in the four straight elections he contested—after which it reverted to its rightful owners. In 1954 he branched out to run for Attorney General of New York State and defeated a Franklin Delano Roosevelt (Jr.) by almost 200,000 votes. Javits's initial successes, first in Manhattan in 1946 and on a statewide basis eight years later, were due more than anything else to the ethnic grapevine.

I NEVER CEASE to be impressed by how rapidly the word gets around. It took only a few months for the hundred thousand or so voters of the 21st district to find out that there was a new candidate named Javits running for Congress. And it took them only a few weeks to persuade themselves to vote for this newcomer even though he was on the Republican ticket. Who tells whom is not clear. But the word gets quickly relayed. And in 1954, even in the wilds of Utica and Binghamton, key voters were apprised of the Manhattan Representative who wanted to go to Albany as Attorney General. It needs no sample survey to know that Ja-

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vits wins because Jewish Democrats cross over to support him. Most Jews are safely in the Democratic column and—unlike other groups—are not usually considered as a "swing" vote susceptible to wooing by a Republican. But Javits has pulled it off. I have looked at the seven Democrats he has successively defeated, and I am convinced that all of them would have compiled records just as liberal as Javits's had they been elected in his place.

We—and by this I mean virtually every New York Jew—not only vote for Javits but, more significantly, we don't even give his opponent a second look. How many would defect were he slightly more conservative, say like Kenneth Keating, is impossible to say. But I don't think many. It is still a fact in 1964 that unassimilated ethnic groups want one of their own kind in public office, and the higher the office the better. The desire for such symbolic representation is in a sense pre-political. For in settling for an ethnic emblem, voters are trading their ballot at a rate far below what they might otherwise command for it. Yet there is no calculus telling us how to compare the psychic gratifications of an ethnic victory with the political pay-offs that might be had from electing representatives not of our own origins. Considering that the Boston Irish have ended up with a Teddy Kennedy, the Cleveland Poles with a Frank Lausche, and the Chicago Negroes with a William Dawson, New York's Jews have not done badly at all.

IF YOU DON'T WEAKEN

THE SCARPERER. By BRENDAN BEHAN. *Doubleday. 158 pp. $3.95.*

Reviewed by THOMAS F. CURLEY

They took me to the cell, and beat me in the face, slaps but not punches. The punches they gave me in the ribs, in the kidneys, and once or twice they hit me across the face with a bunch of keys, but concentrated mostly on the guts and a few kicks in my arse, when they sent me sprawling across the room . . .

My face was not too bad, nothing noticeable, though my lip was cut on the inside where I got the blow of the bunch of keys, and I could feel the blood going down my throat and sickening me. I was also now being sickened, and a cold clammy sweat was coming out on my hands and on my forehead now in delayed action for the fright I hadn't had time to have when they were dragging me up the stairs and belting me in the cell. I wiped the sweat off, too, and then got a kind of sick bilious headache, and I wanted to have a s - - t, and so I did in quick time on the pot and wiped myself and had the cover on and was up and about again in no time, when the door opened and a prisoner and a screw stood in the doorway. They had a parcel of books, and the prisoner handed me two and wrote my name on a card.

In any event I should have a read, and a read every week, and a kind of payday to look forward to when they changed the books; and, thinking these thoughts, I had the cell, between bedclothes and all, laid out and tidied up, and I gave myself another rub with the cold fresh water and had a look at myself in the mirror and I looked all right, except my mouth was a bit bloody with a thin red line around the edge of it, but I wiped that off too and then let myself have a look at the books.

It's a queer world, God knows, but the best we have to be going on with.

THIS is from *Borstal Boy,* and I quote it at such length because it is a good example of the late Brendan Behan's sensibility. He presents the brutality and the subsequent fear but does not linger over them. As soon as he sees the books, he is all right again: "Better than a dozen of stout it was to see them there, the books." His comment on the experience is his most personal comment on life. A queer world it is and a cruel one, but not as sick as a totally evil one. No one was freer than Behan from intellectual hatred and no one could hate more directly and spontaneously. And only Behan, I suppose, could have gotten away with writing, as recently as a few years ago, "Oh, my America, oh, my new-found land. The man that hates you hates the human race."

I suppose any candid "History of Behan in America" would have to admit that his personality overshadowed his work. He was so well liked he was not taken with that high seriousness which, according to St. Matthew, is the essence of great art. One should not claim too much for Behan, but I think here in America we have mistaken his worth. His vision of evil was not fashionable and, despite his youthful revolutionary activities and writings, he was a man of neither the Right nor the Left, although, of course, if he was choosing he'd lead with the Left. "If I skint, I'd sooner be skint in the Bowery than in Westchester County. The Bowery is more civilized and the conversation is better." That, of course, is not political, just common sense.

Behan wrote *The Scarperer* in 1953, the same period as *The Quare Fellow,* and it was serialized in the Irish *Times* under the pseudonym of Emmet Street. In an afterword, Rae Jeffs tells us that Behan wrote under a phony name because at the time he was not in the good graces of the Dublin intelligentsia who had seen some pieces of pornography that he'd written for French magazines—"in English, of course."

The scarperer of the title is one who engineers jail breaks for pay. The particular jail break of this story, however, has a twist. The prisoner to be sprung, The Limey, has promised to pay as soon as he gets back to England. The Scarperer has another plan. He springs The Limey only to drown him off Dieppe; and he drowns him because he looks so much like a French criminal, Pierre le Fou, who, when The Limey's body is found, will be officially dead and therefore free. The plan works perfectly. The prisoners escape; The Limey is murdered; Pierre le Fou pays off handsomely—in counterfeit franc notes. This deception, however, is not discovered until both unlucky Pierre and The Scarperer are dead of bullet wounds, thanks to an elderly lady named Aunt Jeannie who had suspected The Scarperer and his mates of slaughtering horses, had called them murderers to their faces and been slapped for it. Far from rejoicing at having brought killers to justice, Aunt Jeannie is troubled—"It just happened that instead of preventing men's cruelty to dumb beasts, I was assisting at the mystery of their cruelty to each other."

"Well, we all were put in the way of helping the police."

"Let us go and eat and drink and we'll—"

"Forget it."

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Behan does not identify the speakers after Aunt Jeannie's remarks. The words are meant as the briefest of comments on what is bad and cannot be helped. And if we consider Behan's work, *The Quare Fellow, The Hostage, Borstal Boy* and *The Scarperer* (I haven't read or seen *The Big House*), we notice that it all has to do with the mystery of men's cruelty to each other. Aunt Jeannie regrets having assisted at it; Behan has celebrated it, and while by celebrate I mean primarily the marking and memorializing of an occasion, I would not wish to avoid entirely the suggestion of joy. It is a defiant joy, a joy that recognizes cruelty as an inescapable condition of life as we know it and refuses, on that account, to cash in the chips.

Behan's vision of evil was not complex, but it had incisiveness and integrity. It lay behind his comedy, his dialogue—sinuous and slangy and singing—his good-natured bawdry, and it became his means of celebrating a world that is queer, by God, but the best we have.

THE NEW NATIONS

THE MORNING AFTER: A STUDY OF INDEPENDENCE. By BRIAN CROZIER. *Oxford University Press. 290 pp. $7.50.*

Reviewed by ROGER OWEN

LAST JANUARY in East Africa there were three army mutinies and a successful revolution. The British dealt promptly and efficiently with the mutinies, flying in troops at the invitation of the local governments. Later, when it was all over, a letter of thanks from President Nyerere of Tanganyika—always the gentleman—was read out in the House of Commons. In Britain a faint air of self-congratulation, perhaps even a shiver of old imperial feeling, could be sensed. But the British Government couldn't or wouldn't do anything about the revolution in Zanzibar. "Field Marshal" Okello, a grotesque version of the military strongman of many underdeveloped countries, ranted over the Zanzibar radio. In Britain, the exiled Sultan, now the British Government's pensioner, moved sad-eyed and melancholy down a hierarchy of English hotels. By the time the revolution in his native land was seen to be a fact, the Sultan had declined to a genteel boarding house on the South Coast—a fate one might wish on someone more evidently villainous. The spectacle of his decline was a nice indication of British realism.

The convulsions which shook East Africa were also a reminder, if one was needed, of the problems the new countries face and pose—the theme of Mr. Crozier's book. One of the truths that emerges from that book (written before the events I have mentioned) and from the events themselves is that the very idea of a nation-state, as we are accustomed to think of it, only loosely applies. Words themselves fail. In what sense are they countries? Zanzibar (now linked in an uneasy union with Tanganyika) has a population smaller than that of Seattle. The "armies" which mutinied consisted in their entirety of a few battalions. National boundaries derive from administrative caprice—even accident—and are devoid of geographical, racial, or cultural significance. Their budgets are smaller than those of many Western towns. Their leaders are young and inexperienced, their populations are largely illiterate. Their "infrastructure"—roads, railways, industries that form the obvious features of a modern environment—is pathetically thin. And finally, they lack that agreed body of common ideas and assumptions which in the West provides the essential context of social and political discourse.

THEIR PRIMARY and urgent task is, however factitiously, to create this context. It is hard for those of us who live in societies which have it to imagine societies which don't. Some people in Britain, for example, drew comfort from the a-political character of the army mutinies I mentioned, which were in effect armed pay claims. I would say that when armies mutiny in the underdeveloped countries *without* a political purpose, then it is time to begin worrying. That way chaos lies. The revolution in Zanzibar corrected the distribution of power in the interests of the majority, and even though it was executed militarily by a near lunatic, it made a kind of sense. The mutinies, on the other hand, were in their way more fundamentally disruptive and their being non-political is a clue to the kind of non-society which produced them.

These pessimistic thoughts are prompted and confirmed by Mr. Crozier, a widely traveled journalist who works for *The Economist*. He has written a kind of guide book of disappointment, a journalist's threnody on a theme which was once enunciated by Yeats:

> *Parnell came down the road, he said to a cheering man,*
> *"Ireland shall have her freedom, and you still break stone."*

Mr. Crozier's intentions are plain enough. That of his title, for example, is to suggest that the dawn of freedom in the underdeveloped countries of Africa and Asia brings not so much a rosy glow of content as an irritated hangover after the euphoria of the night before. Slogans and promises—so necessary to keep an unsophisticated mass movement like African or Asian nationalism going—lose some of their heady excitement when they have to be acted on. The new men are left to face the hard facts of disease, poverty, ignorance, and hunger, to try to accommodate the soaring expectations which they themselves have encouraged.

However, the hangover metaphor is not entirely apt. Mr. Crozier would admit that there is *some* hope in the dawn and the new nations are proud and glad of their freedom. But as his title indicates, he is eager to deflate the attitudes of the "Western Liberals," particularly their "uncritical identification" with anti-colonialism. They need to be given "a look at things as they really are." Now the trouble with exposing liberals to the cruelty of truth is that it has been done so often and is in danger of degenerating into a technique. Mr. Crozier is sometimes guilty of using this tech-

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nique: for example, in his brief account of the Congo debacle, he can't see "why it should have been immoral for the Katanga to secede from the Congo and moral for Dr. Banda's Nyasaland to secede from the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland." He suggests that it is because the reviling of Tshombe was "fashionable." But Mr. Crozier's sense of fact, which is a good one and which he would hold to be the special glory of his kind of outlook, for once lets him down. He hasn't as he thinks exposed another liberal hypocrisy. The two positions cannot be "contradictory," since they were proffered solutions to two different situations, and not abstract propositions in logic (or morals). I think that the case for Nyasaland's secession was a good one. Mr. Crozier's case for Tshombe should have been argued on its merits, but he evades this task by an exercise in liberal-baiting.

The Morning After has other defects. The writing is sometimes slapdash and clumsy, and a good deal of the straight reporting which gives the book weight is only loosely related to the line of argument. The argument, however, is a good one, enforced with much knowledge and particularly with common sense. I haven't seen so explicit a statement of the truth that "a seat in the United Nations and chauffeur-driven Cadillacs for the boys" is at least one element in the drive for independence. What is refreshing about Mr. Crozier is that he can see that this is so, see too that it is not the whole truth, and also point out that these are "legitimate and humanly understandable aspirations." I would have added that in underdeveloped countries the opportunities and perquisites of government office are often not available in other spheres, and to this extent they can exert a dangerous and unhealthy attraction.

MR. CROZIER argues that many of the new states are not "independent" at all, in any profitable sense of the word. Some have foreigners playing a crucial part in their civil service; some have armies "advised" and even led by foreigners; most don't pay their way and many, as in the case of the former colonies of French Africa, depend on large subventions from the old imperial power. One consequence of this is that the policies which they have pursued have often been assertions of an independence which they felt to be lacking in substance; attempts on the part of their leaders to prove that their countries were indeed free. (This, by the way, is why they need their neutralism—and should be allowed it.) Assertiveness has led to "pointless acts of defiance"—Bourguiba's blockade of the French naval base at Bizerte; Indonesia's self-destructive expulsion of the Dutch. Mr. Crozier mars a good point by including Nasser's take-over of the Suez Canal in this catalogue of irrationality. He rather likes to make patterns, and he sometimes loses sight of the living diversity which is there beneath the common verbal currency of politics—"movements," "situations," "new developments."

But many of the patterns are undeniably to be found. Mr. Crozier is able to show that again and again policies bred out of nationalist sentiment, out of old wrongs felt or real, and inspired by touchy, inflated ideas of national dignity, have done damage. The impulse to industrialize, for example, in which such feelings play a large part, has often got out of hand. Factories which can hardly be manned and only indifferently managed, are built to make products at a cost greater than the imported one would have been. And Mr. Crozier might have added that the favored industries are frequently those sophisticated and prestigious ones which require most handling. It has been reported that there are two electron microscopes in Burma, both of them not working. When the Kenyans, as they intend, have turned some of the "white highlands" into African small-holdings, they will only be solving a short-term problem. Productivity is likely to decline, and with it the capacity to accumulate urgently needed investment capital from taxation.

The author is worried but sensible about the failure of democracy in the new states. It is a fact that poor and illiterate populations encourage the demagogue even more than rich and half-educated ones. It is a fact that two-party systems don't flourish in societies where the dissensions are more profound than the agreed pieties. And there is a quite literal sense in which some Asian and African countries can't afford opposition because they consume, for no immediate end, valuable administrative talent.

Mr. Crozier believes that it is more important that governments should do nothing to discourage foreign investment and enterprise at home than that they should be formally democratic. He is contemptuous of the kind of government planning which he thinks inhibits private development. His case against planning, though, is really a case against bad planning, of which anyone can readily find examples. It seems to me that the real truth which is demonstrated by the frequent failure of planning in the underdeveloped countries is not that socialism is wicked, which is what Mr. Crozier seems to infer. It is rather the same, simple truth that is demonstrated by the failure of democracy as well—namely, that it is hard to transplant things. The kind of facts, such as reliable statistics, which planning requires, aren't there. Further, all the delicate skills, habits, attitudes, and even moral ideas which serve a modern society can be acquired only in the way we know them to have been acquired. And this is in the gradual piecemeal response to felt needs and changing circumstance. The human attributes which make a modern society work are broadly and deeply based on its own rhythms and complexities. They are part of an industrial tradition and they can't be stuck on from outside.

In the meantime the rich get rich and some of the poor get even poorer. Mr. Crozier, who dedicates his book with feeling to "the peoples of the newly independent countries," seems to be saying that in the long run our responsibility to the poor countries is a moral one. On the other

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hand, the prevention of trouble is in our interest. There is no doubt that poverty leads to instability which in some countries shows itself in militancy and virulence in dealing with others. Mr. Crozier has some hard things to say about Indonesia here. Though I am often put off by Mr. Crozier's tendency to lump together the African societies with the Asian ones, it seems to me that Indonesia, curiously, is both the typical ex-colonial country and the most "African" of the Asian ones. It has no natural unity; its leadership was ill-prepared; it contains large racial minorities; it has lost a good deal of European skill; and finally its leader is a man embittered by past experience. It is appropriate that Indonesia should have been the begetter of the Bandung Conference, where the Afro-Asian world first explored and tried to articulate its sense of identity. What is possible, too, is that the way Indonesia is behaving now may pre-figure the way in which some of the new African states *will* behave. Thus, it is in the interests of the West, without hope of gratitude or political fidelity, to assist the new nations in their effort to achieve stability. It is likely to be a long haul.

IDOLS OF THE LAB

SCIENCE: THE GLORIOUS ENTERTAINMENT. By JACQUES BARZUN. *Harper & Row. 307 pp. $6.00.*

Reviewed by A. R. LOUCH

A PERSON reading Jacques Barzun's new book might well have misgivings about sending his children to college at all. He might also wonder how Barzun justifies the academic activities that go on under his own direction at Columbia University. For the bulk of this book is an exposé of the follies, absurdities, and downright drivel that passes for a liberal education in the average American university. A parent of a college student might feel reasonably confident that his child is picking up a decent amount of mathematics and natural science, if he takes those subjects. But in the social sciences and psychology, he will acquire an oppressive jargon that masks obvious truths and frantically accumulate statistics for their own sake, since the results of such activities are tidy and definite, however trivial. If the prospective student elects the humanities he does not fare any better. He learns only how easy it is to impose, quite mechanically, so-called "interpretations" indiscriminately on any work of art; all he has to do is bone up on simple-minded formulations of Freudian psychology, Greek mythology, or some other master plan. And, as with the business of criticism within the academy, so with the business of creation on its fringes. Art, too, has become the mechanical application of arbitrary blueprints, like the solution of so many engineering problems.

This story is told by Barzun with great wit and an ironic flair for the most telling and destructive examples. It is a story he has told before, in *The House of Intellect,* but it is well worth telling again. There is, surely, something radically wrong with the behavioral sciences, the humanities, and much that passes for art. And, what is worse, the absurdities exposed by Barzun are usually sponsored by foundation money.

I could thus endorse Barzun's exposé without qualification if it were not for two further aspects of his book. First, he is not content merely to catalogue academic ills, he wishes also to diagnose them. And second, he wishes to extend both catalogue and diagnosis beyond academic walls to that favorite target of so much mushy thinking nowadays, the predicament of modern man. On the first point, it is indeed possible to see, as Barzun does see, in the grotesque practices of behavioral scientists and humanists, an excessive admiration of science and its methods. And so science comes to play a central role in Barzun's diagnosis. He reminds us in his title chapter that science has allure. It involves the fun of discovery, the imaginativeness of great art, and the satisfaction of being able to say, "It works." No wonder the rest of the academic community tries to follow suit. But the trouble with those who have slavishly emulated what they have supposed to be the methods of science is not that they have extended the bounds of scientific knowledge, but that they have merely parodied scientific procedures. Thus, it would be wrong to blame science for these atrocities, though the success of science may be the occasion for the virulence and epidemic proportions of the disease of science-aping. It is unfortunate that Barzun uses metaphors like "the imperialism of science" and places science in his argument in such a way as to suggest that it is the villain of the piece, bent on a vast conspiracy to usurp the functions and seize the territories of the humane studies. If there is usurpation it is from within; and social scientists, humanists, and artists are wholly responsible for it. Perhaps Barzun intended to say something like this, but his preoccupation with science as some brooding and menacing figure glowering at all its neighbors makes him rather prone to enter the lists of the pro- and anti-science tournament, described by Sir Charles Snow in *The Two Cultures.*

BUT EVEN if his argument is stated with greater care, it becomes nothing short of absurd when applied outside the university to the general ailments that beset modern man. Are we to believe that divorce rates, juvenile delinquency, the breakdown of the family, etc., etc., are the consequences of science-aping? We speak of life as being standardized and mechanized, of course, and deplore the fact that we seem addicted to asking always "how much," "how many," or "how often" of anything that requires our judgment, but there seems at best to be only a punning likeness between mechanized lives and the science of mechanics. Science may have made possible the proliferation of the tangible things that we in turn prize for their tangibility, but it is more difficult to accuse the scientific attitude of being responsible for our habit of prizing whatever is tangible or measurable.

Barzun responds to these strains on his thesis by shifting it. We

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discover that it is not science after all that is at fault, but "techne," by which Barzun means that way of life promoted by industrial society and the machines on which it is built. This, too, is a familiar theme that leads readily to hysterical reactions against the very idea of industrial society. Barzun does not wish to join that chorus of shrill voices either, for industrial society is here to stay, a condition of life to which we simply have to adjust. The threats of mechanization and automation have some relevance, no doubt, to those standardized and mechanized elements in modern living that he deplores. But then it is not clear what all this has to do with the other three-quarters of his book in which he deplores practices in the academic establishment. He appeals to a number of whole or half truths—science is responsible for industrial progress, industrial progress has created the horrors of modern life, the successes of science have worked mischief in the academic establishment. Science keeps reappearing and so it is used as the thread to unite arguments of quite different point and purpose.

THERE IS much in Barzun's book, however, that suggests a common theme. There are ways in which his various cases do seem to resemble one another, though he is prevented from noticing them by his insistence on the slogan that we live in a scientific age. His examples, however, suggest less an addiction to science than a devotion to success. We hanker in ordinary life after the tokens of obvious, measurable achievement, however thin the satisfaction; and, as behavioral scientists, critics, or artists, we pursue the methods that insure us definite and measurable, if trivial, results—the two or ten steps to successful prediction, control, or the fashioning of marketable products. If we look to his examples rather than his thesis, we would be forced to conclude that we do not live in a scientific age at all, but we regard science, along with everything else, as of cash-value interest to youngsters on the intellectual make. The significance of what we do—either as persons seeking some measure of satisfaction for ourselves and those around us or as intellectuals attempting to illuminate and understand the world—falls into the background, if not into positive disrepute. All of this, I venture to say, has little to do with the scientific enterprise, though much, perhaps, with a scheme of commercial values that some aspects of scientific work embody.

SUCH A diagnosis would put Barzun's various complaints into a common focus. That he fails to do so is due to his tendency to look at human problems generally through a screen of academic problems. Within the university his diagnosis of science-aping is sound; moreover, it suggests just the remedy at which Barzun hints in his last chapter, where he reminds us that there are many modes of thought. Science is one; law, for example, is another. Law, too, is an admirably chosen instance with which to counter the tendency to think that rational procedures are exhausted by the methods of natural science. For law is an instance of a non-scientific use of reason which is at the same time highly disciplined. In short, in marking off the limits of scientific method, we do not reduce what lies outside those bounds to a chaos of mere sentiment and intuition.

It is thus a pity that so much sound criticism and such a suggestive remedy should be confused and distorted by Barzun's attempt to string all his complaints on the thread of science. Many in the scientists' camp will be offended by the suggestion that science is, in some subtle way, responsible for these ills, and reject this book as another anti-scientific tract, confirming their suspicion of humanistic follies. And members of the humanist camp, already nervous in the presence of science, will use Barzun's criticism as an excuse for all sorts of muddy thinking, just because it is not scientific and so cannot be judged on rational grounds. It may not have been Barzun's intention to widen the gulf between scientists and humanists; indeed, much of his book could be thought of as a quite important remapping of the geography of that gulf. But he cannot quite free himself of the clichés about our scientific age, and so his map is blurred, in outline as well as detail. It is especially unfortunate that he should have allowed himself to be distracted by such old saws when his criticism of contemporary intellectual life is so trenchant.

BOOK REVIEWERS IN THIS ISSUE

DAVID T. BAZELON, *the author of* The Paper Economy, *is a member of the Institute for Policy Studies.*

ANDREW HACKER *teaches government at Cornell University and writes frequently on American politics.*

THOMAS F. CURLEY *contributed "Catholic Novels and American Culture" to our July 1963 issue.*

ROGER OWEN *is an educational adviser to the BBC.*

A. R. LOUCH, *a new contributor, is a member of the philosophy department at U.C.L.A.*

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

Robert Weaver On Writing

BECAUSE THE O'LEARY Royal Commission investigation of Canadian magazines took no account of conditions in other countries, it was finally unable adequately to describe or explain the huge gaps that exist in Canada's periodical press merely by saying that it's a small country too close to the United States for its intellectual health.

A certain kind of magazine faces problems everywhere, and the only way in which some gaps are closed in such big countries as England and the United States is with subsidies provided by wealthy organizations or individuals. "The New Republic," the American journal of opinion which is now more than 40 years old, has been sup[redacted] in its time by several wealthy families. "[redacted]" was subsidized in the same fashion for [redacted] years before it finally got into the black.

The two best monthlies in the English-speaking world have been published under similar conditions. "Commentary" is backed by the American Jewish Committee, and the English "Encounter" was founded and subsidized for a number of years by the Congress for Cultural Freedom.

FINE MAGAZINES

What these organizations have received in return for their support are fine magazines that have enlarged the general climate of opinion, and that could not have existed if they had had no other resources than circulation and advertising revenues.

In recent years, under young editor Norman Podhoretz, "Commentary" has entered a vintage period. Its February issue is typical of its excellence. There is the usual generous, serious, but lively section of letters from its readers. There are two stories published for the first time, by the Russian-Jewish writer Isaac Babel, who disappeared and presumably died during the Stalinist purges of the thirties. There is a first-rate analysis of the history and influence of the English weekly "New Statesman," which has just celebrated its fiftieth anniversary.

The centre-piece of the February "Commentary" is an article by a German-born writer Guenter Lewy about the background of the play "The Deputy," in which Pope Pius XII is shown as failing to do what he might have done to save some of the European Jews from the Nazis. The article is critical of the Pope, but it is a good deal more critical of the German hierarchy.

ABRASIVE JOURNALISM

It is an article that is bound to trouble or anger Roman Catholics. But it is exactly the kind of abrasive, serious journalism that justifies the existence of magazines like "Commentary."

"Commentary" is a better magazine than "Encounter" because the latter's editorial direction is erratic. Its February issue is not a particularly striking one. But it includes a memoir of Hugh Gaitskell, a story by the very talented Dan Jacobson, and an interesting autobiographical fragment about East Africa by a native refugee from South Africa. Anyone who suspects that subsidies are the enemy of creativity ought to read these magazines.

OF ALL SUBSIDIZED magazines, the one with the most exotic angel is "The Paris Review," which is published by the Aga Khan. Its Winter-Spring issue celebrates its tenth anniversary with a bumper selection of drawings, short stories, and poems by younger poets.

The anniversary issue also includes two of the literary interviews which the magazine has featured since its beginning, and which have been published in book form with the title "Writers at Work." This time two obsessive novelists from different generations are interviewed: the Frenchman Louis-Ferdinand Celine, who died a couple of years ago after a stormy life, and Norman Mailer. A fascinating and logical coupling.

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as long as you're up get me a Grant's



Would you please. That's right. The bottle with the 8 on it. Because it's 8 years old. And that's how long I think it takes to smooth out a Scotch. As long as you're at it why not join me? Thanks. Cheers love.

The light and legendary eight-year-old blended Scotch Whisky in the triangular bottle. Bottled in Scotland. 86 proof. Imported to the United States by Austin, Nichols & Co., New York. ©1964

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